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Short Abstract
There is a distinction between physiological and psychological aspects of addiction. Both of 
which are important for the development and maintenance of substance abuse. Within 
psychological aspects of addiction, attention and learning may play integral roles in 
substance abuse behaviour. This thesis explores how an environment seems to become 
increasingly occupied by substance-related stimuli, as a result of substance use (Chapter 5). 
It is demonstrated how such stimuli are able to initially attract attention (Chapter 2.6) and 
such attentional biases are difficult to inhibit (Chapter 2). Such attentional biases appear to 
be robust behaviours which are not overly affected by craving and outcome expectancies 
(Chapter 3). Moreover, it is discussed how attentional biases may be associated with 
automaticity development (Chapter 6). This research is performed using a dyslexic 
population, as dyslexia has been hypothesised as an impairment in automaticity 
development. Therefore a population potentially impaired in automaticity development 
may demonstrate different patterns of substance-related attentional bias, compared to 
control participants (Chapter 6.6). This means that a deeper understanding of how 
automaticity develops for some stimuli rather than others may be beneficial for the study of 
substance abuse (Chapter 7). Finally, it is suggested how substance abuse interventions may 
benefit from closer consideration of the attentional and learning aspects of addiction 
(Chapter 8).
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Extended Abstract
This thesis examines various aspects o f substance abuse behaviour. Although the majority of 
data collected within this thesis is from heavy users, and not abusers, this is a common 
approach within the literature (e.g. Cox, Fadardi, and Pothos, 2006; Pothos and Cox, 2002) 
and does bear implications for substance abusing populations. In particular, the topics 
investigated are attentional biases, cognitive biases, and automaticity. The intention is to 
illustrate that substance use behaviours are partly maintained by attentional biases and 
develop through automatic skill learning.
A cognitive bias is a distortion in judgement. This can lead to perceptual 
misrepresentation. Some cognitive biases can be classified as an attentional bias. An 
attentional bias is an increase in attention for a certain stimulus. Alcohol-related attentional 
biases have been found to be important in alcohol abuse. Indeed the strength of attentional 
bias can be a good predictor of future alcohol use (e.g. Cox, Pothos, Hosier, 2007). Yet are 
attentional biases a by-product of alcohol abuse, or do they play a causal role? If the latter 
then understanding attentional biases may help with alcohol abuse treatment. In order to 
improve understanding in this area, closer consideration was needed to the nature of 
attentional biases, and the methodologies used in their measurement. In Chapter 2, there is 
clarification of the distinction between initial orienting of attention and attentional capture. 
The thesis then considers the problems with eye tracking experiments which manipulate 
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA: e.g. Noel et a!., 2006) for the measurement of initial 
orienting of attention. This chapter argues that by manipulating variables associated with 
attentional capture insights can be gained into inhibitory control over alcohol-related 
attentional biases. Thus the fixed gaze inhibition task was created using eye tracking 
technology. This task made use of a gaze-contingency paradigm to measure propensity of 
inhibition for attentional biases. The results of this novel task suggest that attentional biases 
for alcohol related information are not just prioritised by the heavy drinker, but may also be 
compulsory.
So are current attentional bias tasks truly capable of measuring the initial orienting 
of attention? Experiment 2 in Chapter 2 empirically explores this idea. Initial orienting of 
attention had previously only been observed in the anxiety attentional bias literature or
(arguably) in abstinent alcoholics. This is considered to be due to the motivational 
properties that these stimuli would develop within high anxiety populations differing from 
the motivational properties within heavy drinking populations. This experiment used the 
same method and data as Experiment 1, but adopted a different approach to analysing the 
data. Here it was demonstrated that it was the initial orienting of attention that it was 
possible to measure with this attentional bias task, rather than a delayed disengagement of 
attention. This distinction refers to the difference between the grabbing and holding of 
attention. Previously only the delayed disengagement (attentional holding) of attention had 
been demonstrated within the substance abuse attentional bias literature. The observation 
of an initial orienting of attention has important implications for craving and substance 
seeking behaviour.
Within Chapter 2 it is demonstrated that following the development of an 
attentional bias for alcohol related information, the heavy drinker is unable to inhibit their 
attention from being distracted by alcohol stimuli. It was also demonstrated that, not only 
do alcohol-related stimuli hold attention (e.g. Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006), but that such 
stimuli can also grab attention. These results, combined with the knowledge that alcohol- 
related stimuli can lead to craving and substance seeking (e.g. Tiffany, 1990), would suggest 
that heavy drinkers in the presence of alcohol-stimuli would have their attention grabbed 
and would be unable to inhibit such a process. There could potentially be a lack of 
awareness between the link between seeing alcohol stimuli and substance seeking. This 
chapter therefore has important implications for the way that substances (e.g. alcohol and 
cigarettes) are advertised, as mere exposure to substance-related stimuli has the potential 
to lead to substance seeking, a process that may be unavoidable for some.
Within attentional bias tasks it is standard procedure to compare two groups, e.g., 
heavy versus light drinkers (see Chapter 2). However, within Chapter 3, a within-subjects 
design was employed in order to look at the effects of craving and outcome expectancies in 
order to see whether these factors would have any within-subjects effects upon attentional 
biases (these are variables which have previously been demonstrated to affect attentional 
biases). Both alcohol users and MDMA users were examined, as research would suggest that 
MDMA use leads to varying levels of craving and outcome expectancies. Three different 
attentional bias measures were used, as well as measures of craving and outcome
expectancies. This study potentially demonstrated an attentional bias with MDMA users for 
the first time. The hypothesis regarding fluctuating attentional biases was not supported. 
This chapter therefore may demonstrate the potential robustness of attentional bias.
Attentional biases are potentially one aspect of an internal state that has developed 
through repeated substance administration (review; Field & Cox, 2008). This internal state 
could lead to a cognitive bias where a number of cognitive faculties would be affected. 
Associations and expectancies regarding alcohol use have been found to motivate 
behaviour. Such neurocognitive structures are analogous to memory. Associations and 
expectancies develop automatically with the abstraction of information from the 
environment and guide future behaviour. As associations develop, propositional links 
develop automatically across the network which would lead to biases developing in a sense 
that positive and salient information regarding behaviour becomes strengthened. The study 
of memory-based biases may therefore be a measure of both implicit and explicit 
components of substance abuse, as positive alcohol-associations may intrude on memory 
(e.g. Rather et al. 1992) causing cognitive biases. Tiffany (1990) argued that the alcoholic's 
environment would become perceived as becoming increasingly occupied by alcohol-related 
stimuli, due to stimuli becoming increasingly associated with alcohol use. Chapter 4 
therefore tested the very basics of Tiffany's (1990) theory by asking participants to report 
from memory what percentage of an environment (in this case a word list) consisted of 
alcohol-related words. Thus a distorted memory for the alcohol-related words that were 
present would be indicative of a cognitive bias. This was validated by creating a food version 
of the task which was found to correlate with body mass index (BMI). A current concerns 
version of the task was however unable to produce meaningful results.
Chapter 6 examined the automatic nature of attentional biases by examining a 
population who are putatively impaired in automaticity development. Dyslexics have been 
hypothesised to have an automaticity deficit, which would explain how they find 
automatising skills difficult (Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990). If automaticity development is 
impaired in dyslexics, then they may potentially demonstrate a different pattern of 
substance use, due to the automatic nature of attentional bias formation. First it was 
examined whether dyslexics report different levels of substance use. Second, attentional
biases and automaticity development were observed. Thirdly, it was considered whether 
the automatic nature of priming would have an effect upon craving.
Firstly, a questionnaire study on dyslexics and non-dyslexic controls was performed. 
The questionnaire consisted of a number of substance use-related questions which mostly 
examined the quantity of substance use prior to the study. It was found that the dyslexic 
participants reported significantly less substance use than the non-dyslexic controls. This 
result was considered in terms of a number of possibilities; however, it was speculated that 
an automaticity deficit could potentially be the underlying cause.
In order to further test this prediction the next experiment looked at automaticity 
development and substance use attentional biases within a dyslexic population and 
compared to non-dyslexic controls. A serial reaction time task and an eye tracking measure 
were used. It was found that automaticity development did not vary between-groups. 
However, it was observed that there was a slight difference between-groups for substance 
use-related attentional biases, but the majority of findings did not support between-group 
differences. Again the importance of automaticity was discussed.
Priming has been suggested to be able to automatically elicit effects upon cognition, 
motivation, and emotion, through its influence upon processes operating outside of 
awareness (see Bargh, 1996). It was considered whether priming would have similar effects 
upon dyslexics. Dyslexics were compared to non-dyslexic controls on their reported alcohol 
cravings when they had either been primed with studying or socialising cues within a 
questionnaire. The results did not demonstrate a difference between groups. This suggests 
that dyslexics may not be affected in a different manner by primes. This is a result that does 
not support the automaticity deficit hypothesis of dyslexia. Implications for the importance 
of automaticity for substance use behaviour is discussed.
The potential importance of automaticity within substance use behaviour was 
observed. However, why do automatic associations develop for some stimuli and not 
others? Chapter 7 looked at three different reasons why some stimuli develop automatic 
associations, whilst others do not. It was considered whether manipulating three aspects of 
stimuli would have an effect on how effectively associations are learned. Experiment 1 was 
concerned with the emotional salience of the stimuli. Emotional salience did not appear to
impact on learning. Experiment 2 manipulated the perceptual richness of the stimuli, but no 
differences were identified for any of the test phase dependent variables. Finally, 
Experiment 3 examined the possibility that thinking about an association might reinforce it. 
In this case, thinking about an association was found to lead to an improved association 
between the stimuli. These results are interpreted as demonstrating that deeper processing 
may lead to stronger representations and associations with positive expectancies. Such a 
finding may have important implications for the distinction between implicit and explicit 
processes which are associated with substance abuse development.
The general findings of this thesis would demonstrate the robustness of attentional 
biases. It would appear that there are a number of factors that influence their development, 
potentially through automaticity. In the future attentional bias modification may be a useful 
form of treatment for substance abuse. Such studies have already produced positive results 
(e.g. Shoenmaker et a l, 2010). It was speculated that the inhibition fixed-gaze paradigm 
from Chapter 2 may be modified in a way that would lead to this task being developed into 
such a tool. This task is useful as it may be able to be used for training substance abusers to 
actively engage their attention away from substance-related stimuli.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
A cognitive bias is a pattern of distortion in an information processing strategy. This can lead 
to perceptual misrepresentation. Some cognitive biases can be classified as an attentional 
bias. Attentional biases have been observed in relation to substance abuse (e.g. Cox et al., 
2002; Calitri et al., 2010; Field et al., 2004; Mogg et al., 2000; Stacy, 1997). These biases 
would suggest 'preferential' treatment o f substance-related stimuli over control stimuli 
(that is, stimuli which are unrelated to  the abused substance). Such attentional biases have 
been found to have predictive value both with respect to relapse (Cox, Hoogan, Kristian, & 
Race, 2002) and changes in the patterns o f  substance abuse (for alcohol abuse; Cox, Pothos, 
Hosier, 2007). Substance-related stimuli imcrease in salience and acquire an inherent ability 
to 'hold' attention, perhaps due to the repeated exposure to substance-related cues, when 
abusing a substance (e.g. Tiffany, 1990; Robinson and Berridge, 1993). This attentional bias 
for substance-related stimuli could be du<e to the development of automatic associations 
(Tiffany, 1990) and the development of substance-related behaviours and habits (Wood and 
Neal, 2007).
1.1: Origin o f Attentional Biases
Regular substance abuse has been foundl to be associated with reactivity to substance- 
related stimuli. For example, when a he>avy alcohol abuser sees or smells an alcoholic 
beverage then they may react with increased physiological arousal and subjective craving 
(see Carter and Tiffany, 1999). Such processes are associated with the maintenance of 
substance abuse and play a role in relapse behaviour. Biases in substance abusers' cognitive 
processing of substance-related stimuli therefore may play an integral role in substance- 
seeking, craving, and relapse. However, tlhe preferential treatment and increased priority 
given to such stimuli, which leads to attenitional biases, may develop in a number of ways. 
This chapter introduces the major theories which describe psychological processes behind 
substance use behaviour and how they miay contribute to the development of attentional 
biases. It is important to state that such theories are not necessarily disparate and can 
potentially be integrated.
Tiffany (1990) proposed an attentional approach to substance abuse which 
emphasised that the learning of associations between the environment and substance 
abuse is important for subsequent substance abuse. Such associations become automatic 
and potentially not enacted within awareness. According to Tiffany (1990) the act of 
substance abuse becomes effortless and difficult to control, once it has been automatised. 
Such automatic behaviours would lead to cognitive disruption should a behaviour, namely 
of a non-automatic variety, e.g. trying to abstain, interfere with such automatic processes. 
Indeed, an alcohol abuser may have many associations between drinking and pleasurable 
emotions, everyday thoughts, and aspects of everyday routine. These associations occur 
frequently and will accordingly eventually become automatised. This would result in an 
alcohol abuser's environment becoming full of stimuli that are associated with alcohol use 
(see Chapter 5), as stimuli would automatically elicit an associated (cognitive) response. If 
this were the case then an alcohol abuser would be constantly reminded of the pleasurable 
nature of alcohol due to the automatised associations between aspects of everyday routine 
and drinking. This is supported by Rather et al. (1992), who found, using multidimensional 
scaling (MDS), that for excessive drinkers, alcohol is perceived 'close' (in psychological 
space) to positive alcohol experience, whereas this is not the case for light drinkers. 
Therefore, during periods of abstinence, a substance abuser will be constantly reminded of 
substance-related stimuli and of the pleasurable nature of substance abuse, thus eliciting 
attentional biases and urges. If this is taken for granted, then this process is likely to lead to 
the formation of associations related to an abused substance, which are triggered by the 
presentation of related stimuli. Such processes would facilitate the act of abusing the 
substance, in the presence of substance-related stimuli. This form of behaviour can be 
construed as habit learning, and emphasises the importance of automatic skill learning in 
the maintenance of substance abuse behaviour, potentially through conscious 
preoccupation with thoughts about drinking. Thus, substance abuse behaviours would tend 
to be relatively fast and efficient, effortless, elicited by specific substance-related stimuli; 
and tend to occur automatically, without a need for conscious awareness. However, if 
behaviours controlled by such substance abuse-related action schemata were to become 
impeded, then more intensive, effortful, resource-demanding processes would be initiated 
in order to rectify the current situation and return to automatic processing. Tiffany 
proposed that such nonautomatic processes underlie substance abuse urges. An
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accompanying attentional bias would therefore direct processing resources away from 
ongoing tasks and activities and toward the goal of substance abuse.
The pursuit of goals is the foundation for the next theory of substance abuse 
behaviour. The theory of current concerms (Klinger, 1975, 1977, 1987, 1996b; Klinger and 
Cox, 2004) posits that people structure the ir lives in pursuit of a number of goals. To have a 
goal is to have a current concern for the achievement of said goal. A current concern is the 
product of becoming committed to a goal and its eventual attainment or disengagement 
from; that is, a current concern is a persiistent motivational state. This motivational state 
leads to relevant information within an environment becoming sensitised and increasingly 
salient. For example, substance abusers would be thought to have a current concern for 
substance abuse. Therefore, they would have a corresponding attentional bias. A current 
concern will bias attention towards goal-related stimuli. Salient goal-related cues develop 
corresponding goal-directed responses. Current concerns have both an implicit and an 
explicit influence over behaviour: A substance abuser may be distracted by substance- 
related stimuli, which is the result o f ha ving a substance use goal. An abuser will, both 
consciously and unconsciously, focus his/her attention on goal-related substance-stimuli. 
Following the establishment of a goal and its current concern, attention towards the 
addictive substance becomes implicit and unconscious. Further evidence of this implicit 
motivation, demonstrated by Moors et al. (2005) and Winkielman, Berridge, and Wilbarger 
(2005), is that spontaneous behaviour can be influenced without awareness by 
motivationally-valued stimuli. This causes the environment to be screened for 
motivationally salient stimuli. As this salience sensitises early perceptual pathways, 
awareness may be lacking of the hypersensitivity to concern related-stimuli. Even following 
active inhibition of goal pursuit, such processes may still influence motivation. This may 
explain relapse (e.g. Mogg et al. 1995). Commitment to a goal initiates an enduring current 
concern, that although can be inhibited, iit cannot be eliminated. Current concerns about 
substance abuse would contribute to the initiation of addiction-related attentional biases. 
This attentional bias further motivates substance abuse.
Robinson and Berridge (1993) proposed a model of substance addiction based 
around the notion o f incentive-sensitisatiion. In this model addictive substances share the
ability to produce brain adaptations, these adaptations take place in neural reward systems, 
neuroadaptations render these systems hypersensitive to substances and substance-related 
paraphernalia (liking). These systems then become sensitised to mediate a subcomponent 
o f reward (wanting). The model suggests two pathways to addiction; liking, which 
undergoes tolerance, due to repeated administration - effectiveness o f the substance 
decreases due to a need to increase the dose in order to maintain effectiveness. Whereas 
wanting, undergoes behavioural sensitisation - increased effectiveness of the substance is 
observed due to repeated administration.
Substance unconditioned stimulus -> Pleasant stimulus Liking -> Pleasure
-> Affective actions
Conditioned stimulus -incen tive  Salient Attributor -> Wanting -> Craving
-> Attraction/attentional 
bias
-> Consumption
Wanting can occur implicitly and can guide behaviour without a person having 
conscious awareness of any precursory factors (Winkelman and Berridge, 2004). In addicts, 
doses of substances that are too low to produce any conscious experience of pleasure can 
activate implicit 'wanting' as indicated by an increase in substance seeking behaviour (Lamb 
et al., 1991). There are different brain mechanisms responsible for 'wanting' and 'liking', as 
hedonic 'liking' is a different psychological process and has its own neural substrate 
(Berridge, 1996).
Robinson and Berridge (2000) suggest that incentive-sensitisation processes are 
fundamental to addiction and can cause relapse. When substances are administered 
repeatedly, some effects undergo tolerance and others undergo sensitisation. There are two 
major classes of substance effects that are sensitised by addicting substances; psychomotor 
activating effects and incentive motivational effects. Both classes of substance effects are 
mediated at least in part by nucleus-accumbens-related circuitry (NAcc), therefore 
sensitisation of these behaviours is thought to reflect reorganisation and sensitisation of this 
neural system (Robinson and Berridge, 1993). Nestler and Malenka (2004) suggest that 
sensitisation may persist because chronic exposure to cocaine has been found to produce 
extra dendrites to  be produced by the neurons in the NAcc. These extra connections may
amplify signalling between linked cells wilth lasting effects, and such heightened signalling 
may cause the brain to overreact to ssubstance-related cues; suggesting a biological 
component to attentional biases. Addictiv<e substances can increase arousal, attention, and 
motor behaviour, producing increased locomotion, exploration, and approach. At high doses 
psychomotor effects can include intense repetitive stereotyped movements (Wise and 
Bozarth, 1987). Psychomotor effects are? easy to measure and are mediated by brain 
systems that overlap with those involved in reward (NAcc, dopamine, etc.: Wise and 
Bozarth, 1987). An important feature of pssychomotor sensitisation in substance abuse is its 
remarkable persistence. In animals psychmmotor sensitisation persists for months to years 
after taking the substance has ceased ((Paulson et al., 1991). Thus, if sensitisation is 
prolonged in humans, then addicts are leftt susceptible to relapse long after discontinuation 
of the substance (Strakowski et al., 1996). Context specific sensitisation has been observed 
in animals. If a substance is administered vwithin an environment which is unusual to the one 
an animal has previously been exposed tco a substance, then psychomotor sensitisation is 
not expressed (Terelli and Terry, 1998). Tfhis explains why addicts, who have abstained for 
years, can experience craving within ;a place previously associated with substance 
administration. Such observations may deemonstrate the importance of substance-related 
stimuli.
Anagnostaras and Robinson (199(6) found that rats that were repeatedly given 
substance treatments in one distinct environment developed psychomotor sensitisation. 
Subsequent substance administration wiithin a new environment leads to a failure to 
express behavioural sensitisation, again (highlighting the importance of cues. This direct 
evidence for sensitisation increasing 'wamting' for substance reward can also be seen in 
other studies. Pierre and Vezina (1998) siuggest that sensitisation decreases the threshold 
dose necessary for rats to learn to self-adrminister substances. Sensitised rats show increase 
in 'breakpoint' when treated on progresssive ratio schedules and will work harder than 
normal to get the substance i.e. they w<ant it more (Lorrain et al., 2000). Such findings 
demonstrate how factors affecting learningg can affect motivation to abuse substances.
Dickinson et al. (2000) have consisttently found that dopamine antagonists suppress 
Pavlovian-type effects. These results havee important implications for understanding what 
sensitisation does to the brain systems tthat generate motivated behaviour. Sensitisation
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enhances the ability of substance-associated cues to trigger irrational outbursts of 'wanting7 
for the reward and in human addicts may lead to the compulsive pursuit o f substances. The 
distinction between liking and wanting can result in strange dissociations in addicts, in which 
goal-directed substance seeking behaviour occurs in the absence of conscious awareness, 
and wanting is dissociated from ability of substances to produce pleasure. Addicts will 
pursue substances they do not like, as well as those they do like (Lamb et al., 1991). Even if a 
person's explicit declarative goal is abstinence, implicit incentive salience attributions, 
undermine the explicit goals. Therefore suggesting a loss of control regarding substance 
abuse when in a context associated with substance abuse. Whereas Robinson and Berridge 
(1993) suggest that a substance becomes increasingly salient, so that craving occurs in the 
presence of an associated stimulus, Tiffany (1990) suggested that it is in the absence of an 
associated stimulus, e.g. during a period of abstinence, that would lead to the greatest 
substance urges, as disruption in substance abuse habits may lead to nonautomatic 
cognitive processes, which activated in parallel with substance-use action schemata, may 
affect decision making (e.g. "I need a fix").
In contrast to hedonic/withdrawal views of addiction, Robinson and Berridge's 
incentive salience model suggests that substance pleasure becomes less and less important 
during transition to  addiction. Incentive motivational consequences of substance-induced 
alterations in NAcc-related circuitry that mediates incentive salience. Circuitry is activated 
by implicit S-R associations (Pavlovian conditioning). This results in pathological wanting 
directed especially to substance-associated cues, incentive salience attributed to these cues, 
making substance-related cues into effective triggers of relapse (Robinson and Berridge, 
1993).
Implicit 'wanting7 increased further in some addicts by substance-induced 
dysfunction in prefrontal cortical systems normally involved in decision-making, judgement, 
emotional register and inhibitory control over behaviour. An inability to assess future 
consequences of one's actions and excessive incentive salience due to sensitisation of NAcc- 
related circuitry, leads to compulsive pursuit o f s ubstances out of proportion to the pleasure 
that substances provide (Robinson and Berridge, 1998). However, evidence of sensitisation 
in humans is limited due to ethical limitations, in that it is not possible to administer high 
doses of substances of abuse (Lambert et al!., 2006). Incentive-salience suggests that
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substances become more desired, and mot necessarily liked. Following sensitisation to 
information about a substance, the subfstances attentional threshold is decreased. This 
theory would suggest that when a substamce abuser performs an emotive-Stroop task then 
semantic interference should take place.
Cognitive theories of substance aibuse maintain that context-response links may 
form a core aspect of subsequent use, following initial exposures. Robinson and Berridge 
(1993) suggest that initial 'liking7 of a subsstance may be different to 'wanting7 a substance, 
the latter having more motivational properties and associated more so with repetitive use. 
Repeated use would therefore entail rrepeated exposure to stimuli associated with 
substance abuse, which may lead to the ‘stimulus itself developing enhanced motivational 
properties. Substances influence the newral system responsible for attributing incentive 
salience, which causes the transformation of the psychological features of an ordinary 
stimulus in such a way that it become.‘s a salient stimulus. Thus, a person abusing a 
substance would become hyper-sensitiive to substance-related stimuli. Exposure to 
substance-related stimuli would then lead to increased 'wanting7, or 'craving7, for associated 
substances (potentially in the absence of Hiking). Robinson and Berridge note that incentive 
attribution can influence goal-directed beehaviour without an awareness of 'wanting7 the 
substance consciously. Thus, as substance abuse is associated with a lack of awareness, the 
theory may run in parallel with theories (of automatisation. Attentional biases would thus 
develop for salient stimuli more readily thaan for stimuli which are not salient.
Franken (2003) extended the theory of incentive salience further. He suggests that 
craving and relapse can be explained in terms of attentional bias. Incentive motivation is a 
state triggered by the perception of stimuili associated with unconditioned stimuli (Ikemoto 
& Panksepp, 1999). Evidence would siuggest that substance abusers can experience 
classically conditioned responses, when presented with substance-related stimuli. These 
responses can be both physiological and siubjective (e.g. craving: O'Brien et al., 1998; Powell 
et al., 1990). Craving is seen as a central asspect of the continuation of substance abuse and 
the occurrence of relapse in detoxified ;abusers (Everitt, 1997). Cognitive processes are 
therefore seen as an essential link betvween stimulus, pharmacological processes, and 
response (Toates, 1998). Of these coginitivte processes, attentional biases are thought to play
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an integral role as such biases are an automatic process that do not require conscious 
processing of the stimuli (Franken, 2003).
Substance-related stimuli have been found to lead to an increase in dopamine levels 
in the brain (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). Although dopamine can cause euphoric and 
pleasurable effects (e.g. Wise & Bazarth, 1985), evidence exists that would suggest that 
dopamine primarily serves to draw attention to stimuli that would predict or signal reward, 
such as substance-related stimuli (Schultz, 1998; Wickelgren, 1997). Franken (2003) 
therefore suggests that within substance abusers, attentional focusing is enhanced for 
substance-related stimuli. This, he suggests, is the result of dopaminergic activity, which can 
elicit craving and promote substance abuse.
In order to explain the role of attentional bias in craving and substance abuse 
relapse, Franken (2003) suggests a model which would predict that attentional biases 
contribute towards addictive behaviours in three ways. First, addictive-type behaviours 
would be maintained by an increased probability to perceive substance-related cues within 
an environment. This would be an automatic process which would explain the enhanced 
selection of substance cues. Perception of substance-related stimuli in this manner is 
related to conditioned responses (e.g. craving) that may trigger relapse (O'Brien, 1997). 
Second, once a substance-related cue has been detected, it is processed automatically, with 
attention affected in such a manner as to render the drawing away of attention difficult (i.e. 
attention is 'held'). Memory biases (another form of cognitive bias) may contribute to 
increases in craving (Franken, et al., 2003). It is also speculated that enhanced attentional 
processing may lead to explicit cognitive processes such as outcome expectancies for 
substances. Third, due to attentional limitations, the automatic focussing of attention on 
substance-related stimuli would lead to fewer attentional resources being available for 
competing cues. Due to the automatic nature o f this, it may be difficult for the substance 
abuser to allocate attentional resources to cognitive and behavioural avoidance strategies 
which may have been established in order to reduce substance abuse (Franken, 2003). 
Therefore, within this model, attentional biases would be seen as a mediating aspect of a 
classically conditioned association between substance-related stimuli and craving and 
relapse. This would suggest an automatic aspect to continued substance abuse (Franken, 
2003).
Field and Cox (2008) suggest an (nttegrative model of theories of substance abuse 
and attentional bias by taking this notion further. They suggest that craving and attentional 
biases have reciprocal and excitatory effects upon each other, which would suggest that 
attentional biases play an integral role in substance abuse. The strongest of such responses 
would occur when the substance is perceiived as being available to use; responses would be 
weaker when the substance is deemed unavailable i.e. when substance is unavailable for 
the substance abuser, substance-related cutes will not elicit subjective craving or attentional 
bias (see Chapter 3). They suggest that attentional focus on substance-related cues would 
lead to increases in craving strength, amd inversely, increasing craving would lead to 
increased attentional bias. Such phenomenon may increase in intensity until a substance is 
obtained or administered. Such a system \would explain subsequent substance abuse and 
relapse. However, further investigation o f atttentional biases and craving is clearly needed as 
a minority of studies show such associatio ns (e.g. Field and Eastwood, 2005).
Field and Cox (2008) also suggest tha t impulsive decision-making and poor inhibitory 
control may be causative factors for substance abuse, but they may also account for the 
incentive-motivational value that substanice abusers attribute to substances and their 
distraction by related stimuli. They suggest ithat individuals with poor inhibitory control may 
lead to a greater sensitivity to the attemttional-grabbing properties of substance-related 
stimuli (see Chapter 2). They also suggest that attentional bias and craving could weaken 
inhibitory control and contribute to impullshve decision making. Therefore impulsivity would 
warrant further investigation in terms off attentional biases, as inhibitory control may be 
important in order to prevent attentions! biases from influencing craving and substance 
seeking. Similarly, Field and Cox (2008) speculate that those who are in treatment for 
substance abuse may use cognitive avoidamce strategies to suppress craving and attentional 
processing of substance-related stimuli. For some, such strategies could be successful in 
reducing craving and attentional bias. However, evidence would suggest, that for others, 
paradoxically, attempted suppression cou Id increase craving and attentional bias (e.g. Klein, 
2007; Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994). Those with better inhibitory controls would therefore 
fall into the former group as they may be better 'equipped' to overcome previous habits. 
Such issues may be demonstrative of the iidea proposed by Tiffany (1990) who suggested 
that, when in times of abstinence, an abuser would experience greater craving and
subsequent attentional bias. This would be due to the automatic nature of their substance 
abuse habit, with nonautomatic processes causing urges and attentional biases.
Therefore it would appear that these theories contribute towards explaining 
attentional biases in terms of their development and their subsequent role in substance 
abuse. An attentional bias would operate implicitly. It may also develop automatically. The 
importance of the reward pathways has also been demonstrated. Following an orienting of 
attention due to an attentional bias, a behaviour could be triggered. Tiffany (1990) would 
suggest that action schemata are triggered in such circumstances. Robinson and Berridge 
(1993) may suggest that a conditioned response caused by perception of a stimulus may 
take place. This form of behaviour could be akin to a habit. A habit could correspond to 
substance seeking behaviour. It would appear that within the theories of substance abuse 
and attentional biases discussed above, that perception of a cue could lead to substance 
seeking. Therefore measurement o f cognitive and attentional biases may predict 
subsequent substance abuse behaviour. Indeed, measures based around such processes 
have been found to reliably predict substance abuse habits. The use of such cognitive 
paradigms has enabled a decrease in reliance upon self-report methods of substance abuse 
and an increase in the use of measures based upon implicit cognitive processes (e.g. Stroop, 
dot-probe tasks). Such measures have been posited as more robust and better predictors of 
current relevant behaviour (Cox, Pothos, Hosier, 2007) and a number of different measures 
are now in use in relation to the study of attentional and cognitive biases.
1.2: Implicit and Explicit Substance Abuse Measures
Research into cognitive and attentional biases, and both implicit and explicit factors which 
affect them, has resulted in the utilisation of a number of experimental paradigms. Stacy 
(1997) conducted research into memory biases (a form of cognitive bias). A questionnaire 
study was performed in order to look at memory associations, outcome expectancies, 
sensation seeking, and other variables, within cannabis and alcohol users. Participants in a 
laboratory answered questionnaires on two separate occasions. The questionnaire started 
with a word association task which included alcohol- and cannabis- related words, as well as 
'filler' words. Other memory association items were included, for example relating to 
outcome associations and object associations, prior to being asked any substance use- 
related questions. The outcome association task listed 21 short phrases, ten of which were
related to either cannabis or alcohol. During the object association task participants were 
presented with 24 ambiguous pictorial cues (six alcohol and six cannabis). Participants were 
then asked to provide free associations regarding the objects. Outcome expectancy items 
(Stacy, Dent et al., 1990), impulsive sensation seeking (Zuckerman et al., 1992), 
acculturation measures (Marin et al., 1987), and drug use (Stacy, Widaman, Hays, and Di 
Matteo, 1985) were all also measured using the appropriate question measures. Memory 
associations were found to significantly predict responses on the subsequent drug use 
questionnaire. Stacy explained his results using implicit and explicit motivations for drug 
use. Stacy (1997) proposed that the memory activation/implicit cognition component of 
drug use would be quick, effortless and automatic. However the outcome 
expectancy/explicit cognition component would represent a more deliberate decision­
making process. The latter would not represent long-term memory associations (Feldman 
and Lynch, 1988), rather they would be the product of expectancy-judgements which would 
not necessarily be as robust an indicator of future drug use as a measure of long-term 
memory associations.
Outcome expectancies may therefore be representative of a distorted perceptual 
process. Judgment-memory relationships (e.g. Feldman and Lynch, 1988; Wyer and Srull,
1989) could interfere with actual perception of one's own behaviour. Stacy (1997) makes 
the point that a heavy drinker who completes an outcome expectancy measure about 
positive outcomes regarding drinking (e.g. relaxation) may readily, but not necessarily 
correctly, make inferences such as 'I drink a lot, so I must think that drinking is very likely to 
be pleasant, relaxing, etc.' (Stacy, 1997; p62). Therefore outcome expectancies are not a 
robust measure of memory association; a better measure would be grounded in implicit 
processes and measured accordingly. This is related to the distinction between explicit and 
implicit cognition. These differences are highlighted by studies where memory deficits affect 
the two memory systems differently (e.g. Schacter, 1985; Shimamura & Squire, 1984; or for 
a review, see Roediger, 1990; Squire, Knowlton, & Musen, 1993).
The predictive value of these memory associations adds further weight to the 
argument that implicit cognitive processes are empirically different to explicit processes, yet 
are an intrinsic part of future drug use behaviour. Explicit measures of alcohol expectancies, 
such as expectancy scales and questionnaires, have been found to be a useful tool for
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predicting future drinking behaviour (Reich, Below, & Goldman, 2010). However it is also 
important that the underlying mental structures of alcohol expectancies are explored. For 
this to be achieved, it is necessary to use experiments that are concerned with automatic 
and implicit processing of alcohol-related stimuli.
Implicit cognition has been said to be able to influence behaviour and memory 
w ithout explicit awareness (Wiers, and Stacy, et al., 2002). The two in effect can be 
differentiated. Implicit and explicit memory tasks differ due to the difference in task 
demands (e.g. priming, Stroop, behavioural associates production, homographic 
identification, and the Implicit Association Test). It is speculated that the retrieval o f alcohol- 
related memories differs between implicit and explicit memory and leads to this dissociation 
between memory and behaviour. Stacy (2002) suggests that implicit memory tasks are 
worth further investigation, as they assess cognitions that fuel alcohol-use behaviour, better 
than explicit tasks.
However, it would be an oversight to suggest that implicit and explicit tasks are 
distinct in terms of their conscious awareness (e.g. Dulany, 2003). Dienes and colleagues 
(Dienes, 2004; Dienes & Perner, 1999; Dienes & Scott, 2005) suggested that, during an 
experimental task, implicit knowledge would be a process where we would feel as if we are 
guessing, and explicit knowledge would be a process where we would feel we have some 
degree of knowing. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to consider implicit processing in 
terms of reflecting passive processing, as implicit knowledge may merely be information 
unavailable to consciousness at the time of cognition (cf. Reber, 1989; Sun et al. 2005). In 
one situation knowledge may be activated implicitly, whereas in another it may be explicitly 
activated. Artificial grammar learning (AGL) is used to explore the processes which underlie 
learning. It is considered a useful paradigm for the measurement of implicit learning. 
However, there is a debate whether AGL represents a true implicit learning task, or whether 
it is both implicit and explicit in nature (Pothos, 2007).
The AGL task has been adopted for the study of addiction and may be useful for 
distinguishing implicit and explicit learning. This, it has been argued, is due to  the 
observation that AGL tasks seem to involve a number of processes, such as associative 
learning (Perruchet and Pacteau, 1990; Knowlton and Squire, 1996), rules (Dulany et al.,
1984; Reber, 1989), and similarity (Brooks and Vokey, 1991; Pothos and Bailey, 2000). AGL is 
a paradigm which examines the sequence learning of symbols which have become 
associated with particular rules. The rules specify which symbols can follow preceding 
symbols. Sequences are therefore legal (grammatical), or illegal (ungrammatical). Typically 
during AGL tasks, participants witness a training phase where they see grammatical 
sequences, with instructions only to observe them. During the test phase participants are 
informed that they witnessed a number of rules in the training phase, and that their task is 
to decipher which of a number of sequences are grammatical or ungrammatical sequences. 
A robust finding is that people perform better than chance with this task, suggesting 
learning is taking place, be it of either an implicit or explicit nature. Thus, as AGL tasks 
measure a broad range of cognitive processes; an addiction-related AGL task would be able 
to measure how addiction-related biases manifest within cognition, however, when using 
the AGL task to study addiction, the implicit/explicit learning distinction is not o f interest, as 
it is the interference caused by the substance-related stimuli that cause discrepancies in 
results between heavy and light users. Pothos and Cox (2002) demonstrated this to be the 
case when they found results consistent with a cognitive bias being present in heavy 
drinkers and not in light drinkers, when the task was modified to include alcohol-related 
stimuli. They concluded that the cognitive biases observed in the AGL task, like other 
measures of cognitive bias, could be playing a role in the maintenance of alcohol addiction. 
Cognitive biases may be mediating alcohol use due to heavy drinkers allocating more 
attentional resources to alcohol-related cues within the environment (Cox and Klinger,
1990). It would appear that such measures demonstrate cognitive interference. Interference 
caused by alcohol-related stimuli is indicative of distorted processing which is detrimental 
for task performance. Such adverse performance therefore indicates that the processes 
involved in cognitive bias are occurring automatically and once a cognitive bias has been 
established it will operate to implicitly affect behaviour. Indeed, mere exposure to a cue 
could initiate automatic habitual responses that guide behaviour.
It would therefore appear that there are a number of different implicit and explicit 
factors which would affect attentional biases. This thesis considers the appropriateness of 
existing experimental paradigms (Chapter 2 and 5) and it is suggested that closer 
consideration of implicit and explicit processes would benefit attentional bias research
(Chapter 3). With consistent conditions and the correct context a cognitive bias and a 
corresponding attentional bias may develop automatically. Such biases may implicitly affect 
behaviour and lead to habitual responses. Therefore the study of such processes would be 
important in order to intervene in substance abuse behaviours.
1.3: Habits and Automaticity
A habit is generally regarded as a learned act which is in response to an associated trigger. 
This link between act and trigger can be highly automatised, due to its high degree of 
repetition. Once a link between automatised cue and act has been developed, a habit will 
be easily and effortlessly carried out. Such 'habitual' behaviour may be the result of 
situational and cue responses (i.e. responses in the presence of a specific situation or cue, 
respectively) that have developed automatic associations with certain behaviours, e.g. 
substance abuse, through repeated 'practice'. Within habit formation, automaticity 
development for the association between trigger and response would appear to be a key 
component. Habits can develop for a number of behaviours. For example, habits can be 
detrimental to health, such as smoking, or have a positive impact on health, such as 
exercising. These behaviours may persist due to situational cues that become associated 
with aspects of the behaviour (e.g. Wood and Neal, 2007).
Orbell and Verplanken (2010) performed research into how habits may be analogous 
to a form of cue-contingent automaticity. They suggest that a high degree of habitual 
behaviour is due to an automatic component. Through a number of experiments, they 
found that repetitions of behaviour lead to attentional biases for habit-cues. A participant's 
stable behavioural responses that had developed through habitual automaticity led to 
related cues also acquiring attention-grabbing properties. They further make the suggestion 
that assessing the strength of habitual automaticity may be a good predictor of how well 
substance abusers will perform in intervention measures designed for changing habits. 
Therefore the study of how cues develop in relation to habitual responses is an area of 
research with important potential practical applications (see Chapter 7).
A habit which is repeated frequently will be automatically activated within the 
correct context. This has been proposed to be the result of learning of associations within a 
classic behaviourist framework (e.g. Hull, 1943), in that reinforcement and repetition are
considered important for habit development. Indeed habits can develop within a consistent 
environment; then, once established, due to the associations that can develop for habits, 
features within an analogous context may trigger the habit (Wood and Neal, 2007). It has 
therefore been suggested that people form context-response links in procedural memory, 
and these are expressed as habits.
Therefore it can be seen how a substance-related cognitive bias could act as a trigger 
for a habitual response which would be associated with substance abuse behaviour. These 
processes are grounded in theories involving automaticity development. Following the 
development o f attentional biases, substance abusers will give higher priority to the 
processing of addiction-related stimuli over neutral stimuli. Yet, following presentation of a 
stimulus, a substance abuser may 'experience' difficulty disengaging their attention from 
this addiction-related stimulus (Mogg, Bradley, Field, De Flouwer, 2003). This could be due 
to the increased automatic nature of processing such a stimulus compared to neutral 
stimuli. These processes have been termed strategic automaticity (Gollwitzer and Schaal, 
1998) and explain the unconscious connection between 'stimulus' and 'behaviour' which 
leads to the automatic processing of addiction-related stimuli. Here, if X is encountered then 
behaviour Y is activated automatically. This falls into line with Tiffany's (1990) theory of the 
importance of automatic action schemas for behaviour. As drinking and substance use 
behaviour can be highly automatic themselves (e.g., Marlatt, 1985a; Tiffany, 1990), it may 
be expected that users are unaware of the factors that motivate their substance abuse 
behaviour (e.g., Wiers, Stacy, et al., 2002). Thus, an abuser may have no control over their 
attentional bias.
However, if substance abuse is reinforced by the automatisation of the associations 
between a substance and positive expectancies and/or habits, would there be a reduced 
rate o f substance abuse in a population where the automatisation of behaviour is impaired? 
Cox et al. (2001) found evidence indicating that attentional biases are not just a correlate of 
substance misuse, but appear to also be a contributing factor. They suggested that the 
eventual automatisation of associations between a given substance (e.g., alcohol) and 
positive expectancies (e.g., pleasure), can reinforce the state of addiction. Moreover, Mogg 
and colleagues found a diminished attentional bias for anxiety-related stimuli when 
participants were 'cured' of an anxiety disorder (e.g., Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995),
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which demonstrates the role that attentional biases have in the maintenance of such 
disorders. Dyslexia has been hypothesised as being a condition which is associated with a 
broader range of deficits rather than just that of reading and writing. Nicolson and Fawcett's 
(1990) theory for dyslexia involves a component relating to a difficulty with automatising 
behaviour. They found that dyslexic children were impaired in automaticity experiments, 
indicating that dyslexia is a broad learning impairment. They have been led to the 
suggestion that dyslexic children need to consciously compensate when performing a 
number of tasks, thus causing any secondary task to be adversely affected. From this 
conclusion, it has been speculated that dyslexia may be partly due to a failure to fully 
automatise skills. Therefore, from research on attentional biases in substance abuse and 
research into automatisation problems in dyslexia, an intriguing hypothesis presents itself, 
namely that persons with difficulty in automatising behaviour (such as dyslexics) may be less 
susceptible to addiction problems (see Chapter 6).
1.4: Dyslexia Automatisation Deficit
Developmental dyslexia is considered an impairment in reading competency, without 
impairment in IQ, neurological damage, or when the individual has had adequate 
educational opportunities. In essence, it is a reading condition that is not the result of 
intelligence or learned behaviour. Flowever, dyslexia is characterised by much more than 
just a problem with reading and phonology (e.g. Bradley & Bryant, 1983; Frith, Landerl, & 
Frith, 1995; Stanovich, 1988). Dyslexia has also been found to be associated with problems 
in memory (Liberman, Mann, & Shankweiler, 1982), visual processing (Eden & Zeffiro, 1998; 
Pavlidis, 1991; Stein, 1990), auditory processing (Tallal, 1980), and attention (Casco, 
Tressoldi, & Dellantonio, 1998; Facoetti, Paganoni, Turatto, Marzola, & Mascetti, 2000).
Sensory delay between visual and verbal processes of reading is an inadequate 
explanation for the broad symptoms associated with dyslexia, and has been argued to be an 
unlikely explanation for a lack of fluency (the ability to communicate clearly, readily, and 
effortlessly) and processing speed in dyslexic readers (Denckla and Rudel, 1976). 
Furthermore, speed limitations in word identification have been observed within the 
literature. This suggests that a substantial amount of effort is involved in decoding words, 
whereas non-dyslexics would execute this step of automatically (Nicolson and Fawcett, 
1994b; Yap and van der Leij, 1993). Van der Leij and van Daal (1999) state that speed
limitations could be indicating that dyslexic children have difficulty in automatising word 
recognition skills. This in turn could lead to maladaptive reading processes.
The role of automaticity in reading competence, and so possibly dyslexia, has been 
the focus of considerable research and is also relevant to the thesis as well. Automaticity 
with regard to reading is defined as quick, correct and effortless word recognition at the 
single word level. Comprehension is best predicted by the rate and accuracy with which 
single words are known (Hook & Jones, 2002). Automaticity, as well as being defined as 
quick, correct, and effortless, is also defined as the ability to execute a task without placing 
significant cognitive effort on attention (LaBerge and Samuels, 1974; Logan, 
1988). Presumably, when learning to read and write, the learner becomes aware of the 
connections between orthographic and phonological word units. Following practice, he/she 
can take advantage of increasing the span of the relevant unit in visual analysis. The learner 
develops increasing phonetic capability at different stages of reading, moving from the 
mapping of single graphemes to single phonemes. The learner soon develops the ability to 
process and comprehend words by recognising letter clusters and eventually whole words. 
Word familiarity will lead to quicker processing and understanding, and through practice, 
when the connections between orthographic and phonological aspects of words have been 
established, word reading becomes automatic.
Many learners with reading difficulties are able to compensate for early reading 
problems with proper instruction. These learners become good decoders but do not 
succeed in reaching the level of satisfactory fluency needed to become fast and competent 
readers. Therefore, the development of skills necessary for increasing automaticity and 
fluency is vital (Hook & Jones 2002). LaBerge and Samuels' (1974) theory used the concept 
of automaticity to explain why fluent readers are able to decode and understand text with 
ease, while beginning readers have difficulty. This would imply that the developing reader 
will cultivate effective skills, as automaticity develops, to switch attention from decoding in 
order to devote attention towards comprehension. Specifically, the automaticity of reading, 
as theorised by LaBerge and Samuels (1974), suggests that a reader's internal attention is 
limited. As a result, if readers allocate too many cognitive resources on simple reading 
tasks, like decoding, then there will not be adequate resources left for comprehension. The
internal components of attention are considered the most important to the model of 
automatic information processing in reading. Furthermore, it is assumed that deriving 
meaning from print involves the following two steps: printed words first need decoding, 
before the decoded words can subsequently be comprehended. According to this model, 
the developing reader extracts meaning from reading by switching back and forth between 
decoding and comprehending. This results in a reading experience that will inevitably be 
time-consuming, difficult and frustrating. Like the developing reader, the poorer (or 
dyslexic) reader spends too much time decoding and as a result, comprehension can often 
be adversely affected. Fluent readers require little internal attention to decode words, as 
they have developed automaticity for this stage of reading, thus allowing the fluent 
readers the ability to focus their attention on comprehension (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974).
The idea that dyslexic people may have difficulty with automatising behaviour has 
been the basis of Nicolson and Fawcett's (1990) theory. Above, a number of ways were 
demonstrated in which automatising certain processes are crucial for fluent reading 
performance. Nicolson and Fawcett's (1990) theory for dyslexia would suggest that people 
with dyslexia have deficits in automatising all behaviours and, specifically, the ones relevant 
for reading. They observed that when performing automaticity-based experiments, dyslexic 
children in a dual-task condition (where attention is divided between a primary and a 
distracter task) were significantly impaired over controls. These results are hard to 
comprehend on a traditional lexical skills deficit framework, and have led to the suggestion 
that dyslexic children need to utilise a larger amount of cognitive effort than controls for 
monitoring balance, thus causing any secondary task to be adversely affected. From this 
conclusion, it has been speculated that dyslexia may be partly due to a failure to fully 
automatise skills. This approach to understanding dyslexia has attracted a lot of attention, 
though not all the reported results are consistent with Fawcett and Nicolson's theory 
(Beaton, 2002; Bishop, 2002).
Dyslexia has traditionally been described as a reading difficulty, but it has also been 
described as a learning difficulty (Nicolson and Fawcett, 2008). The automatisation deficit 
hypothesis is the only major theory to explicitly characterise dyslexia as a deficit in the 
learning process (Nicolson and Fawcett, 2008). If dyslexia is indeed a problem with
automaticity in learning processes, then literacy may not be the only observable effect. 
Fawcett and Nicolson (1990) suggest that motor skill and balance are also affected by 
dyslexia. Using a dual-task paradigm, whereby a participant is unable to wholly concentrate 
on one task, dyslexia leads to impairments in concurrent tasks, for example in balancing. 
Fawcett and Nicolson suggest that this is an example of how dyslexic children have 
incomplete skill automaticity, and therefore need to consciously compensate to perform a 
task that a person without dyslexia could perform without conscious awareness. Deficits for 
skill automaticity have been found in motor skill, phonological skill, and rapid processing. 
Dyslexic people have deficits in each of these skills 'across the board', rather than 
participant-specific areas, as would be suggested by sub-types. This skill fluency problem is 
found for skills that should become automatic through extensive practice, including reading 
and writing.
Brindley (1964) suggested that plasticity of the cerebellum and its input and output 
pathways are associated with behavioural practice and is important in the learning of motor 
skills due to its connection with the sense organs. Nicolson et al. (1999) investigated 
cerebellar deficit in dyslexics using PET. Brain activation was lower for dyslexics in the right 
cerebella cortex and left cingulate gyrus. These results suggest abnormalities in cerebellum 
activation for dyslexics. Lang and Bastian (2001) found that damage to the cerebellum 
resulted in a diminished ability to turn an attentionally demanding unpractised movement 
into an automatic movement, which again supports an assumption about the role o f the 
cerebellum in learning.
Although the relationship between dyslexia and rapid automatic naming and fluency 
is well documented (e.g. Wolf and Bowers, 1999), the evidence for deficits in motor 
automaticity for dyslexic children is less clear (Savage, 2004). This is a view supported by 
Raberger and Wimmer (2003) who suggest that poor balancing (an aspect of their task they 
suggest is demonstrative of motor automaticity) was associated to a greater extent with 
ADHD than dyslexia, as the balancing of dyslexics did not differ from the non-impaired 
control group. However, the children with ADHD were found to have intact reading skills. 
This is contrary to the automatisation/cerebellum deficit hypothesis of dyslexia and would 
suggest that problems in motor automaticity (i.e. impaired balance) and reading 
competency are only incidental effects of dyslexia. Raberger and Wimmer (2003) propose
that the results of Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) may be due to the accidental inclusion of 
ADHD children. This suggestion is consistent with Denckla et al. (1985), who argued that 
motor impairments were only found in dyslexics if they also had ADHD. Yet Rochelle, 
Witton, and Talcott (2009) make the suggestion that even subclinical ADHD symptoms may 
be able to confound motor automaticity measures between dyslexics and non-dyslexic 
controls. Nevertheless Giedd et al. (2001), in a neuroimaging study, found cerebella 
abnormalities in subjects with ADHD.
Roughly half of the dyslexic children reported in Ramus, Pidgeon, Frith (2003) were 
impaired on a battery o f motor- and cerebella-function tests. Ramus et al. formed the 
conclusion that cerebella dysfunction is not the cause of phonological and reading 
impairment in dyslexia. This is further supported by Beaton (2002), who pointed to 
methodological imperfections in the examination of deficits for dyslexics in relation to 
cerebella function. He also posits that a deficit in cerebella function does not necessarily 
suggest a causal mechanism. Bishop (2002) further highlights the notion that cerebella 
abnormalities may be an effect and not a cause of dyslexia. Also, there has been evidence 
showing that learning processes of dyslexic people are unimpaired (at least implicit 
learning), casting doubt on a conceptualisation of dyslexia as a learning problem (e.g., Kelly, 
Griffiths, and Frith, 2002; Pothos & Kirk, 2004; Roodenrys and Dunn, 2008).
Kelly, Griffiths and Frith (2002) used the serial reaction time task (SRTT) to examine 
the implicit learning within those with dyslexia. Reaction time during the sequenced 
elements of the task decreased even in the absence of awareness. This result would suggest 
that implicit learning was intact in dyslexics. This result is contrary to Vicari, Marotta, 
Menghini, Molinari, and Petrosini (2003), who found dyslexics to be impaired on an SRTT. 
They concluded that an implicit learning deficit was evident in dyslexic people. However, 
whereas Kelly, et al. (2002) asked participants to respond to every item in the sequence, 
Vicari, et al. (2003) requested that participants only respond to certain elements of the 
sequence; a task measuring implicit learning, but also, arguably, response inhibition -  a 
potential confound. However, further support for this deficit is provided by Stoodley, 
Harrison and Stein (2006) who found SRT learning deficits in dyslexic adults. They observed 
that 42% of dyslexic participants showed learning on the SRTT compared with 86% of 
controls. This discrepancy within the literature could be due to methodological differences
between the SRT tasks used in the different experiments or maybe due to inappropriate 
screening for dyslexia. It has also been suggested that ADHD measures should also be 
considered when using a dyslexic population (Germano, Gagliano, Curatolo, 2010). Pothos 
and Kirk (2004) made similar suggestions regarding dyslexia with respect to implicit learning 
using an artificial grammar learning task. Stimulus format was found to  be an important 
feature for non-dyslexic learning, but not dyslexic learning. Although dyslexia caused no 
impairment here, the results do suggest a difference in learning processes, or, as the 
authors suggest, the results could be due to a motivation factor. This result could imply that 
implicit learning was intact for dyslexic participants, but explicit strategy discrepancies led to 
the difference in results between the two groups. The authors suggest that both implicit and 
explicit learning is necessary for knowledge development, and that dyslexia could lead to 
problems with explicit strategy formation. It is worth noting from the above studies that the 
learning of dyslexic participants can be intact, even if the ability to automatise is impaired, 
as the two processes can be independent.
It can be seen from this review of the dyslexia automatisation deficit hypothesis 
(Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990) that the development of automaticity could indeed be an 
underlying cause of dyslexic traits. Therefore if dyslexics are impaired in automaticity 
development, then it may be possible to explore automatic aspects of substance abuse, e.g. 
attentional biases, by utilisation of this population.
1.5: Rationale
In summary, attentional bias is significant in substance abuse. In the case of alcohol abuse, 
for example, the significance of attentional biases is partly related to the fact that they 
predict clinical outcomes (Cox, Pothos, Hosier, 2007). Intuitively, it is easy to see why 
attentional bias for alcohol-related stimuli might predict future changes in alcohol abuse. 
Greater attentional bias for alcohol related stimuli implies that a drinker is more likely to 
notice alcohol-related information in his/her environment (see Chapter 5) and make links 
between alcohol and positive alcohol expectancies (cf. Pothos & Tapper, 2010; Tiffany, 
1990). It is no surprise that many researchers have sought to explore the intervention 
potential of these biases (e.g., Fadardi & Cox, 2009; Wiers et al., 2006; cf. Hogarth & Duka, 
2006).
Attentional biases are associated with addiction (e.g. Cox, Pothos, Hosier, 2007), but 
is it possible that they may also be playing a contributing role in substance abuse? Whether 
attentional biases are a cause or effect of addiction is open to debate but this thesis aims to 
provide more evidence regarding this issue. The development of attentional biases in 
substance abusers plausibly involves some processes which are automatic. This is because 
repeated administration of the substance leads to the association of substance-related 
stimuli to substance administration. Repeated exposure to such associations would lead to 
an abuser learning to associate more stimuli with substances. Tiffany (1990) would argue 
that attentional biases contribute to addiction, as, following automatic associations, 
attentional biases toward addiction-related stimuli would continuously remind a substance 
abuser of the pleasurable effects of the substance which is abused. Therefore this would 
lead to further addiction-related behaviour. Thus, attentional biases for addiction-related 
stimuli may mediate substance abuse behaviour and, as has been shown, predict relapse. 
Cox, Hogan, Kristian, and Race (2002) observed that alcoholic patients who were seeking 
treatment were more likely to relapse post-treatment, if they had an increased alcohol- 
Stroop interference. Similarly, Cox, Pothos, & Hosier (2007) found that, of alcoholics not 
seeking treatment, those with a lower attentional bias would drink on fewer days six 
months after testing. These studies demonstrate the predictive value of attentional biases. 
The development of attentional biases may be the result of a number of processes, for 
example, automaticity (Tiffany, 1990), incentive-salience (Robinson and Berridge, 1993), or 
current concerns (Klinger and Cox, 2004). Within each theory is the same underlying notion 
that consistent substance abuse will lead to substance-related stimuli leading to 
corresponding attentional biases. Repeated exposure, or practice, is the precursor of 
automaticity.
In this vein, this thesis examines novel attentional and cognitive bias measures, 
suggesting that these tasks could offer a novel insight in relation to the study of substance 
abuse. Further, the role that automaticity plays in the development of attentional biases is 
examined. From the literature review above, a number of questions are apparent. Tiffany 
(1990) suggests that substance abuse reflects a 'loss of control'. Likewise, Field and Cox 
(2008) suggest that poor inhibitory control may influence craving, substance seeking, and 
subsequent attentional bias. This thesis therefore aims to examine attentional bias and
inhibitory control in Chapter 2 Experiment 1 and specifically explore whether consideration 
of inhibitory control leads to a more sensitive measure of attentional biases. Franken (2003) 
suggests that a bias in preconscious processing may not be present in appetitive 
motivational states. This is a notion examined in Chapter 2 Experiment 2 by presenting 
stimuli peripherally. Within anxiety research subliminally presented aversive stimuli has 
been found to be reflected in increasing attention; a result not replicated in substance- 
related tasks. Therefore the novel task presented in Chapter 2 may be able to explore this 
further by measuring attentional effects caused by decreased awareness through 
peripherally presented stimuli rather than subliminally presented stimuli. Such research is 
important as Field and Cox (2008) suggest that psychological interventions which may 
minimise attentional biases may reduce craving and substance seeking behaviour. Therefore 
greater understanding of inhibitory and preconscious processing of cues would be beneficial 
in this domain. Field and Cox (2008) further make the suggestion that stronger associations 
between craving and attentional biases would be observed when a substance is perceived 
as being available. Chapter 3 explores this further by measuring the association between 
use intention (potentially analogous to availability) and corresponding attentional biases, 
craving, and outcome expectancies. Here it is possible to further explore the dissociation 
between Tiffany (1990) and Robinson and Berridge (1993), where the former would predict 
greater attentional bias when not abstaining as it is habit-congruent whilst the latter would 
predict greater attentional bias when abstaining due to stimuli being appetitive.
Tiffany (1990) suggests that prolonged substance abuse would lead to the substance 
abusers' environment being perceived as becoming increasingly occupied by substance- 
related stimuli. Therefore a direct assessment of this could be performed in order to 
examine this aspect of Tiffany's theory further (see Chapter 5). For Tiffany's (1990) theory to 
be supported it would be expected for a HD to misestimate the proportion of alcohol- 
related cues within an environment. Therefore, the contrary argument would also be true; a 
person who misestimates the alcohol-related stimuli within an environment, in that they 
report an inflated amount of alcohol-related stimuli, may therefore be a HD. Such a task 
may therefore become a useful screening tool (see Chapter 5). In order to further examine 
automaticity and attentional bias, a population putatively impaired in automaticity may 
shed new light upon the automatic aspects o f substance use. Therefore it is suggested that a
dyslexic population be used in order to measure substance use, attentional bias, and 
priming (in order to look more closely at habits and goal directed behaviours). This thesis 
does not measure automaticity development. Instead it utilises a population who are 
putatively impaired in automaticity development. Therefore by using a dyslexic population it 
may be possible to explore whether a population impaired in automaticity could 
demonstrate a different pattern of attentional biases related to substance use (see Chapter 
6). Chapter 7 explores some factors which may contribute to the speed of learning. This 
may explore automatic associations between an abused substance and relevant thoughts 
(cf. Tiffany, 1990). Is frequency, i.e. repeated exposure to substance-related stimuli, 
primarily the function by which automatic associations develop, or do certain kinds of 
associations become learned more readily than others? An exploration of these 
characteristics may therefore help identify what associations are more likely to become 
automatic. An increased understanding of the automaticity of substance abuse would 
further the literature and eventually lead to develop a better understanding of the 
psychological aspects of substance abuse.
Attentional biases, cognitive biases, and automaticity would appear, from the 
literature, to play integral roles in substance abuse behaviour. This thesis aims to explore 
the questions that arise out of the literature in order to further understanding of substance 
abuse and aid in the development of substance abuse intervention.
1.6: Research Questions:
Chapter 2 Experiment 1: Is poor inhibitory control within HDs associated with attentional 
biases?
A novel gaze contingent eye tracking task is reported which has the potential to 
measure inhibitory control. It is aimed as a tool to study differences between HDs and LDs in 
terms of their ability to inhibit attention toward substance-related stimuli. It is hypothesised 
that heavy drinking will lead to poorer inhibitory control for alcohol-related stimuli.
Chapter 2 Experiment 2: Do alcohol-related stimuli lead to an initial orienting of attention 
for HDs?
The initial orienting of attention has not convincingly been demonstrated for 
alcohol-related stimuli. However, reanalysis of the data obtained from the gaze contingency
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task in Experiment 1 can be interpreted in this manner. This section of Chapter 2 aims to 
establish whether alcohol-related stimuli can cause an initial orienting in HDs but not LDs. It 
is hypothesised that HDs will demonstrate an initial orienting for alcohol-related stimuli.
Chapter 3: Are attentional biases robust phenomena, or are they affected by craving, 
outcome expectancies, and/or use intention?
This experiment aims to establish whether an attentional bias fluctuates in intensity 
as a result of craving, outcome expectancies, and/or use intention. Attentional bias for 
alcohol or MDMA will be measured within groups of either HDs or MDMA users on two 
occasions; when intending to use a substance and when not intending to use a substance. 
Measures of craving and outcome expectancies will also be taken in both 'use intention' 
conditions. The attentional bias, craving, and outcome expectancy results can then be 
compared between 'use intention' conditions. These results can then be compared and 
contrasted between alcohol and MDMA users. This will enable a deeper understanding of 
the mechanisms involved in the use of substances which are different in terms of the 
pattern of their use. It is hypothesised that participants in the alcohol condition will 
demonstrate a more robust attentional bias than MDMA participants, as alcohol use is 
different from MDMA use, due to it being more readily available.
Chapter 5: Do cognitive biases reflect in some sense biases in an environment is perceived?
The aim of this chapter is to establish whether substance use can lead to  a distortion 
in how information in a person's environment is perceived. A word list will be administered 
to both HDs and LDs. Within this list of words a known number of alcohol-related words will 
be present. It is hypothesised that HDs will overestimate the number of alcohol-related 
words within the list.
Chapter 6 Experiment 1: Does automaticity, as measured using a population putatively 
impaired in automaticity development (dyslexics), affect substance use?
The aim of this chapter is to explore the importance of automaticity in substance use 
by using a population putatively impaired in automaticity development. The first experiment 
will aim to provide preliminary results regarding the pattern of substance use in dyslexics. A 
substance use questionnaire will be administered to dyslexic and non-dyslexic controls. It is
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hypothesised that the dyslexic group will demonstrate a different pattern of substance use 
compared to the non-dyslexic controls.
Chapter 6 Experiment 2: Do dyslexics have different substance-related attentional biases? 
What does this suggest about attentional bias in general?
The aim of this chapter is to further explore the importance of automaticity in 
attentional bias development. A measure of attentional biases for substance-related stimuli 
in dyslexics and non-dyslexic controls will be performed. Attentional biases may develop 
through automaticity. Therefore, it is hypothesised that dyslexics will demonstrate a 
different pattern of attentional biases for substance-related stimuli than non-dyslexic 
controls.
Chapter 6 Experiment 3: Does goal-directed priming affect dyslexics and non-dyslexic 
controls in the same way?
The aim of this experiment is to explore the automatic aspects of goal-directed 
priming by again using a dyslexic population who are potentially impaired in automaticity 
development. Two questionnaires will be administered to dyslexic and non-dyslexic 
controls. One of the questionnaires will be designed to prime urges to consume alcohol, 
whilst the other will be designed not to prime alcohol urges. It is hypothesised that the non- 
dyslexic controls will be more readily primed to consume alcohol when already 
demonstrating strong alcohol use behaviour.
Chapter 7: What factors affect the development of automatic associations?
The aim of this experiment is to establish what factors may affect the development 
of automatic associations. The strength of association between two stimuli will be measured 
under three different conditions. Emotional salience, richness of representation, and 
thinking about an association will be examined. Automatic associations will be judged to 
have developed if memory recall improves. In this way, it is possible that automatic 
associations will be related to  increased emotional salience, more richly represented stimuli, 
and deeper thinking about the associations.
Chapter 2: Measuring inhibitory processes for alcohol-related attentional biases.
This chapter describes a new experimental paradigm that can be utilised to 
investigate attentional bias towards alcohol-related visual stimuli, specifically the ability to 
inhibit the initial orientation of attention toward peripherally appearing stimuli. In this way 
it is hoped to study a novel aspect of attentional bias. This would hopefully help to 
understand more about attentional biases and how they relate to substance abuse 
behaviour. Alcohol-related attentional biases have often been observed within the literature 
for heavy drinkers. These attentional biases have been found to have predictive value over 
relapse in abstaining alcoholics. Similarly impaired inhibitory processes have also been 
found to be associated with heavy drinkers. The experiment presented here introduces a 
novel eye tracking task which aims to observe inhibitory processes for alcohol-related 
attentional biases. As far as the author is aware, this is the first such experiment to combine 
both of these processes within the same eye tracking experimental measure. Results 
indicate that heavy drinkers do indeed demonstrate impaired inhibitory processes for 
alcohol-related attentional biases. These results will be discussed in terms of implications 
for current understanding of attentional bias processes.
2.1: Experiment 1: Introduction
Alcohol abuse leads to attentional biases for alcohol-related information, so that abusers' 
attention is more readily directed towards alcohol-related information and it is more 
difficult for them to disengage attention from such information. There is extensive evidence 
for attentional biases for alcohol-related information. Cox, Fadardi, and Pothos (2006) 
reviewed 18 studies utilising the alcohol version of the Stroop task, and concluded that 
alcohol Stroop interference can discriminate between broad categories of drinkers i.e. light 
and heavy drinkers (in this thesis light drinkers refers to males drinking on average less than 
6 alcohol units/week and females less than 4 alcohol units/week (one alcohol unit = 10 ml. 
of pure alcohol). Heavy drinkers are defined as males consuming more than 21 units of 
alcohol/week and females more than 14 units/week: this is discussed further in Section 
2.2.5). Several other paradigms purport to reveal attentional biases for alcohol-related 
information, or related cognitive biases, such as the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986), 
memory tasks (Jones & Schulze, 2000; Palfai & Ostafin, 2003; Stacy, 1997), and conceptual
structure measures (Rather et al., 1992). Moreover, attentional biases for alcohol-related 
information can predict clinical outcomes. Cox et al. (2002) showed that alcoholics in 
treatment who showed an increased alcohol Stroop bias during the treatment were more 
likely to relapse three months later. Cox, Pothos, and Hosier (2007) found that alcohol- 
Stroop bias prospectively predicted a reduction in the number of drinking days in a group of 
excessive drinkers. Such results suggest an important role for attentional biases in alcohol 
abuse (Waters & Feyerabend, 2000).
Despite the predictive success of alcohol-related attentional biases, there is ongoing 
debate whether such biases have a causal role in excessive drinking or are simply a 
correlational by-product of such behaviour. Resolving this controversy is ultimately linked to 
corresponding theoretical developments regarding the source of attentional biases for 
alcohol-related information. In such efforts, each novel task purporting to demonstrate 
alcohol-related attentional biases offers the promise of some additional insight regarding 
their nature and role in alcohol abuse. The objective of the present study is exactly this: to 
report a novel paradigm for the measurement of attentional biases. This novel paradigm is 
based on eye tracking and, it is argued, provides a unique perspective on the properties of 
attentional biases for alcohol-related information. Note that the present research is 
formulated in terms of alcohol abuse and related attentional biases. There are both practical 
and theoretical reasons for such an approach. From a practical point of view, excessive 
drinking is a behaviour which is fairly commonplace in the UK, so that recruiting suitable 
population samples does not pose a challenge. A theoretical reason for researching 
attentional biases for alcohol-related information is that these biases tend to be robustly 
present in excessive drinkers (as the meta-analysis of Cox et al., 2006, shows). Thus, in 
exploring a novel paradigm for attentional biases related to substance abuse, alcohol abuse 
avoids several methodological and interpretative complications. Having said the above, the 
theory for attentional biases for alcohol-related information is not actually unique to alcohol 
abuse and most o f it applies to any kind of substance abuse. Indeed, attentional (or 
cognitive -  this is a subtle distinction, which is not relevant to the present chapter) biases 
have been demonstrated for many kinds of substance abuse, appetitive behaviour, and 
even certain kinds of psychopathology (e.g., Calitri et al., 2010; Field et al., 2004; Mogg et 
al., 2000; Stacy, 1997).
To understand the possible utility for an alternative paradigm for attentional biases 
for alcohol-related information, it is important to briefly consider the currently dominant 
experimental paradigms and the corresponding supporting theory. The alcohol-Stroop task 
is by far the most common measure of attentional biases for alcohol-related information. 
Participants are exposed to  words, which are either related to alcohol or neutral (in relation 
to alcohol). These words are printed in different colours and the objective is to name the 
colour as rapidly as possible. The robust finding (Cox et al., 2006) is that heavy alcohol 
drinkers take longer to name the ink colour o f alcohol-related words than neutral words 
and, also, that such a difference is not observed with light drinkers. Note first that 
interference in the alcoholl-Stroop task cannot be explained by the mechanisms postulated 
to account for interference in the classic Stroop task. In the latter, interference arises from 
the conflict between the meaning of the word and the ink colour. However, in the alcohol 
Stroop task there is no conflict between alcohol meaning and ink colour.
Some researchers have suggested that repeated alcohol use increases the incentive 
salience of alcohol-related stimuli, so that an alcohol abuser becomes hypersensitive to 
alcohol-related information (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). According to such a view, a 
lowered attentional threshold for alcohol-related stimuli can make such stimuli more 
'attention-grabbing', an implication which translates into a corresponding attentional bias. 
Klinger and Cox (2004) reached an analogous conclusion, using their theory of motivation 
based on current concerns. A current concern (i.e., a goal) of, for example, drinking alcohol 
causes drinkers' attention and other cognitive processes to be focused on stimuli related to 
attaining the goal. Tiffany (1990) adopted a more cognitive perspective and suggested that 
repeated alcohol use eventually automatises both schemas related to alcohol consumption 
(e.g., the sequence of actions leading to obtaining alcohol) and related expectancies. In this 
way, alcohol-related stimuli are attentionally prioritised because of the several automatic 
links they generate with o ther information, and vice versa.
All these perspectives could be employed to understand attentional biases for 
alcohol-related information in the alcohol-Stroop task. But, there are some interpretative 
difficulties as well. To appreciate these difficulties, note first that an attentional biases for 
alcohol-related information could reflect either or both of two attentional effects. First, an 
effect can be identified o f initial attentional orientation, which 'grabs' attention i.e. the
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ability of the stimuli to spontaneously cause attentional shift toward one stimulus as 
opposed to another. This initial orientation effect would select out and prioritise alcohol- 
related stimuli, at the expense of other stimuli. Second, an effect can be considered of 
attentional engagement, according to which an alcohol-related stimulus captures attention 
more so than alternative, matched stimuli.
Regarding the alcohol Stroop task, it is already known tha t the meaning of the word 
will be processed before its colour (see Cox, Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006). Therefore, it is 
problematic to appreciate whether an alcohol abuser processing a trial with an alcohol- 
related word gets captivated by the meaning of the word, beca use it is alcohol-related (cf. 
Robison & Berridge, 1993, or Klinger & Cox, 2004) or simply because reading appears to be a 
process more automatic than ink-colour processing. Accordingly, results from the alcohol- 
Stroop task tend to be interpreted more as relating to sustained attention, as opposed to 
initial attentional orientation.
Such considerations in part motivated the development of the dot-probe task 
(MacLeod et al., 1986), which can eliminate any potential confounds introduced by the 
reading process. In the dot-probe task, a trial involves two stimuli, typically presented on 
the left and right part o f the distal layout, such that one stimulus is neutral, while the other 
alcohol-related. The stimuli disappear and a dot appears either at the location of the neutral 
or the alcohol-related stimulus. The task of the participant is to  identify the location of the 
dot as quickly as possible. Depending on whether the dot replaces the neutral or the 
alcohol-related stimulus, and the relative speed of responding across trials, the 
experimenter can establish the presence of an attentional bias fo r alcohol or not -  almost. A 
complication in the dot-probe task is that participants may attend to say the alcohol 
stimulus, then to the neutral stimulus, then back to the alcohol stimulus etc. Even if the 
alcohol stimulus is more salient or attentional grabbing, it would not exclusively occupy a 
participants' attention, leading to important interpretative difficulties. In practice, dot-probe 
researchers employ a range of time delays between the presentation of the stimuli and that 
o f the dot. But, some of these interpretative difficulties remain, especially for longer times, 
since it is not clear how many attentional shifts had occurred prior to  the observed 
attentional focus (cf. Posner & Cohen, 1984; Rafal, Davies, & Lauder, 2006).
Such issues make problematic the use of the dot-probe task for studying sustained 
attention components of attentional biases. However, they potentially show more promise 
regarding the initial orientation of attention. Unfortunately, the relevant results still fall prey 
to ambiguities. For example, Field et af. (2004a) demonstrated that heavy drinkers showed 
an attentional biases for alcohol-related information for delays between the stimuli and the 
dot (stimulus onset asynchronies -  SOAs) of 500ms and 2000ms. Yet, there was no evidence 
for attentional biases for alcohol-related information for stimuli presented for only 200ms. 
By contrast, Stormark et al. (1997), using a sample of alcohol abusers in a treatment centre, 
showed an attentional biases for alcohol-related information with a SOA of 100ms and, in 
fact, avoidance of alcohol-related information at 500ms. This latter result was reflected in 
Noel et al.'s (2006) investigation as well, with abstinent alcohol abusers. But, abstinence 
from heavy drinking is hard to reconcile with specific predictions regarding attentional 
biases for alcohol-related information, since there is evidence that whether abstinence is 
associated with an attentional bias or not would relate to the eventual probability o f relapse 
(e.g., Cox et al., 2002).
Another potential difficulty with such measures concerns agreeing on the SOA which 
indicates initial attentional orientation. For example, while Bradley et al. (2003) interpreted 
a 500ms SOA as indicative of initial attentional orientation, some researchers have argued 
that a SOA as long as this is better interpreted in relation to delayed disengagement (e.g., 
Koster et al., 2005) and that SOAs as brief as 50ms to 200ms would be needed to study 
initial attentional orientation (Theeuwes, 2005).
Overall, the dot-probe task, with sufficiently many SOA conditions (and perhaps with 
concurrent eye tracking measurements as well) can provide a good measure of the time 
course of attentional capture by alcohol-related stimuli, even if the conclusions regarding 
initial attentional orientation are perhaps not entirely satisfactory. But it could be the case 
that the question of initial attentional orientation, in the context of the dot-probe task, is 
not the one most critically relevant in understanding the role of attentional biases for 
alcohol-related information in excessive drinking anyway. In the dot-probe task, the 
participant can freely process the alcohol-related stimulus. From the point of view of a 
participant even vaguely interested in alcohol (and certainly not necessarily an alcohol 
abuser), the neutral control stimuli would compete only weakly for attentional resources
with the alcohol-related stimuli. However, it is worth noting, that some of these issues that 
are discussed here could be resolved with a closer comparison of time taken processing 
neutral cues. By calculating a 'difference score', a dot-probe is better able to control for 
such vague interest in the presented stimuli. It would be possible to compare the initial 
fixation times for alcohol-related stimuli and neutral stimuli to produce a 'difference score'. 
This may provide a more accurate account o f how attentionally salient each stimulus-type is 
fo r each participant. However, this 'difference score' may again merely be demonstrative of 
a general preoccupation rather than being indicative of an underlying motivational state 
which has arisen from repeated administration. Once attention has been 'grabbed' by an 
alcohol-related stimulus, the time course can be measured of attentional emphasis. But, 
such an approach is less informative regarding the key issue of exactly how compulsory is 
the initial orientation of attention towards alcohol-related stimuli, for alcohol abusers (Field, 
2010). In other words, it would also seem pertinent to examine the degree to which an 
alcohol abuser is unable not to process an alcohol-related stimulus. Put more simply, exactly 
how distracting will an alcohol-related stimulus be for an alcohol abuser?
Current measures of attentional bias do not appear to directly address this critical 
issue, even though poor inhibitory control is an established theme in research relating to 
excessive drinking (Cox & Klinger, 2004; Wiers et al., 2007). For example, it has been 
suggested that elevated impulsivity and diminished inhibition of alcohol abusers could lead 
to  difficulty in controlling responses to alcohol-related stimuli. Field and Cox (2008) further 
suggested that the presence of an alcohol-related stimulus can lead to a number of 
interrelated reactions. For example, classical conditioning would lead to alcohol-related 
stimuli eliciting an expectation regarding the subjective effects of consuming alcohol (see 
also Wiers & Stacy, 2010). Such expectations could have a mutually excitatory relationship 
with craving, depending on explicit knowledge of whether a substance is currently available 
or not. For example, in situations where alcohol is not perceived as available (e.g., within a 
treatment centre), there would be decreased craving and also decreased attentional bias. 
Importantly, Field and Cox (2008) make the further suggestion that attempts to control 
craving and attentional biases could paradoxically lead to increasing both. Individual 
differences in impulsivity and the ability to demonstrate inhibitory control would also be 
associated with the degree of attentional biases and craving.
Overall, it is possible to see how Field and Cox"s (2008) model relates attentional 
biases and craving on the one hand, with a crucial mechanism of inhibitory control in 
relation to both, on the other hand. The focus of the present study concerns the empirical 
measurement of failures of inhibitory control, which arise from alcohol-related stimuli. 
Recently, Weafer and Fillmore (2012) used a go/ no-go paradigm, so as to measure 
inhibition for alcohol-related stimuli. They found that inhibitory failures were more common 
after a pre-exposure with alcohol-related stimuli. But, the empirical measurement of such 
failures in inhibitory control were measured in a task separate to that for attentional biases 
for alcohol-related information. Clearly, ideally one would want to examine failures of 
inhibitory control as a direct result o f attentional biases for alcohol-related information.
The current study aims to directly link failures of inhibitory control due to alcohol- 
related stimuli and corresponding attentional biases. A simple attention fixation task was 
employed, during which participants were instructed to attend to a particular fixation region 
on a computer screen (the fixation region's location also varied). While the participant was 
attending to the fixation region, other visual stimuli would appear on various locations on 
the computer screen. Even though the participant might be aware of the presence of these 
distractor stimuli (through peripheral vision), his/ her instructions were clearly to only 
attend to the fixation region. Moreover, if the participant did attend to these peripheral 
distractor stimuli, the distractor stimuli would disappear, for as long as the participant's 
gaze was directed away from the fixation region (a minimal corresponding threshold was 
specified, for the degree to which the participant would need to direct his/ her gaze away 
from the fixation region, before the distractor stimulus disappeared). With this innovative 
paradigm, a participant has really no incentive to process the distractor stimuli at all: the 
instructions clearly indicate he/ she should not. Moreover, even when the participant does 
attempt to process these distractor stimuli, they actually disappear immediately. Under 
such circumstances, discouraging as much as possible lapses in attention away from the 
fixation region, it can be studied exactly how distracting alcohol-related stimuli can be for 
excessive drinkers, compared to broadly matched neutral stimuli.
Within this experiment eye movements were measured away from the fixation 
region toward the distractor stimuli. However, fixation counts were measured within the 
fixation region when in the presence of both neutral and alcohol-related stimuli. Adopting
such an approach enabled the measurement of attentional processing irrespective of 
whether the fixation region's threshold had been breached. Therefore both the participants' 
ability to attend to the fixation region and the attentional processing of distractor stimuli 
was measured. Both of which are argued provide a novel insight into attentional biases.
2.2: Method
2.2.3: Participants
48 participants were recruited (6 males; 42 females) aged 18 -  40 years (M= 20.63; SD = 
3.98) from the undergraduate population within the psychology department at Swansea 
University. Participants were recruited using the psychology subject pool, and course credit 
was offered in return for participation. Participants were not informed of the relation of the 
study to excessive drinking. The alcohol content of the study was only revealed as 
participants became aware of the alcohol-related stimuli during the eye tracking task. 
Instead participants were led to believe they were taking part in a task designed to look at 
eye movements and dyslexia. Participants were, however, fully debriefed, following the 
task. Full ethical approval was granted by the Department of Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix V).
2.2.4: Apparatus
EyeLink Desktop 1000 eye tracker (SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). Participants wore a 
target sticker as the camera was on the desktop. The target sticker negates the use of a 
head clamp and allows the camera to calibrate to the participants' position. Participants sat 
55cm away from the monitor, as this gives the clearest eye movement data. Their dominant 
eye was deciphered by using the Miles test (Roth, Lora, and Heilman, 2002) and tracked 
accordingly. Experimenter Builder software Version 1.4.128 B (SR Research Ltd., Ontario, 
Canada) was used to control the stimulus events during the eye tracking task. E-prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) was used to control the 
presentation of the stimuli during the awareness task.
2.2.5: Data Scoring and Response Definitions
Three eye tracking variables were created: fixation counts - the number of fixations when 
the stimulus was presented; break frequency -  the number of times participants tried to
look at the stimulus; binary breaks -  whether the stimulus was looked at. These variables 
were used in order to measure how distracting the dlistractor stimuli were. In order to 
obtain a measure of how distracting alcohol distractor stimuli were, relative to neutral ones, 
for each of these variables the scores were subtracted for the neutral distractor stimuli from 
the corresponding scores for the alcohol distractor stimuli. Thus, for all three variables, 
larger positive values indicate greater distractibility o f alcohol distractor stimuli relative to 
neutral ones.
Furthermore, the participants were divided into heavy and light drinkers, on the 
basis of the Department of Health guidelines (Shenker, Sorensen, and Davis, 2009). 
Accordingly, light drinkers were defined as males drinking on average less than 6 alcohol 
units/week and females less than 4 alcohol units/week (one alcohol unit = 10 ml. of pure 
alcohol)(N=13; Average unit count= 1.32; SD=1.57). Heavy drinkers are defined as males 
consuming more than 21 units of alcohol/week and females more than 14 units/week 
(N=23; Average unit count=22.99; SD=9.70). Note that the HD LD distinction used here is 
based on the department of health guidelines and is a common way to identify LD, MD 
(mid-level drinkers), and HD groups (e.g. Cox, Fadardi, and Pothos, 2006; Cox, Pothos, and 
Hosier, 2007; Pothos and Cox, 2002). Field, Duka, Eastwood, Child, Santarcangelo, and 
Gayton (2007) adopt a similar approach, whereby 'heavy social drinkers' are those who 
consume more than is deemed 'safe' by the Department of Health (Shenker, Sorensen, and 
Davis, 2009) guidelines. However, they do not use the same guidelines for an LD category. 
Note, although according to the Department of Health guidelines (Shenker, Sorensen, and 
Davis, 2009) the HD category of drinkers consume more than the recommended units per 
week, their alcohol usage is not necessarily excessive. Likewise, most of the participants 
recruited during this thesis are from non-clinical populations, and as no dependency 
measures are used, they cannot be construed as addicts. Yet, the study of non-clinical 
populations may still be applicable to clinical substance abusing addicts. Within the drinking 
categories used in this chapter, based on undergraduate consumption norms (see Bewick, et 
al., 2008), one would broadly expect to find a 50/50 split between HD and low-mid drinkers 
(e.g. Bewick, et al., 2008, observes that, cross-sectionally, 51% of first year males are LD, 
whilst the remaining 49% are MD or HD drinkers; 49% of female first years are LD, whilst the 
remaining 51% are MD or HD). However, as mid-level drinkers were removed from the
analyses in this thesis it would be expected to find a distribution of more HD participants 
than LD participants (e.g. in this chapter HD = 23; LD = 13; following the removal of 12 mid­
level drinkers. Bewick, et al., 2008 grouped LD and MD together; if this was performed here 
then it would be expected to obtain groups of 23 HDs and 25 LD/MDs. This is broadly 
analogous to the 50/50 split found by Bewick et al., 2008). Therefore the current sample 
would be analogous with previous research in the field. Note that in subsequent chapters, 
wherever a HD LD distinction is employed, it is the same distinction as the one described 
here. Slight variation in HD LD group sizes would be an artefact o f the removal of mid-level 
drinkers and should be expected within a normal population of undergraduate students 
whose pattern of alcohol consumption varies during their university studies (see Bewick, et 
al., 2008).
2.2.6: Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of a database of pictures from Hogarth, Dickinson, and Duka (2009). Each 
picture of alcohol use had a carefully matched control picture. For example, a hand holding 
a pint o f lager would have a corresponding picture showing a hand holding an object with 
broadly similar shape and colour, but not alcohol related (see Figure 2-1, for an example). 
The alcohol-related distractor stimuli included pictures of lager or bitter beer, red and white 
wine, spirits including vodka, whisky, and gin, and alcopops. The neutral distractor stimuli 
were from a single thematic category, that of office equipment. They included pictures of 
books, phones, folders, etc. There were 16 pictures in each category and all pictures 
measured 105mm x 105mm. Distractor stimuli could be presented within any one of six 
equally-sized regions which the computer monitor was notionally divided into (Figure 2-1). 
Finally, the visual fixation region the participant was instructed to attend to was as large as 
the alcohol-related or neutral distractor stimuli and was designed to be visually salient 
(Figure 2-2).
On each trial the fixation region would appear in one of the six regions of the screen. 
Alternative array designs may be used, for example, one possibility was to place the fixation 
region in a consistent place, e.g., in the middle of the screen. But it was decided that having 
a variable fixation region would make it less likely that participants may suffer lapses of 
attention due to salient distractors, and so amplify the effect that was being looked for, 
without reducing the ecological validity of the task. Therefore a configuration is used which
employed a number of possible locations for fixation regions and distractor stimuli. This 
partly enabled an exploration of whether the distance between the fixation region and the 
distractor stimuli may be a relevant variable. For example, prior to the task, it was not 
possible to establish whether distractor stimuli closer to the fixation region, or furthest 
away, would be the most distracting. Therefore, a mixture of distances are employed in 
order to measure which distance was the most distracting for the participant. Participants 
were instructed to look at the fixation region centre for each trial. Once participants had 
attended to the fixation region area for one second, the distractor stimuli would appear 
(only one distracting picture would appear per trial). Following the presentation of the 
picture, if the participant's gaze was to leave the fixation region boundary, then the 
distractor stimuli would disappear instantly. Therefore participants were unable to fixate 
upon the distractor stimuli. For the distractor stimuli to reappear, participants would need 
to fixate on the fixation region for 10ms. The fixation region was displayed for five seconds 
in total, so the maximum duration for which the distractor stimuli could be displayed on the 
screen was 4 seconds.
Each alcohol-related distractor stimuli and its corresponding neutral distractor 
stimuli were presented within separate trials within the same location on the screen and the 
fixation region would also appear in the same location as in the matched trial. An alcohol 
trial and its matched control trial could never occur consecutively, neither could the same 
fixation region location and distractor stimulus location follow from each other. Therefore, 
the participant looked at a different segment of the computer display in each trial. The 
distance between the distractor stimuli and the fixation region was manipulated in the 
experiment. There were overall four separate distances which were employed. However, for 
the purposes of statistical analyses, it is more meaningful to consider a distractor stimulus 
as being either 'Near' the fixation region (actual distances between distractor stimulus and 
fixation region were 115mm or 165mm; distances were measured from the centre of the 
distractor stimuli to the centre of the fixation region) or 'Far' away from the fixation region 
(distances were 230mm or 265mm). The distractor stimuli were randomly allocated to each 
of the distance groups. Also, the assignment was randomised of the type of alcohol 
portrayed by the distractor stimuli, so that for each distance, a variety of alcoholic drinks 
were displayed.
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Figure 2-1. Example of fixation region and distractor stimuli. This example of control 
distractor stimuli depicts a hand reaching for a folder (no grid lines were present in the 
experiment, they are shown here to represent the 6 sections of the screen which contain 
the fixation region and distractor stimuli).
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Figure 2-2. Example of matched distractor stimuli. This example of alcohol distractor stimuli 
depicts a hand reaching for a pint. Note the similarity with Figure 2-1. The matched control 
and experimental distractor stimuli are subtracted in order to make a 'difference' score. It is 
this score that is used to create the measures of attentional biases.
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Questionnaires -  Participants completed a computer-based questionnaire, designed to look 
like a general questionnaire on health, and which also included questions relating to 
dyslexia (the dyslexia questions were used to mislead participants: see Appendix A). Within 
this questionnaire, there was an embedded question related to weekly alcohol 
consumption. The question which was asked of the participants was 'How many alcohol 
units do you drink per week?' and an alcohol unit calculator was provided. The purpose of 
the questionnaire was disguised in this way so as to minimise priming effects. After the eye 
tracking study, participants also completed a computerised version of Love et al.'s (1998) 
alcohol craving questionnaire, the Desire for Alcohol Questionnaire (see Appendix B). This 
questionnaire was chosen as it has been argued to be a good measure of craving (e.g., see 
Love, James, and Wilner, 1998).
2.2.7; Procedure
Participants first completed the general health questionnaire, followed by the Dyslexia Adult 
Screening Test (Fawcett and Nicolson, 1998), which was added in order to further mislead 
participants following the alcohol unit question. The alcohol question was presented in this 
way, in between tasks, so as to minimise a perception of its importance in the experiment, 
and so reduce possible priming effects (indeed, questions presented first or last would likely 
be remembered the most, if one considers the well-known recency, primary effects in 
memory relevant in this context). Therefore, although participants were subsequently 
debriefed, at this stage of the experiment it was wanted for participants to be blind to the 
alcohol nature of the study. The DAST consisted of five measures designed to screen for 
dyslexia; rapid naming task, one minute reading task, two minute spelling task, nonsense 
passage reading, and the one minute writing task. They then performed the main 
experimental task, which involved being asked to continuously attend to the fixation region, 
whilst ignoring any distractor stimuli, which might be presented in their peripheral vision. 
While participants were carrying out the task, an eye tracker would measure their eye 
fixations. Specifically, the fixation counts were measured in the presence of the distractor 
stimuli, as a function of the position of the distractor stimuli, relative to the fixation region. 
Thus, a distractor stimulus could be either near or far. Recall, when a participant directed 
his/ her gaze away from the fixation region, towards a distractor stimulus, beyond a certain 
threshold (the edge of the fixation region), the distractor stimuli would disappear. So, the
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number of times a participant would break this threshold was measured, again as a function 
of the type of distractor stimuli and distance. A binary variable of whether a distractor 
stimulus caused the threshold to be broken was also recorded.
Because the distractor stimuli would vanish as soon as participants directed their 
gaze towards the distractor stimuli, participants would have very limited opportunity to 
process the distractor stimuli in any great detail. Therefore, following the eye tracking task, 
participants completed an awareness task for the distractor stimuli (this was computerised 
and implemented with the ePrime program). The stimuli in the awareness task were all the 
images employed in the eye tracking task, and some additional foils. The foils were 28 
pictures from the database of Hogarth, Dickinson, and Duka (2009), which were not 
employed in the eye-tracking task. Therefore, there were 60 pictures in the awareness task. 
In each trial of this task, participants would see an image on a computer screen and be 
required to determine whether they had seen it previously and, if yes, how sure they were 
that they had seen it.
Finally, participants completed Love eta l.’s (1998) alcohol craving questionnaire.
2.3: Results
It was aimed to measure participants' ability to inhibit their attentional biases. The main 
dependent variables were the number of fixations within the fixation region when the 
distractor stimuli appeared, the number of times a participant broke the fixation region 
threshold, and the binary variable of whether the fixation region threshold was broken or 
not for each trial (so that for a participant, the break binary variable would be the sum of all 
the trials for which the threshold was broken at least once). Note that, in all cases these 
variables were computed in terms of the measure for the alcohol distractor stimuli minus 
the corresponding measure for the neutral ones. Thus, in all cases larger scores indicate an 
attentional bias for alcohol-related information. The three independent variables were the 
type of distractor stimuli (alcohol-related vs. neutral), the distance between distractor 
stimuli and fixation regions (near vs. far), and the type of participant (heavy drinker vs. light 
drinker). The first two variables were manipulated as within-participants variables, whilst 
the last variable is a between-participants one. The first variable is called fixation counts, the
second variable break frequency, and the third variable break binary. Note that eye tracking 
variable scores were excluded from all analyses, which were higher than the 2.5 standard 
deviations from the corresponding means; this represented excessive artefacts in the 
recording of eye movements, e.g., the tracker losing the eye due to participants' excessive 
movements.
The correlation results for the three dependent variables can be seen in Table 1 
below. The results demonstrate a high level of consistency in the eye tracking results.
Table 2-1. Correlations between the attentional bias variables obtained using the fixed gaze 
inhibition task. Each attentional bias variable is created by calculating the 'difference' 
between alcohol and matched control distractor stimuli. The attentional bias means and 
standard deviations are also displayed.
Fixation
Counts
Break
Frequency
Break
Binary
Fixation Near 1.00** .469** .216
Counts Far 1.00** .623** .275
Break Near 1.00** .545**
Frequency Far 1.00** .332*
Break Near 1.00**
Binary Far 1.00**
Near -.739 -.496 -.560
Mean
Far 1.106 1.667 .500
Standard Near 5.013 15.095 1.895
deviation Far 5.074 11.033 1.278
Note: The Pearson's r values appear in the table. The significance of these values are 
denoted by *p < .05. **p  < .01 (two-tailed).
Fixation Count
For each of the dependent variables, two analytical approaches were adopted, depending 
on how alcohol consumption was measured. On the one hand, there are the raw reports of
alcohol units consumed per week. Alcohol units could be directly related to the dependent 
variables. On the other hand, there is the distinction between heavy and light drinkers. Also 
reported are corresponding results regarding the measure of craving.
A linear multiple regression analysis was used to examine whether the fixation 
counts for each of the distance categories (near, far) could predict reported weekly alcohol 
unit consumption. Using the enter method, a significant model did not emerge, F{2, 41) = 
2.420; p = .102. However, there were trends consistent with the expectation that higher 
alcohol consumption is associated with a greater fixation count for alcohol distractor stimuli 
for both Near distances (corresponding standardised beta, P = .309, p = .054) and Far 
distances (p =.214, p = .176).
Figure 2-3 demonstrates the average fixation counts for heavy and light drinkers. A 
mixed ANOVA was carried out for fixation counts, with distance being a within participants 
variable, and the heavy drinker/light drinker distinction the between participants variable. 
The analysis yielded a non-significant main effect for distance F[1, 29) = .523; p = .476, so 
that there was no difference in fixation counts, depending on whether the distractor stimuli 
appeared in a Near or a Far location. The interaction between the two variables, distance 
and participant type, was also not significant, F{1, 29) = 1.979; p =.170. Crucially, there was a 
significant between-subjects effect for the type of participant variable F{ 1, 29) = 6.505; p = 
.016. Therefore, the results revealed a significant difference in fixation counts, between light 
and heavy drinkers.
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Figure 2-3. Average fixation counts within each distance for heavy drinker (HD) and light 
drinker (LD) groups. The bars represent the 'difference scores' obtained by subtracting 
control and alcohol-related stimuli. The error bars show the standard error of the mean.
Next fixation counts were explored in relation to craving. First, a linear multiple 
regression analysis was performed, with fixation counts for each distance as independent 
variables, to predict craving scores. The regression model was not significant, however, F[2, 
41) = .741; p = .483. As before, the standardised beta coefficients were consistent with a 
trend for an association between higher craving and higher fixation counts, though none of 
the beta even approached significance ((Near: P = .034, p = .834; Far: p =-.181, p = .271).
Finally, it was of interest to examine whether higher fixation counts would be 
associated with greater awareness. Note that, as the distracting images disappeared every 
time a participant tried to fixate on them, it cannot be taken for granted that participants 
were consciously aware of the distractor stimuli. First it was important to consider two tests 
which do not relate to any of the specific dependent variables. Overall there were 60 images 
in the awareness task, of which 32 had been presented in the eye tracking task and 28 were 
novel foils. Therefore, a 50% chance score in the awareness task would correspond to 30 
correct responses. The mean of participants' correct responses was 30.29 (SD=2.86) and a 
single sample t-test did not show this to be significantly different from the chance score of
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30, t(47) = .707; p = .483. Thus, there was no evidence that participants were consciously 
aware of the distractor stimuli.
The average percentage correct for each item and the average confidence rating for 
the recognition decision for each item was computed. A high correlation between 
percentage correct and confidence ratings can be taken as evidence that participants have 
conscious awareness of the corresponding knowledge (this is the 'zero order' correlation 
criterion, e.g., Dienes et al., 1995). But, the correlation was not significant, r(48) = -.007; p = 
.960. These results together provide evidence that participants were not consciously aware 
of the distractor stimuli. However, some (obviously reduced) awareness of the distractor 
stimuli may still have affected the eye tracking variables. Therefore, next to be considered 
was whether awareness of the distractor stimuli might impact on fixation counts. It was 
expected that participants were more likely to remember the distractor stimuli, which they 
attempted to look at more frequently. Therefore a regression analysis was employed to 
examine whether the fixation counts for each distance could predict the awareness scores. 
Using the enter method, a marginally significant model emerged, F(2, 41) = 2.618; p = .086. 
Adjusted R square =.073. A slight association between fixation count and awareness was 
thus observed, though this did not differentiate between fixation counts for the Near and 
Far distances (Near: p = .304, p = .056; Far: P =.246, p = .120).
Break Frequency
Tested first was the possibility that the break frequency variable for the Near distance and 
for the Far distance could together predict weekly alcohol consumption, using a linear 
multiple regression, as above. The regression model was not significant, even though 
standardised betas were consistent with a trend for higher scores on the break frequency 
variable to be associated with higher alcohol consumption {F{2, 44) = 1.393; p = .260, Near: 
P = .229, p = .143; Far: p =.165, p = .288).
Figure 2-4 demonstrates the average break frequencies for heavy and light drinkers. 
A mixed ANOVA was then carried out for the break frequency variable, with distance being 
the within participants variable, and the heavy drinker/light drinker distinction the between 
participants variable. The analysis yielded a non-significant main effect for distance {F[ 1, 32) 
= 2.943; p = .096) and no interaction effect (F( 1, 32) = .531; p =.472). However, the main
interest is in whether break frequency scores were different between light and heavy 
drinkers, and this was the case, as shown by a significant corresponding main effect: F( 1, 32) 
= 6.529; p = .016.
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Figure 2-4. Average break frequencies within each distance for heavy drinker (HD) and light 
drinker (LD) groups. The bars represent the 'difference scores' obtained by subtracting 
control and alcohol-related stimuli. The error bars show the standard error of the mean.
Also, in this case, higher break frequency scores were significantly associated with 
higher craving scores, though equally so regardless of the distance between distractor 
stimuli and fixation region. A regression for craving scores against break frequency scores, 
for the two distances, was found to be significant, F(2, 44) = 3.434; p = .042 (Near: (3 = .241, 
p = .109; Far: (3 =-.236, p = .116).
Finally, a regression was used to test whether the break frequency for each distance 
could predict awareness scores, this was found not to be significant, F(2, 44) = 1.119; p = 
.336. Nonetheless, as in the other cases, the standardised betas showed a trend such that 
higher values on the break frequency variable corresponded to higher awareness (Near: (3 = 
.221, p = .161; Far: (3 =.119, p = .447).
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Break Binary
A regression was used to test whether the break binary variable for each distance could 
predict the reported weekly alcohol unit consumption. Using the enter method, a marginally 
significant model emerged, F{2, 44) = 3.038; p -  .059. Adjusted R square = .085. The beta 
coefficients were consistent with the expectation that an increase in break binary frequency 
would be associated with a greater degree of alcohol consumption (Near: P = .269, p = .069; 
Far: P =.240, p = . 104).
Next to be performed was a mixed ANOVA for this variable, with distance being the 
within participants variable and the heavy drinker/light drinker distinction the between 
participants variable. Figure 2-5 demonstrates the average break binary scores for heavy 
and light drinkers. The analysis yielded a significant main effect for distance F( 1, 31) = 5.812; 
p = .022, indicating that the break binary variable was much higher for Near distracting 
images, than for Far ones. The interaction between the two variables was not significant, 
F( 1, 31) = .208; p =.651. Importantly, as before, there was a significant effect for type of 
participant F{ 1, 31) = 4.351; p = .045, indicating that heavy drinkers had higher scores on the 
break binary variable, compared to light drinkers.
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Figure 2-5. Average break binaries within each distance for heavy drinker (HD) and light 
drinker (LD) groups. The bars represent the 'difference scores' obtained by subtracting 
control and alcohol-related stimuli. The error bars show the standard error of the mean.
Next, a regression model between break binary scores (as predictors) and craving 
scores was found to be not significant, F(2, 44) = 1.388; p = .261 (Near: (3 = .245, p = .109; 
Far: 3 =-.039, p = .795).
Finally, an examination of the association between the break binary variable and the 
awareness scores was performed. However, the association was not significant, F[2, 44) = 
.386; p = .682.
Sum m ary o f  Results
The most consistent results were identified with respect to the classification of drinkers as 
heavy vs. light. For all three dependent variables, fixation counts, break frequency, and 
break binary, a main effect for alcohol usage group was observed. In all cases, heavy 
drinkers were significantly more distracted by alcohol-related distractor stimuli than light 
drinkers. This was the key variable of interest. By contrast, significant main effects for the 
distance variable were not consistently observed, i.e. the distance between the fixation 
region and the distractor stimuli. There was a significant distance main effect for the break
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frequency dependent variable, but this was not observed for either fixation counts or the 
break binary variable. Finally, in no case was a significant interaction between participant 
type and distance observed.
The results regarding weekly alcohol use and craving were less consistent. It was 
attempted to predict alcohol use on the basis of fixation counts, break frequency, or break 
binary, for the two distances, but no model emerged as significant, even though there were 
trends in the expected direction. Regarding craving, while there was a significant main effect 
regarding the break frequency variable, this was not the case for fixation counts or break 
binary.
Finally, regression models looking at awareness against fixation counts, break 
frequency, and break binary were not significant. This is not surprising, since awareness 
levels were very low overall in the first place. The single samples t-test against chance 
revealed that participants could not discriminate between the images included in the eye 
tracker task and the novel foils. This is a very interesting finding, in light of the robust results 
regarding attentional bias for the alcohol distractor stimuli (i.e., the main effects of 
participant type, which were observed for all three dependent variables).
2.4: Discussion
Here a novel experimental task for the measurement of attentional biases for alcohol- 
related information has been presented. The paradigm is based on an eye tracking task. 
However, all traditional tasks measuring alcohol-related attentional biases with eye tracking 
techniques rely on the idea that a higher degree of attentional biases for alcohol-related 
information would be associated with a greater preference of an alcohol-related stimulus, 
relative to a neutral stimulus. It should be stressed that there is little doubt that this is, most 
likely, a key aspect of what attentional biases for alcohol-related information are (Field, 
2010; Hogarth et al., 2009).The motivation for this proposal is based on the idea that there 
is, potentially, an alternative facet to attentional biases for alcohol-related information, 
concerning the extent to which the processing of alcohol-related information is not just 
prioritised (relative to neutral information), but rather is compulsory for alcohol abusers. 
Exactly how distracting is an alcohol-related stimulus for an alcohol abuser? Such a
perspective to attentional biases for alcohol-related information links well with 
corresponding theory regarding how alcohol abuse may undermine inhibitory processes, in 
relation to alcohol use (cf. Field & Cox, 2004; Wiers & Stacy, 2010). Thus, an experimental 
task was examined in which the participants' task was to focus on a simple fixation region 
and ignore any presented distractor stimuli. Each trial lasted five seconds. During each trial, 
a single distractor stimulus would be presented at various distances, relative to the fixation 
region. Not only were participants told not to attend to this fixation region, but, moreover, if 
they did attend to it, it would disappear. Thus, it is believed there were excellent incentives 
for participants to avoid attending to the distractor stimuli. Despite this, the participants 
who were heavy drinkers produced more fixations to the alcohol distractor stimuli than the 
neutral ones, relative to light drinkers (all dependent variables in this work were computed 
as difference scores between a measure for alcohol distractor stimuli and the corresponding 
measure for neutral images). It is thought that this result provides evidence that attentional 
biases for alcohol-related information can have a distracting influence for heavy drinkers, 
over and above the evidence which has been forthcoming from alternative tasks for alcohol- 
related attentional biases (Cox etal., 2006; Williams e ta i, 1996).
This research provides encouragement for the use of this novel experimental 
paradigm for the study of attentional biases for alcohol-related information and also 
motivates several further directions for future research. One important issue concerns the 
best way to characterise excessive drinking. These results revealed systematic associations 
between eye-tracking and alcohol use, but only relative to the distinction between heavy 
and light drinkers, not the number of alcohol units consumed. Moreover, alcohol craving 
scores failed to provide a consistent pattern of results across the three dependent variables 
(i.e., fixation counts, break frequency, break binary). Can it be assumed that the broad 
distinction between heavy and light drinkers is perhaps more valid than these alternative 
variables? This is arguably the case, especially for this population sample, which exclusively 
consisted of university undergraduates. Employing a ratio measure, such as weekly alcohol 
consumption, assumes that even small differences in the measure (e.g., a weekly alcohol 
use of 10 units, instead of 12) are meaningful. However, when such differences are not 
meaningful, they are noise, greatly reducing the power of the corresponding regression 
analyses or correlations. Given that these participants were university undergraduates,
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there is a strong expectation that their drinking patterns would be fairly variable and also 
subject to considerable fluctuation (e.g., depending on work deadlines, holiday periods, 
etc.). Therefore, while a distinction into heavy and light drinkers is most likely valid, a finer 
attempt to differentiate members of such a population sample on the basis of weekly scores 
is unlikely to be successful (note that this is also the reason why a minimalist approach was 
adopted regarding the measurement o f alcohol use, with just a single question). Overall, it 
was no surprise that the distinction between heavy and light drinkers is the one which led to 
the most consistent results. Indeed, the intuition that the association between alcohol- 
related attentional biases and alcohol use is probably best understood in terms of broad 
distinctions of alcohol users has been expressed for the alcohol-Stroop task as well and with 
samples of a much greater variety (Cox et al., 2006). Note also that the LD group in the 
current study has a much narrower range of alcohol use that that o f the HD group. The 
wider variation of units in the HD group could potentially bias results, for example, it is 
known that unequal sample sizes reduce the power of independent-samples comparisons. 
However, it is common practise (e.g. Field, Mogg, Zetteler, and Bradley, 2004) to exclude 
from an analysis those considered to have low-to-median substance usage, rather than use 
a median-split when creating substance use groups, as this leads to distinct group 
differences (see Field and Cox, 2008). Indeed, the practice of creating groups by median 
splits has been intensely criticised in the literature (MacCallum et al., 2002). The use of a 
suitable control group (e.g. light-users) means that group differences can be unequivocally 
interpreted as being a result of heavy substance use. Therefore a low range in a LD group 
could be seen as necessary in order to ensure only light-users are within this control group. 
Yet, within a wide HD range of usage, extreme scores could potentially be skewing results. 
Therefore future research which utilises such alcohol-usage conditions may benefit from 
closer consideration of this issue. Yet, the current sample would seem analogous, in terms 
of unit consumption, to previous research exploring alcohol use in student populations (see 
Bewick, et al., 2008). Bewick et al (2008) found similar patterns of substance use in his large 
sample (N= 5895) where roughly half o f the participants were HD; which is equivalent to the 
current sample HD = 23 out of 48. However, Bewick, et al. (2008) found variability in 
percentage of HDs dependent upon year o f undergraduate study. Within this thesis this 
information (year of study) was not tracked, in relation to drinking patterns, as it was
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considered very unlikely that it would affect the relation between the DVs and IVs that were 
studied.
Demand characteristics may also have influenced results. Even though measures 
were taken to try to disguise the initial alcohol unit question, some participants may not 
have been entirely blind to the alcohol-nature of the study (this is important, since 
participants aware that this is an alcohol study may be show a higher attentional bias, 
irrespective of alcohol use). This limitation could be addressed in future by asking 
participants o f their alcohol usage following the eye tracking task rather than prior, although 
of course such a procedure produces the converse possible problem, of having a report on 
alcohol use influenced by the cognitive tasks.
Note that some of the arguments above apply to craving scores as well. However, 
the inclusion of craving scores in the study was motivated partly as an attempt to explore 
whether attentional biases for alcohol-related information in this paradigm could be best 
characterised by alcohol consumption or craving. The results indicate the former approach 
leads to the strongest associations.
A related question is which of the three eye tracking variables; fixation count, break 
frequency, or break binary, is more diagnostic or informative, regarding attentional biases 
for alcohol-related information. Currently, there is no compelling reason to prefer one 
variable, as opposed to the others, and this is a significant limitation of the study. But it can 
be speculated that fixation count may be the most appropriate measure. This is because 
processing a stimulus and how distracting it is possibly feed into each other. In other words, 
once a distractor stimulus has appeared, a participant would only be marginally aware of its 
properties and form. Every time the participant attempts to process it, he/ she would get a 
fraction more of information about the distractor stimuli (recall, the distractor stimuli would 
disappear once the participant directs his/ her attention away from the fixation region). It is 
likely that each such fraction of information actually increases the distractibility of the 
distractor stimulus, in the simple sense that the more aware a heavy drinker becomes of an 
alcohol-related stimuli, the stronger the corresponding attentional biases for alcohol-related 
information -  such a prediction seems consistent with several corresponding theoretical 
approaches (e.g., Cox & Klinger, 1988; Tiffany, 1990; Wiers & Stacy, 2010). Such a
perspective is consistent with the idea that attentional biases for alcohol-related 
information of this kind are best measured by fixation counts. Exploring these (admittedly, 
currently speculative) ideas in a rigorous experimental setting appears a fruitful avenue for 
extending this work.
This experimental design also manipulated the distance between the fixation region 
and the distractor stimuli. There were no strong prior expectations regarding the possible 
effect o f distance on results. It could be the case that stimuli further away from the fixation 
region would be less distracting than stimuli closer to it. Equally, participants would always 
be aware of the presence and the approximate nature of the distractor stimuli, so that 
distance would not matter. These results are more consistent with the latter hypothesis, 
since there was no interaction between distance and participant group. However, clearly 
more work is needed before this issue can be settled with certainty, one way or the other. It 
is a limitation of the current experiment that it is not possible to provide a firmer motivation 
in relation to the possible impact o f distance on the results. Perhaps more careful 
manipulation of the distance variance, in future research, may reveal results which will help 
understand the potential role of this variable. At a simple prescriptive level, it can be noted 
that the distance that results in the strongest effect appears to be the 'near' distance.
Field and Christiansen (2012) state that establishing the internal reliability of tasks 
intending to measure substance-related attentional biases, such as the emotional-Stroop 
and the dot-probe is essential for the development of the area. They suggest that reliability 
o f such tasks can be improved if stimulus selection is tailored specifically for each individual. 
The task reported here, however, would not suffer from such individual stimulus selection, 
as participants would only look at the pictures that they themselves cannot inhibit their gaze 
away from. The rest of the stimuli, the experimental stimuli that a participant may not have 
an attentional bias for (e.g. a heavy drinker who does not have an attentional bias for white 
wine picture stimuli because they only drink ale), would not affect the attentional bias 
results, as only the gaze away from the fixation region caused by specific distractor stimuli is 
being measured. Other tasks, e.g. the dot-probe, would display two pictures on the screen 
at any one time. So, for example, a HD ale drinker, when presented with a picture pair, one 
of which being white wine, may not necessarily feel the urge to look at the white wine 
stimuli at all, giving an impression that they themselves are not a HD. The task above would
not suffer from such erroneous results caused by specific consumption habits. Ataya et al. 
(2012) make the point that tasks such as the emotional-Stroop and the dot-probe are used 
to measure the underlying mechanisms of substance abuse, as well as a predictor of 
treatment outcomes. Ataya et al. (2012) state that such uses of the tasks are motivationally 
very different, so appropriate tasks should be used in each case. Here inhibitory control was 
considered. This is argued to be a more robust measure of attentional biases.
Perhaps the most significant extension of the present work concerns an examination 
of the predictive role of attentional biases for alcohol-related information measured in 
terms of fixation counts, in relation to changes in alcohol use. Such predictive results in 
alcohol abuse (e.g., Cox et al., 2002; Cox, Pothos, & Hosier, 2007) and appetitive behaviour 
in general (e.g., Calitri et al., 2010) have been cornerstones in motivating an understanding 
of attentional biases for alcohol-related information as having a causal role in the 
corresponding behaviour and related theoretical developments. Will attentional biases for 
alcohol-related information concerning the distractibility o f alcohol-related stimuli produce 
similar predictive results? This is an exciting challenge for future work.
Summary: Within this experiment it was considered whether a heavy drinker is able to 
inhibit their attentional bias toward alcohol-related stimuli. A gaze contingency paradigm 
was used to measure the compulsion to process or attend to alcohol stimuli. Poor inhibitory 
control is an important aspect of alcoholism. It was found that there was a significant 
distinction between HD and LD participants in terms of all three eye tracking measures of 
inhibitory control and attentional bias. Results suggest that attentional bias is not just a 
process of stimuli becoming prioritised (e.g. Field and Cox, 2008), but also stimuli become 
compulsory to attend to and process.
2.6: Experiment 2: Rapid Orienting of Attention to Alcohol Stimuli
It was demonstrated that a lack of ability to inhibit an attentional bias once it has been 
established. Previous literature has shown that attention can be 'held' by alcohol stimuli for 
heavy drinkers. But, in relation to the initial orienting of attention, the 'grabbing' of 
attention, the literature is not so clear. Here, a method of analysing the results of the fixed 
gaze inhibition task is described. Such that it is possible to establish whether there is an 
initial orienting of attention toward alcohol related stimuli in the HD group. Note that this is 
a re-analysis of the same study data as Experiment 1.
2.7: Introduction
Of attentional bias tasks, the most commonly used measure is the Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935). This classic task involves participants identifying the colour of words, whilst ignoring 
the meaning of the text. Interference occurs as people automatically read the word, so are 
therefore impaired in colour naming, when the meaning of the word is in conflict with the 
ink colour o f the word. When the text is replaced by emotional words (e.g. alcohol-related 
words for heavy drinkers), compared to control words (e.g. transportation-related words), 
then a delay in reaction time for the emotional words would be expected, as long as the 
word meaning is relevant to participants. This interference has been suggested to be 
representative of an attentional bias. This is because the delay is thought to be the result of 
the meaning of the word capturing the attention of the participant, thus reducing cognitive 
resources for the concurrent task (that of naming the colour). This interference on the 
emotional-Stroop task has been found for both addiction-related and anxiety-related words, 
and in both cases it is assumed to be representative of attentional biases. However, anxiety- 
related attentional biases are generally assumed to be the result o f a negative appraisal of 
threat-related stimuli. By contrast, for the substance abuse-related attentional bias, the 
situation is a bit more complicated, as substance abuse-related stimuli may be perceived as 
either appetitive or aversive, due to a number of issues (e.g. social drinkers compared to 
abstaining alcoholics). Therefore to merely suggest that the Stroop is a measure of 
attentional bias would be misleading, as the attentional bias that exists for anxiety and 
substance abuse is actually different.
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The attentional bias associated with threat-related stimuli has been well 
documented (e.g. Bar Haim et al., 2007). Those who are prone to anxiety problems have 
been found to have an increased attentional bias for stimuli related to threat compared to 
those who are typically not anxious (e.g. Mogg and Bradely, 1998). For example, those with 
specific phobias have demonstrated an attentional bias for stimuli related to their phobia 
(e.g. an attentional bias for spiders). By contrast, those who have generalised anxiety 
disorders demonstrate an attentional bias for stimuli that are generally threat-related (see 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Such attentional biases have been found to be a robust 
phenomenon within populations high in anxiety (e.g. Cisler, et al., 2009). Whether these 
attentional biases are toward the stimulus or away from the stimulus is an important issue, 
and the focus of this chapter, as is discussed below.
As mentioned previously, attentional biases have also been found to be associated 
with substance abuse (see Field and Cox, 2008). Such biases have been observed between 
groups (e.g. heavy versus light drinkers) or indeed within groups, e.g. increased craving has 
been found to be associated with an increase in attentional bias (Cox, Munafo, Franken, 
2009). Research has found attentional biases for a number of different substances; alcohol 
(Cox, Hogan, Kristian, & Race, 2002), nicotine (Waters, et al., 2003), cocaine (Hester, Dixon, 
Garavan, 2006), and cannabis (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004). Yet, a qualitative difference 
could potentially exist between threat and substance abuse related attentional biases. 
Whereas threat stimuli could potentially have inherent motivational properties, e.g. we may 
have an innate fear of snakes due to  our evolutionary past, this same inherent motivational 
property would presumably be lacking in substance abuse, e.g. cans of lager are relatively 
new in human evolution! It is therefore assumed that at least some kinds of attentional 
biases (both for threat and substances) are learnt rather than being innate.
As stated above, Stroop interference studies would suggest that the attentional bias 
effect seen for both substance abuse and threat related stimuli can be analogous, if the 
Stroop task is employed. However, the same conclusion is not necessarily reached if other 
measures of attentional bias are used. Cisler and Koster (2010), through meta-analysis, 
made the suggestion that there are three forms of attentional bias: facilitated attention, 
delayed disengagement, and attentional avoidance (attentional avoidance cannot occur 
concurrently with the other forms of attentional bias). These forms of attentional bias have
all been demonstrated within the anxiety attentional bias literature. However, for substance 
abuse, the results are less clear. First, each form of attentional bias is briefly summarised. 
For threat stimuli, facilitated attention has been observed. In such cases, attention has been 
found to  be drawn to threat stimuli. This is a process of rapid orienting of attention. Further, 
threat stimuli are also associated with a delayed disengagement of attention. This is when 
attention has been captured by threat stimuli, which impairs the switching of attention. 
Attentional avoidance has been suggested to be the complete contrast of traditional notions 
of attentional bias, as it is thought that threat stimuli, in some cases, actually cause 
attention to be diverted away from a threat cue (e.g. Koster, et al., 2006). This entire 
process, though noting that each component can exist without the presence of the other 
two, has been thought to be the result of a hypersensitive system for coping under threat. 
We are rapidly able to locate threat and have trouble removing our attention from it. But, 
following threat, we remove our attention from the threatening stimulus, perhaps to 
alleviate anxiety (Cisler and Koster, 2010).
Substance abuse-related attentional biases apparently operate in a different 
manner. It would appear that abused substances may capture the attention of individuals 
within the substance abusing population (e.g. Cox et al., 2002) and there is also evidence of 
an overt gaze away from substance-related stimuli (e.g. Noel, et al., 2006). However, 
whether or not substance related stimuli can draw attention has not yet been established. 
Indeed Field (2010) states 'To date, no published studies have used adequate 
methodologies to convincingly demonstrate rapid orienting of attention toward drug- 
related stimuli. Instead, substance abusers seem to show a bias in the maintenance or 
disengagement of attention, in that drug-related cues are able to 'hold', but perhaps not 
rapidly 'grab7, their attention' (Field, 2010; p637). The apparent importance of such an 
aspect o f attentional bias is the focus of this chapter. The implications of such a feature of 
substance abuse-related attentional biases may suggest that attentional biases are not 
merely an effect of substance abuse, but may also be involved in the maintenance of such 
behaviours. As substance abuse related stimuli can trigger urges that lead to substance 
seeking behaviour (e.g. Tiffany, 1990). So if attention can also be grabbed by such stimuli, 
then merely being in the presence of substance related stimuli may lead to urges which 
could subsequently lead to further substance abuse. This is qualitatively different to what is
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already known about attentional biases and urges, as initial orienting of attention may imply 
a lack of awareness over attention toward substance -related stimuli. If this is the case then 
a cycle of initial orienting of attention -> urges -> substance abuse may initiate prior to 
awareness, suggesting a loss of control (see Tiffany, 1990).
It has however been observed that those seeking treatment for alcoholism may 
demonstrate rapid orienting of attention (e.g. Noel, et al. 2006) and an attentional 
avoidance (e.g. Townshend and Duka, 2007), yet these findings have not been observed 
with people not receiving treatment. It may be that those who seek treatment for 
alcoholism may start to see alcohol as threatening, so any attentional bias becomes more 
like a threat-related attentional bias, rather than a substance-related attentional bias, as 
observed in heavy drinkers. Indeed, Noel et al. (2006) found that by using 3 different 
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) on a dot-probe task, only the 50ms SOA resulted in an 
attentional bias for abstinent alcoholics, whilst 500ms and 1250ms SOAs resulted in 
attentional avoidance. These results are consistent with the notion that following an initial 
brief drawing of attention, the stimulus is then actively avoided, potentially due to an 
implicit desire to reduce anxiety that this stimuli may be causing (the corresponding 
participants would be alcoholics who may have entered treatment for their problem, so may 
therefore have a history of bad experience with alcohol, leading to their seeking of 
treatment). However, such a drawing of attention has not been observed in heavy drinking 
non-clinical populations, prior to the potential negative appraisal of substance-related 
stimuli.
However the drawing of conclusions, regarding initial attentional orienting, from the 
dot-probe paradigm is limited, as reaction times only suggest where the participant's 
attention was when the probe appeared (e.g. Braddeley, et al., 2004; Field et al., 2004a). 
Also, Field et al. (2004a) found that heavy drinkers and light drinkers did not differ in terms 
of dot-probe performance with an SOA of 200ms (it is generally assumed that SOAs of 50 -  
200ms are required to measure initial orienting: Duncan et al., 1994). This result which may 
suggest that the dot probe methodology may not be sufficient for measuring initial orienting 
of attention.
The purpose of the current experiment is to measure whether alcohol stimuli can 
grab attention within a non-abstaining or treatment seeking population, as this form of 
attentional bias is seen as empirically different from the holding of attention, which has 
already been established in previous research. In order to differentiate this experiment from 
previous attentional bias measures, which may not necessarily be able to measure the initial 
orienting of attention, a novel paradigm has been developed. Within the current task 
participants are explicitly told to look at a fixation region and ignore all other (distracting) 
stimuli on a screen. Should a participant's attention wander from the fixation region, then 
the distractor stimulus would vanish. Half o f the distracting stimuli in this task are alcohol 
related, whilst the other half are neutral controls. Therefore, participants would not know in 
advance the content of the distracting stimulus. Following the onset of the distracting 
stimulus, the time it takes for participants' first break (in terms of attentional focus) away 
from the fixation region is measured. This time to first break, is hypothesised, to be 
demonstrative of initial orienting of attention, or 'grabbing' of attention. Each participant's 
difference between the times for alcohol and control first break is calculated. It is predicted 
that heavy drinkers will have shorter first break times, than light drinking control 
participants.
2.7: Method
The actual experiment here is the same one as that reported in Chapter 2. However, the 
hypotheses and corresponding analyses are distinct and so are discussed in a likewise 
distinct way. For brevity, a description of the participants and experimental procedure is not 
repeated. Specifically, the difference here is that a different approach to analysing the data 
is adopted. Note that, although the data is analysed differently, this experiment is not 
contradictory to the previous findings, and the results here are complimentary. The reason 
for presenting this data separately is due to the distinct areas of interest that each sets of 
results correspond to. Whereas previously inhibition and attentional bias were considered, 
here it is whether attentional biases reflect a drawing of attention as well.
2.7.1: Data Scoring
The time of the first break away from the fixation region for both the alcohol and the 
control distractor stimuli was measured. Each participant's average first break time
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following the onset of the distractor stimulus was calculated for both alcohol and control 
stimuli. Break time (control) minus break time (alcohol) was computed. Therefore, positive 
results mean that alcohol stimuli were more attention-grabbing (i.e. shorter times for 
alcohol would equate to the alcohol distractor stimuli being attended to faster than the 
non-alcohol stimuli).
2.8: Results
The dependent variable was first break time. The independent variable was the type of 
participant (heavy drinker vs. light drinker), or the reported weekly alcohol use of the 
participants. The different independent variables, although both denote alcohol use, were 
used for separate analyses; t-test and correlation.
An independent samples t-test was performed in order to assess the differences 
between light (M = -1487.54; SD =3750.74) and heavy drinkers (M =615.56; SD =1059.10) for 
the time of their first break (see Figure 2-6). The difference between the groups was 
significant, t(30) = -2.328; p = .027, suggesting that the HD group had shorter first break 
times for alcohol stimuli.
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Figure 2-6. Mean first break time for light drinker (LD) and heavy drinker (HD) groups. Mean 
first break time (ms) is the difference between control and alcohol distractor stimuli first 
break times. The bars indicate the mean first break time (p<.05). Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean.
A correlation analysis was performed for weekly alcohol use (reported units of 
alcohol use) and the first break time. The results were found to be significant (r(42) = .310; p 
= .045), suggesting that as alcohol use increases the first break time difference between 
alcohol and control stimuli increases (recall, that a higher value on the dependent variable 
means shorter first break times for alcohol distractor stimuli, for the same break time for a 
control distractor stimulus).
This result would imply that a first break time demonstrative of shorter first breaks 
for alcohol stimuli was found to be associated with weekly alcohol units consumed. There 
was also found to be a difference between heavy and light drinkers, in terms of their first 
break time. This suggests that alcohol stimuli were able to grab the attention of heavy 
drinkers, but not grab the attention, as speedily, of the light drinkers.
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2.9: Discussion
This is a clear and conceptually simple demonstration o f rapid orienting of attention to 
alcohol stimuli, within a group of participants who are heavy drinkers, but outside of alcohol 
treatment. The results would lead to the suggestion that an alcohol .stimulus is able to both 
grab attention, as well as hold attention (much of the existing research on alcohol-related 
attentional biases can be thought of as relating to the latter).
The grabbing of attention by alcohol-related stimuli within heavy drinkers in this task 
was measured using the first fixation away from the fixation region toward the distractor 
stimulus. This therefore means that attention grabbing and not attention holding was being 
measured, as the distracting picture would vanish, as soon as the visual fixation region 
threshold was violated (see Chapter 2 Experiment 1, for the full details of the task 
methodology). This is empirically different from other measures of attentional bias, as tasks 
such as the dot probe may be measuring the ability of substance related stimuli to hold 
attention or indeed be merely a measurement of attention when the probe appears (see 
Bradley et ol., 2004).
Franken (2003) suggests that attentional biases, as well as being an effect of 
substance abuse, may also lead to increased craving and substance seeking behaviour. This 
may be due to an environment becoming increasingly occupied by stimuli that are 
associated with alcohol (see also Tiffany, 1990). If this were the case, then unwanted 
distraction may lead to an inability to devote full attention to coping responses. The 
potential causative influence of attentional biases has been demonstrated by Field and 
Eastwood (2005), who found that manipulating attentional bias for alcohol stimuli resulted 
in a group which received 'high attentional bias' reporting higher levels of craving and 
consuming more beer, than a control group who, at baseline (prior to attentional bias 
manipulation), was similar in terms of alcohol use. These results have not been wholly 
replicated (e.g. Attwood, et al. 2008), yet if attentional biases do have a causative influence, 
or at least are involved in the maintenance of substance abuse, then understanding the 
mechanism of how alcohol stimuli can 'grab' attention would be important (perhaps in 
terms of suggestions regarding a loss of control in relating to substance abuse). For 
example, if attentional biases lead to  increases in craving and substance abuse behaviour,
and attention can be readily drawn and captured by such stimuli, then attentional biases 
would form an integral part o f addiction.
Attentional bias based interventions have led to some promising results. When 
attentional biases for alcohol-related stimuli are reduced, then heavy drinkers' drinking 
behaviour appears to be affected. Fadardi and Cox (2009) demonstrated that an alcohol 
attentional-control training programme, which was aimed at improving drinkers' inhibitory 
processes, succeeded in reducing the amount of alcohol consumed. Schoenmakers et al. 
(2010) also reported some encouraging results. They observed that attentional bias training, 
whereby on a dot probe task the target consistently replaced the neutral stimuli, helped 
alcoholics remain abstinent for longer than those who had not undergone the attentional 
bias training. These results demonstrate that attentional biases may be more than just an 
effect of substance use. However, because Schoenmaker et al. (2010) used a dot probe 
measure, their training task may only impact on the ability of alcohol stimuli to hold 
attention, rather than grab attention. This initial orienting of attention could potentially be 
more important for aiding those who are trying to abstain (see Noel, et al., 2006). This, 
therefore, leads to the suggestion that the method reported in this chapter may lead to 
interventions which have the potential to modify initial orienting of attention. It is however 
important to distinguish between eye movements and attention. Sheppard et al. (1986) 
demonstrated that attention can shift irrespective of eye movement. However, the same 
was not true of eye movement, where eye movement (in the absence of peripheral 
stimulation) was found to always lead to a corresponding shift in the focus of attention too. 
Hogarth et al. (2008) suggests that detection of stimuli within the peripheral visual field is 
sufficient to control behaviour on a substance-seeking task. He therefore suggests that an 
eye tracker, which measures eye movement fixations as a form of attention, would not be 
ideal for the measurement o f such 'covert attention'. Hogarth et al. (2008) suggest that an 
orienting of attention toward a stimulus is associated with appetitive motivational 
properties of substance-related stimuli, which would account for the relationship between 
attentional bias and treatment outcome (e.g. Cox et al., 2002), and the observation that 
attentional biases can be modulated by deprivation/satiation of a substance (e.g. Field et al., 
2004). However, Hogarth et al. (2009) suggest that such attentional orienting would not play 
a causal role in substance-seeking behaviour as they found that S+ (a positively reinforced
stimulus) could predict substance-seeking behaviour regardless of a lack of eye movement 
toward S+. They further suggest that peripheral detection is an adequate explanation for 
substance seeking behaviour. Further research would therefore be required to explore the 
distinction between overt and covert forms of attentional biases, yet in the meantime it 
would appear that overt attentional bias research may not provide a sufficient foundation 
for the treatment of addiction as it is associated to a greater extent with appetitive 
motivational states. Therefore eye movements should be distinguished from attention, as 
stimuli may also be attended to that is in peripheral vision, which may operate outside of 
awareness. This suggests that behavioural effects, e.g., subsequent substance seeking, could 
be initiated regardless of initial eye movements which are the result of a stimulus.
Within this chapter it was argued that the current measure concerns the initial 
orienting of attention. The methodology reported here will hopefully illuminate this 
important aspect of attentional biases and further contribute to the important programme 
of developing related interventions. However, further research which explores the 
distinction between covert and overt forms attentional biases is clearly needed.
Summary: Within this experiment the aim was to establish whether a bias could be 
observed in preconscious processing of stimuli that is associated with a motivational state. 
The initial orienting of attention had previously only been observed within the anxiety 
literature. Therefore the aim was to establish if such an attentional bias could be observed 
within HDs. The data was analysed from Experiment 1 in a different manner by measuring 
'first break time'. Doing so enable an association between alcohol units and first break time 
to be observed, as well as a distinction between LD and HD indicative of HD's displaying 
shorter break time for alcohol distractor stimuli. The results are interpreted as representing 
an initial orienting of attention for alcohol stimuli. A loss of control over inhibition, or 
unwanted distraction, may lead to non-automatic processes. If attentional bias is associated 
with craving and substance seeking, this may have implications for attentional bias 
modification training, as alcohol consumed and time abstinent have been found to decrease 
following such training. However, further research into this field is needed as not all results 
are consistent. Particularly regarding the role that craving plays in attentional bias; an issue 
discussed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3: Are attentional biases affected by craving and outcome expectancies: A w ithin- 
subjects investigation using M DM A users and alcohol users?
Chapter 2 explored the differences between heavy and light drinkers in terms of their 
inhibition for attentional biases and initial orienting of attention. The results revealed a 
difference between the two population groups. The next chapter uses a within-participants 
design to explore attentional biases further. Evidence would suggest that MDMA (3,4- 
methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine) users' craving and outcome expectancies may vary 
due to certain variables. As attentional biases can be affected by craving and outcome 
expectancies, an intriguing situation arises where it may be possible to explore attentional 
biases within-participants, rather than between, as varying levels of craving and outcome 
expectancies may have effects upon attentional biases. The following chapter is also the 
first known study of attentional bias research using MDMA users.
3.1: Introduction
Attentional biases have been observed within heavy drinking alcohol users. This is an 
orienting of attention toward or away-from a stimulus that has become associated with 
substance abuse. The strength of attentional biases has been found to have predictive value 
over future drinking behaviour (Cox, Pothos, Hosier, 2007). Those who drink a high level of 
alcohol have a correspondingly strong attentional bias (e.g. Field, Mogg, Zetteler, & Bradley, 
2004). There are a number of methods used for assessing attentional biases. The emotional- 
Stroop and dot-probe are the measures that are most widely used (Cox, Fadardi, & Pothos, 
2006). Yet eye tracking methods provide more accurate data than reaction time based tasks 
as reaction time tasks plausibly are subject to extraneous noise due to the comparison of 
one reaction time (RT) to another (Desroches, Joanisse, & Robertson, 2006). This chapter 
further explores the applications of the eye tracking inhibition task developed in Chapter 2. 
This task has the potential to measure both attentional bias and inhibition. Inhibition 
alongside attentional bias has also been associated with substance abuse.
As well as alcohol attentional biases, previous research would indicate that 
attentional biases exist for other substances of abuse also. Attentional biases have been 
observed within heavy users of cocaine, cannabis, heroin, and nicotine. Such observations
suggest that attentional biases may be an inherent aspect of all substance abuse behaviour 
given enough exposure to associated stimuli. Biases for these substances do empirically vary 
(Field, Munafo, & Franken, 2010), suggesting that several factors may play a role in 
attentional bias development. If this is the case, then the study of attentional biases alone 
may not be telling the full story, so an investigation o f associated factors, for instance 
craving and outcome expectancies, are important for further understanding of substance 
abuse. MDMA use has never been considered in relation to attentional biases. MDMA is an 
illegal stimulant drug. Its use is associated with feelings of euphoria, intimacy with others, 
and decreased anxiety. MDMA may have an interesting pattern of attentional bias, as 
MDMA is unique from other substances. According to McDowell and Kleber (1994), patterns 
of usage amongst MDMA users suggest usage that is fairly occasional with escalating usage 
uncommon. Since that study was conducted, a rise in the use of MDMA has been reported. 
Some studies report average MDMA lifetime consumption between 218 to 371 incidences 
of use (Reneman et al., 2000; McCann et al., 1998; Parrott et al., 2000) with 13% of British 
university students reporting taking the substance (Webb et al., 1996). However, Wijngaart 
et al. (1997) reported that 81% of rave attendees had used MDMA. Therefore it would 
appear that usage may be more prevalent amongst rave-goers and consumption of MDMA 
may coincide with particular events, e.g. summer music festivals or dance raves, which may 
be few and far between. Such a pattern of usage may suggest that craving for MDMA is 
implicitly controlled in such a way that enables the user to wait for appropriate occasions 
for usage. Therefore craving for MDMA may dramatically increase prior to MDMA usage. 
Such behaviour may differ from substances, such as alcohol, which are readily available. 
Craving has been found to be associated with attentional biases, as well as outcome 
expectancies. Since MDMA may potentially differ from other substances in these domains, 
attentional biases may vary. If this is the case, it should be possible to measure attentional 
biases within-participants when intending to use and not intending to use, and measure the 
corresponding attentional biases.
Craving is an intense desire to consume a substance. It is recognised as being a 
fundamental aspect of substance abuse. Craving may occur in the presence of substances 
(Robinson and Berridge, 1993) or in the absence of substances (Tiffany, 1990). Hopper et al. 
(2006) found that MDMA dependence symptoms and cravings only occurred during the few
hours prior to planned ecstasy usage (i.e. late on Friday afternoon and early evening if usage 
was intended later that day). Hence MDMA dependence symptoms are strongly time- 
related, with minimal symptoms at other times. Indeed Huxster et al. (2006) observed that 
for recreational MDMA users, although craving was generally found to be mild, it was 
significantly higher in subjects who subsequently used the drug than in those who did not. 
Powell, Bradley and Grey (1992) suggest that craving may be the result of conditioned 
responses, which are analogous to opponent-process theory or withdrawal reactions. 
However, the authors found stronger support for the cognitive model which highlights the 
role of outcome expectancies, as determinants of both appetitive and avoidance 
motivations.
Outcome expectancies are a measure of the extent to which a behaviour is 
motivating, based on the desirability of the behaviour's outcome. Therefore, the decision 
making process can be affected by outcome expectancies, with behaviours likely to be the 
result o f inflated outcome expectancies. Those who view the consequences of substance 
abuse as being relatively favourable are more likely to engage in substance abuse than 
those who view substance abuse consequences negatively. Outcome expectancies are 
therefore an important aspect o f substance abuse. They are potentially able to distinguish 
between users from non-users. However, concerning MDMA use, this difference may not be 
quite so transparent. Positive expectancies for MDMA may increase prior to ecstasy use 
(Engels & ter Bogt, 2004). Therefore, outcome expectancies within MDMA users may differ 
within-participants dependent upon when usage is planned.
Both craving and outcome expectancies have been found to have an association with 
attentional biases. Stronger craving has been associated with increased attentional bias 
(Field and Cox, 2008). Also, those who have more positive outcome expectancies have also 
been found to have an increased attentional bias (Field and Cox, 2008). Craving and 
outcome expectancies are thought to vary within MDMA users. If this is the case then, 
MDMA users may not demonstrate a pattern of attentional bias that is as constant across 
time as for other substances, e.g. alcohol. This chapter is the first analysis of MDMA-related 
attentional biases. The aim was to explore any putative biases by adopting a within- 
participants design, where intended usage is the independent variable. It is then aimed to 
compare and contrast the results obtained from the MDMA users with corresponding
results from alcohol users. Both participant groups will be completing an analogous task, in 
terms of intending to use and not intending to use.
3.2: Method
3.2.1: Participants
18 participants (MDMA and alcohol users together, see below) completed both sessions of 
the experiment (3 further participants did not complete both sessions). Participants were 12 
males and six females, aged 18-32 (mean age: 23.89 years; SD: 3.83). Participants were 
recruited using snowball sampling from within Swansea. That is, existing participants helped 
recruit future participants from amongst their acquaintances. Participants were not 
explicitly informed that they would be tested on days they would be intending to use the 
substance and days when they would not, due to ethical considerations. Participants were 
instead asked to come to the laboratory on at least one Tuesday and one Saturday, since 
these are days on which MDMA users typically do not intend or intend to use MDMA (see 
Hopper, etai., 2006). When a participant had been successfully tested on both a day he/ she 
was and was not intending to use, the participant was told the experiment was over. The 
day of the week each participant attended the laboratory on the first occasion was 
counterbalanced. Each participant was entered into a prize draw for £100.
The population sample comprised of alcohol users (N = 10) and MDMA users (N = 8). 
Alcohol users reported weekly unit consumption ranging between 10 and 55 units (M = 
32.90; SD = 15.007). MDMA users reported between 3 and 200 (M= 97.125; SD = 68.649) 
incidences of MDMA use since they first started consuming the substance. Full ethical 
approval was granted by the Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (see 
Appendix V).
3.2.2: Stimuli
Alcohol stimuli were from the Hogarth database also used in Chapter 2. These stimuli were 
used for both the eye tracking and fixed gaze tasks. For MDMA stimuli, 18 pictures were 
obtained using a Google image search. The search criteria included 'ecstasy', 'MDMA', and 
'rave'. An equal number of pictures were taken from each category. Pictures were verified 
through a pilot study (see below).
3.2.3: Pilot study: Verification o f MDMA Picture Stimuli
The pilot study was run with 6 MDMA users in order to verify the MDMA relevance of each 
picture. Participants rated each picture out of 5 for its relevance to MDMA use. 44 MDMA- 
related pictures were rated and the 18 pictures with the highest scores were used in the 
study. Each picture was a standardised size of 105mm x 105mm. Of the 18 pictures, each of 
the Google image search criteria were used; 6 were ecstasy-related, 6 MDMA-related, and 6 
rave-related.
3.2.4: Materials
A number of questionnaire measures were used, all administered via computer. In order to 
measure MDMA craving a pre-existing craving questionnaire was used from Parrott et al. 
(unpublished). This consisted of 20 statements with a 5 point Likert response scale (see 
Appendix C). An MDMA Outcome Expectancies questionnaire was also administered (Engels 
and Bogt, 2004). This consisted of 35 statements with a 5 point Likert response scale (see 
Appendix D). The alcohol participants each completed Love et al/s (1998) Desire for Alcohol 
Questionnaire (see Appendix A). This consists of 36 questions and a 7 point Likert scale. An 
alcohol outcome expectancy scale was obtained from Leigh and Stacy (1993), which 
consisted of 34 statements with a 5 point Likert response scale (see Appendix E).
Each participant completed a mood questionnaire (MDMQ) consisting of 30 
questions (Stayer et al., 1997) (see Appendix F). Each participant also completed a 
questionnaire that enquired about their alcohol or MDMA use (see Appendix G & H). This 
consisted of 32 questions. Importantly, this questionnaire contained questions enquiring 
about when they next intended to use alcohol or MDMA (depending on the experimental 
group). In order to assign a participant to the 'intending to use' condition, he/ she would 
need to have responded with 'today* in the relevant question. For the 'not intending to use' 
condition participants were to state that they were not intending to use the substance that 
day. Participants were not explicitly told of the conditions, but until a participant had been 
tested in both conditions, more testing would be scheduled for another occasion (typically, 
a Tuesday or Saturday, depending on which condition was still required).
There were three attentional bias measures, implemented in separate tasks for 
either alcohol or MDMA users. Each task conformed to the exact same template and utilised
the same control stimuli (taken from Hogarth e t al., 2009). There were two versions of the 
Stroop task; an alcohol and MDMA version. The neutral test card that was used consisted 
entirely of tool-related words. The emotional-Stroop cards contained 20 different words 
repeated twice. Therefore 40 words were read by each participant. Eight different colours 
were used, but the same colour never appeared consecutively (see Figures 3-1, 3-2 & 3-3).
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Figure 3-1, 3- 2, & 3-3. Stroop test cards: neutral (tools), alcohol, and MDMA. By calculating 
the difference in reaction time between the control and experimental Stroop cards, the 
Stroop measure of attentional bias was obtained.
The eye tracking task comprised of presenting two pictures simultaneously on the 
screen (see Figure 3-4). One picture related to substance use (alcohol or MDMA-related) 
whilst the second picture was of a control stimulus. Control stimuli were matched with 
specific alcohol or MDMA stimuli and were judged to be of similar complexity and colours. 
There were 28 events, each consisting of two pictures. Picture presentation was 
randomised. Pictures were presented for four seconds and were interspersed with a fixation 
cross. Participants were instructed to fixate on the fixation cross between events. 
Participants were instructed to study the pictures for a memory test. This ensured that both 
pictures would be attended to. However, no subsequent memory test occurred.
Figure 3-4. Example of a trial in the eye tracking task. The stimulus on the right depicts a 
hand reaching for a pint of lager. The stimulus on the left is a carefully matched control 
stimulus which depicts a hand reaching for a folder. Both pictures form separate interest 
areas which are used to work out a 'difference' score. This score is used to create the 
measures of attentional biases.
For the fixed gaze task (first reported in Chapter 2), each picture of alcohol use or 
MDMA use had a carefully matched control picture (see Figures 3-5 & 3-6). Distractor 
stimuli could be presented within any one of the six equally-sized regions the computer 
monitor was notionally divided. Finally, the visual fixation region the participant was 
instructed to attend to was as large as the alcohol-related or neutral distractor stimuli and 
was designed to be visually salient. Further information on the fixed gaze inhibition task can 
be found in Chapter 2; however there were some slight alterations. The furthest distance 
from Chapter 2 was not included in order to make the experiment more concise. The 
distractor stimulus was either 'Near' the fixation region (actual distance between distracting 
picture and fixation region was 115mm; distances were measured from the centre of the 
picture to the centre of the fixation region); or 'M id' (distance was 165mm); or 'Far' away 
from the fixation region (distances were 230mm). The distractor stimuli were randomly 
allocated to each of the distance groups.
Figure 3-5. Example of fixation region and distractor stimulus. This is a control picture and 
depicts a hand reaching for a folder (no grid lines were used in the experiment, they are 
shown here to represent the 6 sections of the screen which contain the fixation region and 
distractor stimuli).
Figure 3-6. Example of matched distractor stimulus. This example of alcohol stimuli depicts a 
hand reaching for a pint. Note the similarity with Figure 3-5. The matched control and 
experimental stimuli are subtracted in order to make a 'difference' score. It is this score that 
is used to create the measures of attentional biases.
3.2.5: Apparatus
This task used the EyeLink Desktop 1000 eye tracker (SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). 
The eye tracking apparatus was identical to that of Chapter 2.
3.2.6: Procedures
Both groups were administered the test battery on at least two occasions. Under one 
condition they would intend to use either MDMA or alcohol (dependent on group), and 
under the other condition they would not intend to use at all. The ordering of conditions 
was counterbalanced so that the use intention condition varied between participants.
3.2.7: Design
2(Group: Alcohol. MDMA) x 2(Condition: Intended Use. No Use). Group; between-subjects. 
Condition; within-subjects.
3.2.8: Test Battery Procedure
The ordering of the task procedure was fixed:
1. Craving questionnaire (alcohol or MDMA)
2. Mood questionnaire
3. Stroop tasks (alcohol or MDMA)
4. Drug use questionnaire (alcohol or MDMA)
5. Outcome expectancy questionnaire (alcohol or MDMA)
6. Dot probe and fixed gaze task (alcohol or MDMA)
3.2.9: Data Scoring
The use of three attentional bias tasks was employed, the modified Stroop, an eye tracking 
task, and a fixed gaze task based on that from Chapter 2 (see Table 3-1). The Stroop task 
consisted of two test cards, a substance card (either alcohol or MDMA -  employed 
depending on group) and a neutral card (consisting of tool-related words). From the RTs 
from these two cards, a difference score was calculated. This difference score was the 
Stroop attentional bias measure. From the eye tracking task a difference score was also 
calculated by subtracting the interest area scores of the control and substance stimuli. This 
provided another difference score. The following eye tracking variables were used for the 
analyses: dwell time, first fixation time, first run fixation count, and first fixation visited
count. These variables were selected due to the fact that they measure overall time spent 
processing a stimulus and also initial attentional orientation for a specific stimulus. Dwell 
time referred to the amount of time spent looking at each stimulus; first fixation time was 
the time taken to look at the picture during the first saccade (a rapid eye movement); first 
run fixation count was the amount of fixations made within the first gaze; first fixation 
visited count was the amount of times the first stimulus that was looked at was viewed. For 
the fixed gaze task from Chapter 2, a difference score was again calculated between the 
control and substance stimuli. Three different distances were used between pictures and 
fixation regions (note that it was not wanted to use the furthest of the four distances from 
Chapter 2 when programming the experiment, as the previous results with this distance 
were less interesting; also, this made the experiment shorter in duration). However, there 
are now have three distance variables rather than two (recall, previously there were 'Near' 
and 'Far' picture distance in Chapter 2) as previously it was opted to collapse the four 
distances, whereas here each of the distances were looked at individually (Near: 115mm; 
Mid: 165mm; Far: 230mm, where the length refer to the distance between fixation region 
and distractor stimulus). The variables fixation count, first run fixation count, and break 
frequency were looked at across the three distances. Fixation count was a measure of how 
many fixations were made during a presentation of a stimulus. First run fixation count was a 
measure of the number of fixations made initially following presentation of a stimulus. 
Break frequency was a measure of how many times the participant attempted to look 
outside of the fixation region in the direction of the distractor stimulus; something they 
were explicitly told to avoid.
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Table 3-1: A description of the attentional bias dependent variables used within the 
experiment.
Attentional Bias Measure Description
Stroop The difference between control-Stroop interference and MDMA/alcohol-Stroop interference
Eye Tracking
Dwell Time Difference between alcohol and MDMA/alcohol time spent looking at each stimulus
First Fixation Time Difference between alcohol and MDMA/alcohol time taken to look at the picture during the first saccade
First Run Fixation Count Difference between alcohol and MDMA/alcohol number of fixations made within the first gaze
First Fixation Visited 
Count
Difference between alcohol and MDMA/alcohol number of 
times the first stimulus that was looked at was viewed
Fixed Gaze Inhibition
Fixation Count
Difference between control and MDMA/alcohol number of 
fixations were made during a presentation of a distractor 
stimulus at either near, mid, or far distances
Difference between control and MDMA/alcohol number of 
fixations made initially following presentation of a distractor 
stimulus at either near, mid, or far distances
First Run Fixation Count
Break Frequency
Difference between control and MDMA/alcohol how many 
times the participant attempted to look outside of the 
fixation region in the direction of the distractor stimulus at 
either near, mid, or far distances
3.3: Results
Whether there is an association between attentional bias and usage is first considered. This 
represents the traditional measure of attentional bias and establishes if there is an 
attentional bias within the sample. However, it is also considered whether there is an 
attentional bias when intending to use or when not attending to use. Next considered is 
whether there is a distinction between craving, outcome expectancies, and mood when 
either intending to use or not intending to use. This will demonstrate whether such 
phenomena are influenced by use intention. Then it is considered whether use intention 
affects attentional bias by comparing attentional bias measure scores when use is intended 
and when not. Any statistical significance observed here would be indicative of a fluctuating 
attentional bias which varies depending upon when next use of a substance is intended.
Finally considered is whether craving or outcome expectancies are associated with 
attentional biases when either use is intended or not. This would indicate whether reported 
craving or outcome expectancies could influence attentional bias dependent upon use 
intention.
Several attentional bias tasks that were employed in this study, and so a number of 
attentional bias DVs were created, inflating the number of possible correlations in the 
analysis. Because the number of correlations would be high in this case and, moreover, 
there was relatively little a priori expectations regarding the genuine associations vs. the 
accidental, non-significant ones, in this case, to avoid type one errors, Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha levels were used (although it is noted that concerns have been expressed in the 
statistics literature regarding the procedure of adopting Bonferroni corrections; e.g., 
Nakagawa, 2004; Perneger, 1998). In this case, because different sets of cognitive variables 
arose from different tasks, rather than employ a uniform adjustment in the alpha value (i.e., 
0.05/ all possible comparisons), it was considered more appropriate to adjust the alpha in 
terms of the comparisons for each possible task separately. Thus, it was aimed to achieve a 
trade-off between an inflated Type I error (that the Bonferroni adjustment was meant to 
protect against) and an over-inflated Type II error (which is the basis for most criticism for 
the Bonferroni procedure, Nakagawa, 2004; Perneger, 1998).
The Stroop task led to only one DV, so the alpha level for the correlations involving 
the Stroop task remained unchanged. The eye tracking task had four DVs and the fixed gaze 
inhibition task had three distinct distances each leading to three DVs. Therefore, the 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels were: for the eye tracking task an adjusted alpha level of 
.0125 per test (.05/4); the fixed gaze inhibition task Near distance had an adjusted alpha 
level of .0167 per test (.05/3); the fixed gaze inhibition task Mid distance had an adjusted 
alpha level of .0167 per test (.05/3); and the fixed gaze inhibition task Far distance also had 
an adjusted alpha level of .0167 per test (.05/3). Note that the different distances within the 
fixed gaze inhibition task were considered separate thematic groups due to the different 
results obtained at the different distances within Chapter 2.
3.3.1: Attentional bias and usage
First to be considered are the attentional bias measures in terms of substance use, to 
explore whether an attentional bias was present. The 'use intention' variable was computed 
depending on when participants intended on using their substance next, information which 
was available by asking participants if they intended using either alcohol or MDMA 
(respective of group) later that day. This created a binary variable.
Only participants who completed both conditions of the task were included in the 
data analyses. Participants had to both be judged to have been intending to use (i.e. going 
to use MDMA or drink alcohol later that day) and not intending to use (i.e. not using MDMA 
or drinking alcohol later that day).
Alcohol
Alcohol usage was not found to correlate with the Stroop difference score for either the 
intending to use condition or the not intending to use condition (see Table 3-2).
The eye tracking measures did not lead to any significant correlations with alcohol 
usage, when intending to use. However, when not intending to use alcohol, usage 
correlated first run fixation count (i.e. number of fixations made within the first gaze) (r(10) 
= -.844; p = .002 ) significance established at the adjusted level of .0125. Note that a 
negative correlation is observed when not intending to use. This suggests that there is an 
attentional bias away from the alcohol stimuli when not intending to use (see Table 3-2).
The fixed gaze task produced a correlation with alcohol usage, with significance 
established at the adjusted level of .0167. For the closest and furthest distances, there were 
no significant correlations when intending to use. But for the mid-distance, break frequency 
was found to marginally correlate with alcohol usage (r(10) = .719; p = .019). When not 
intending to use, fixation counts for the nearest distance were found to correlate negatively 
with alcohol use (r(10) = -.918; p <.0005). This was also the case for break frequency within 
the furthest distance (r(10) = -.840; p = .002). These results provide partial evidence that an 
attentional bias was present within the sample. However, the strongest attentional bias 
would appear when use is not intended.
MDMA
MDMA usage was not found to correlate with the Stroop difference score for either the 
intending to use condition or the not intending to use condition. Moreover, there were no 
significant correlations on the eye tracking task.
The fixed gaze task, however, led to many significant correlations at the adjusted 
level of .0167. When intending to use; the near distance led to a significant negative 
correlation between usage and break frequency (r(8) = -.801; p = .017). These negative 
correlations would suggest that at the near distance, light users were less able to inhibit 
their attentional bias than the heavy users. The furthest distance correlated positively with 
first run fixation count (r(8) = .851; p = .007) and marginally with break frequency (r(8) = 
.794; p = .019). This suggests that when picture stimuli are furthest away the heavier users 
are less able to inhibit their attentional bias than the lighter users. When not intending to 
use; the mid-distance led to a significant correlation between usage and first run fixation 
count (r(8) = -.829; p = .011), fixation count (r(8) = -.823; p=.012), and break frequency (r(8) 
= -.830; p = .011). Again the negative correlation implies that it is the light users that are 
less able to inhibit their attentional bias, even when not intending to use. These results 
suggest that, generally, as use increases, attentional biases decrease, especially when not 
intending to use (see Table 3-2).
Table 3-2. Correlations between either alcohol or MDMA reported usage for the different 
attentional bias measures when intending to use and not intending to use the substance.
Intending to use
Not intending to 
use
Attentional Bias Measure Alcohol MDMA Alcohol MDMA
Usage Usage Usage Usage
Strooo .396 .159 .245 .293
Eve Tracking
Dwell Time -.055 .201 -.693 .357
First Fixation Time .665 -.092 .044 .145
First Run Fixation Count -.189 .495 .603 .263
First Fixation Visited Count .632 .125 . 844** .164
Fixed Gaze
Near Distance
Fixation Count 0.472 -.719 -.918* -.351
First Run Fixation Count .497 -.307 -.102 -.239
Break Frequency -.060 -.801* -.353 -.287
Mid Distance
Fixation Count .431 .412 -.363 -.823*
First Run Fixation Count .407 .457 -.448 -.829*
Break Frequency .719ms .435 .156 -.830*
Far Distance
Fixation Count -.298 0.677 .545 .035
First Run Fixation Count -.156 .851* .214 .140
Break Frequency .620 .794ms -.840* .192
Note: The Pearson's r values for alcohol (N=10) and MDMA (N=8) users' attentional biases 
and substance usage (either alcohol or MDMA, respective of group) when intending to use 
and not intending to use. The significance of these values are denoted by *p<.0167 
**p<.0125. These are Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels.
3.3.2: Craving and Outcome Expectancies
These analyses involve the comparison of the measures of craving, outcome expectancies, 
and mood between the different use intention conditions. Note, the aim is not to try to infer 
use intention from craving, outcome expectancies, or mood. The hypothesis is that use 
intention will lead to differences, within-subjects, for craving, outcome expectancies, and 
mood.
Alcohol
Using questionnaires a number of variables were measured which may have differed 
between intention to use and intention not to use. Using the craving measure it was found 
that intended use (M = 146.40; SD =53.048) and non-intention (M =76.00; SD = 58.982) 
differed significantly in terms of reported craving (t(9) =2.618; p = .028), with less craving 
reported when use was not intended. Mood (t(9) = -.847; p = .419) and outcome 
expectancies (t(9) = .000; p = 1.000) were not found to be affected by use intention. 
Outcome expectancies and craving were not found to correlate.
MDMA
The responses of MDMA users on the questionnaires were not found to vary due to use 
intention, as can be seen from the non-significant t-tests between intending to use and not 
intending to use for mood (f(7) = .259; p = .803), and outcome expectancies (f(7) = -.250; p = 
.810). However there was a trend to suggest that intended use (M = 52.00; SD = 17.11) led 
to differences for reported craving over non-intended use (M = 40.00; SD = 12.57), (f(7) = 
1.686; p = .136), which was in the expected direction. A significant positive correlation was 
observed between craving and outcome expectancies when intending to use (r(8) = .830; p = 
.011), and was marginally significant when not intending to use (r(8) = .678; p = .065). This 
indicates that when intending to use, positive outcome expectancies are associated with 
increased craving.
These results suggest that craving is affected by use intention for alcohol users but 
not MDMA users. However, the association of outcome expectancies and craving within 
MDMA users but not alcohol users suggests differences in the pattern of use between the 
substances. The difference in craving scores can be seen in Table 3-3.
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Table 3-3. Mean craving scores for both alcohol and MDMA when use was intended and 
not. The percentage difference between the mean craving scores is calculated due to the 
difference between the alcohol and MDMA craving measures. The difference between the 
craving in the Use Intended condition and the Use Not Intended condition is expressed as a 
difference in percentage; the Percentage Difference score.
Use Use Not Percentage
Intended Intended Difference
Alcohol 146.40 76.00 48.09%
MDMA 52.00 40.00 23.08%
3.3.3: Intention to use and attentional bias
To look at the potential differences in attentional bias that intention to use may have 
caused, a series of t -tests were performed comparing whether use was intended or not for 
the different attentional bias measures (see Table 3-4).
Alcohol
The alcohol Stroop was administered to participants when they were intending to use and 
when they were not. A comparison of the means found no significant difference concerning 
when participants were intending to drink next. The eye tracking measure also found no 
difference between use intention days. Neither did the fixed gaze task lead to a significant 
difference between intending to use and not intending to use. These results demonstrate 
that intention to use alcohol does not affect attentional bias. Each t-test can be seen in 
Table 3-4 below.
MDMA
Intention to use MDMA also did not have a large effect on attentional bias. Of the 
attentional bias measures, only the eye tracking task showed a significant difference 
between intending to use (M =1.687 ; SD = 1.112) and not intending to use (M = -.016; SD = 
.194) for dwell time (t(7) = 4.774 ; p = .002) significance established at the adjusted level of 
.0125. This would suggest a weak difference between intention to use and the eye tracking 
task. Stroop and fixed gaze task did not reveal a difference caused by use intention.
Table 3-4. t-test results for the use intention condition and the non-use intention condition 
in terms of the attentional bias measures for both alcohol and MDMA participants.
Intention to use
Attentional Bias Measure Alcohol MDMA
Strooo .952 1.476
Eve Tracking
Dwell Time .444 4.774**
First Fixation Time -.038 .394
First Run Fixation Count 1.398 -.296
First Fixation Visited
Count .281 .329
Fixed Gaze
Near Distance
Fixation Count 2.116 -.735
First Run Fixation Count .839 .940
Break Frequency 1.461 -.847
Mid Distance
Fixation Count 2.342 -.833
First Run Fixation Count 1.612 -.836
Break Frequency 1.123 -.844
Far Distance
Fixation Count -.881 .153
First Run Fixation Count .504 .000
Break Frequency 1.718 .612
Note. The t-values in the table are the result of paired-samples t-tests between intention to 
use and intention not to use for alcohol (N=10) and MDMA (N=8). Each attentional bias 
measure was performed when intending to use and not intending to use. The table above 
shows the difference between attentional bias measure when intending to use and not 
intending to use. The significance of these values are denoted by *p<.0167 **p<.0125. 
These are Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels, where the adjustment procedure is as discussed
in section 3.3. Note that, aside from MDMA dwell time differing between use intention 
conditions, there was not a distinct difference caused by use intention with regard to 
performance on the attentional bias tasks for both alcohol and MDMA.
3.3.4: Outcome expectancies, craving, and attentional biases
In order to see whether outcome expectancies or craving were associated with attentional 
biases, a number of correlations were performed (see Table 3-5). The aim of which was to 
establish whether there was an association between craving or outcome expectancies and 
attentional biases. Separate correlations for when a participant was intending to use and 
not intending to use were performed for both craving and outcome expectancies with each 
attentional bias measure.
Alcohol
When intending to use alcohol, outcome expectancies did not correlate with any of the 
attentional bias tasks significantly. Craving was found to significantly correlate with the 
Stroop score, (r(10) = .745; p = .013) significance established at the level of .05. Craving, 
however, did not correlate with the eye tracking measures nor the fixed gaze measures. 
When not intending to use alcohol, neither outcome expectancies nor craving were found to 
correlate with any of the attentional bias variables.
MDMA
When intending to use MDMA, outcome expectancies and craving do not correlate 
significantly with the attentional bias measures. When not intending to use MDMA there 
are again no significant correlations. However, overall the results suggest that there is no 
association between outcome expectancies and craving with attentional biases.
Table 3-5. Correlations between craving and outcome expectancies for the attentional bias 
measures. Positive correlations would indicate that higher craving or outcome expectancy 
scores were associated with increased attentional biases.
Intending to use Not intending to use
Attentional Bias
Measure Alcohol MDMA Alcohol MDMA
Craving OE Craving OE Craving OE Craving OE
Strooo .745* .249 0.499 .358 -0.29 .343 -0.547 -.102
Eve Tracking
Dwell Time 0.524 .071 0.608 .400 -0.067 .480 -0.266 -.069
First Fixation Time 0.007 .063 0.552 .542 0.005 .245 0.084 -.235
First Run Fixation
Count .639 .087 0.516 .274 0.233 .394 -0.161 -.458
First Fixation Visited
Count 0.089 .070 0.516 .545 0.042 .366 0.299 -.145
Fixed Gaze
Near Distance
Fixation Count 0.387 .260 0.327 -.012 0.402 -.388 -0.259 -.586
First Run Fixation
Count 0.428 .186 0.018 -.401 0.273 -.150 -0.535 -.654
Break Frequency 0.368 -.124 0.258 .017 0.603 =.154 -0.078 -.496
Mid Distance
Fixation Count 0.117 -.114 -0.314 -.136 -0.063 -.362 -0.132 -.086
First Run Fixation
Count 0.039 -.164 -0.476 -.340 -0.19 -.401 -0.049 -.107
Break Frequency 0.344 .212 -0.18 -.005 -0.369 .045 -0.087 -.170
Far Distance
Fixation Count -0.006 .116 -0.031 .421 -0.228 .028 -0.155 .575
First Run Fixation
Count -0.054 .335 -0.015 .202 -0.2 -.373 0.581 .641
Break Frequency -0.049 -.007 -0.096 .310 0.165 -.433 -0.152 .580
Note: The Pearson's r values show alcohol (N=10) and MDMA (N=8) users' correlations 
between the attentional bias measures and craving and outcome expectancies. The 
significance of these values are denoted by *p<.05 as only the Stroop score led to a 
significant rvalue.
3.3.5: Summary o f results
Evidence was observed which may indicate an attentional bias in both alcohol users and, for 
the first time, within MDMA users as well. The alcohol attentional bias results would appear 
to correlate with reported alcohol unit consumption more strongly when usage is not 
intended. Interestingly, the pattern of the MDMA attentional bias is not the same as that 
typically associated with alcohol use, and appears to be one of attentional avoidance, as 
shown by the results of the fixed gaze task. This indicates that high MDMA use may be 
associated with an attentional bias away from the MDMA-related stimuli. However these 
results are only observed within the near distance when intending to use and the mid 
distance when use is not intended. At the far distance when use is intended the contrary is 
also demonstrated i.e. an attentional bias toward the MDMA-related stimuli (see Table 3-2). 
It was also observed that alcohol leads to greater variability in craving than MDMA, due to a 
significant difference between alcohol craving when intending to use and not, but not a 
significant difference between intending to use and not within the MDMA users. This is 
contrary to the hypothesis made in the introduction. Intention to use was not found to alter 
attentional biases for the alcohol group of participants but was found to affect the 
attentional bias of MDMA participants. Outcome expectancies and craving were not found 
to be associated with attentional biases. It would appear that the inhibition fixed gaze task 
was the more sensitive measure of attentional bias and usage as this led to the most 
consistent results.
3.4: Discussion
Evidence was found to suggest an attentional bias within the alcohol users that was 
associated with unit consumption. When intending to use alcohol a trend was observed 
showing that heavy drinkers may have a stronger attentional bias than light drinkers when 
intending to consume alcohol. However, this was a very weak association and a stronger 
attentional bias was associated with not intending to use. A negative correlation is observed 
between alcohol usage and attentional bias measures when not intending to use, suggesting 
that the heavy drinkers were more able to inhibit their attentional biases than the lighter 
users. Use intention was also found to lead to a difference in reported alcohol craving 
suggesting that craving increases prior to alcohol consumption. Outcome expectancies were
not found to vary as a result of use intention, suggesting that outcome expectancies may 
not motivate drinking behaviour. Use intention was not found to lead to large differences 
between attentiona! bias measures potentially indicating the robustness of attentional 
biases. The fixed gaze inhibition task did however observe some differences in attentional 
biases dependent upon use intention, suggesting that inhibition of attentional biases may 
be affected by use intention. Alcohol also led to a correlation between craving and the 
alcohol Stroop attentional bias measure, but only when intending to use, suggesting that 
craving may be associated with attentional biases when use is intended. Outcome 
expectancies did not correlate with any attentional bias measure.
The alcohol findings provide some support for previous attentional bias tasks. Unit 
consumption has typically been found to be associated with attentional biases. A positive 
correlation, albeit weak, was found when intending to use and a negative correlation was 
observed when not intending to use. This may suggest that when not intending to use, 
heavy drinkers may display attentional avoidance in an analogous way to anxiety sufferers 
or abstinent alcoholics avoid 'threatening7 stimuli (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Noel, et a i, 
2006). Therefore alcohol-related stimuli may be being implicitly avoided. This would indicate 
that heavy drinkers, when not intending to consume alcohol, may avoid alcohol-related 
stimuli. Such a theory could run in parallel with the notion that alcohol-related stimuli can 
lead to craving (e.g. Field & Cox, 2008). Therefore avoiding such stimuli may be beneficial 
when remaining abstinent. However, confidence in such claims is undermined by the 
inability to provide firm evidence of an attentional bias, toward the alcohol-related stimuli 
when use was intended. It was predicted that craving amongst the alcohol users would 
remain relatively constant; this was not supported within the task where a significant 
difference was observed between the use intention conditions regarding reported craving. 
This result would suggest that prior to alcohol use, craving increases. Craving was also found 
to significantly correlate with the alcohol Stroop attentional bias measure when intending to 
use, but the evidence is unable to suggest that alcohol attentional biases are associated with 
craving due to the number of non-significant correlations with the other attentional bias 
DVs. The results would suggest that heavy drinkers7 attentional biases lead to slight 
differences depending upon whether use is intended or not. But these differences are not 
significantly different from each other when comparing between the use intention
conditions. This potentially suggests that once attentional biases are formed they are fairly 
stable and consistent within heavy drinkers. However, it is hard to draw firm conclusions 
due to the lack of an attentional bias toward alcohol-related stimuli when use is intended. 
Previous attentional bias research would suggest that an attentional bias should be present 
under these circumstances (e.g. Cox, Pothos, and Hosier, 2007).
Evidence was found which may suggest that attentional biases may develop for 
MDMA-related stimuli within MDMA users. The main observation was that the attentional 
bias dependent variables obtained using the fixed gaze inhibition task indicate that an 
attentional bias away from stimuli was associated with high MDMA use at near and mid 
distances. Yet an attentional bias toward the stimuli was observed at the furthest distance. 
However, these results are not entirely consistent. It was also observed that use intention 
did lead to a difference in reported MDMA attentional biases; however this was only 
observed for one of the attentional bias dependent variables. This is the first known 
demonstration of the potential existence of attentional biases within MDMA users. 
Attentional biases have been observed previously for other kinds of abused substances and 
these have been found to have motivational properties, which perhaps indicates similar 
processes involved in MDMA abuse. The attentional bias results were observed on the fixed 
gaze inhibition task alone which leads to the suggestion that contemporary attentional bias 
tasks may benefit from considering the potential importance of inhibition. The MDMA 
results for the fixed gaze inhibition task were inconsistent, as both positive and negative 
correlations are observed, potentially suggesting both an attentional bias toward and away 
from the MDMA stimuli. However, this may be an artefact of the correlational design of the 
study. Further research into the fixed gaze inhibition task is needed before any firm 
conclusions can be made. Craving and outcome expectancies were not found to differ 
significantly as a result of use intention, which suggests that these variables are not affected 
by intended MDMA use. But when intending to use, craving correlated with outcome 
expectancies, which may be indicative of an association between positive motivational 
properties of MDMA and craving. There was also found to be a slight difference due to use 
intention for dwell time. However this is the only attentional bias measure that significantly 
demonstrates a difference between use and non-use intention in terms of attentional bias
tasks. Craving and outcome expectancies were also not found to correlate with attentional 
bias measures when use was intended or not.
As the MDMA attentional bias was only observed on the fixed gaze inhibition task, it 
would appear that the measurement of attentional bias inhibition may be important when 
measuring attentional biases within MDMA users. Also, when intending to use, both a 
positive and a negative correlation is observed. Only a negative correlation is observed 
when use is not intended. This suggests that, although an attentional bias may be present, 
there could potentially be differences in whether the stimulus was attentional holding or 
avoidant. This may be due to the salience of the stimuli used. The attentional bias which 
may be indicated by the results within the MDMA users may also suggest that as use 
increases attentional bias toward stimuli decreases when not intending to use. As this result 
was obtained using the fixed gaze inhibition task, a task associated with attentional bias and 
inhibition, it may be that prolonged use of MDMA may lead to a better ability to suppress 
attentional biases to salient MDMA-related stimuli, when the substance is not desired. This 
may be demonstrative of the mechanisms assumed within the incentive salience account of 
drug use (Robinson & Berridge, 1993), and relate to implicit attentional strategies to avoid 
salient MDMA stimuli. By contrast, a 'novice' user may not so readily be able to inhibit their 
attentional biases for MDMA-related stimuli. The result may reflect a process that was 
proposed by Parrott (2006a), according to which, as tolerance increases, the number of 
reported negative effects caused by MDMA increases. This may lead to attentional 
avoidance, in a way analogous to that for alcohol stimuli for individuals undergoing alcohol 
treatment (e.g. Noel et al. 2006). Therefore attentional avoidance may be associated with 
stimuli that are no longer liked or for stimuli that substance users are actively trying to 
suppress attention for. However, this is speculation and cannot be confirmed within the 
current experiment. The discrepancies observed on the fixed gaze task for the various 
distances may reflect awareness of the stimuli and how this subsequently affects how 
distracting the stimulus is. Craving and outcome expectancies were not found to vary, which 
does not support Hopper et al. (2006) who found that craving increased prior to MDMA use. 
However, Hopper et al. (2006) had a much larger participant sample than the experiment 
reported here. Yet, this result may suggest that craving and outcome expectancies are more 
consistent than first thought. The correlation between craving and outcome expectancies
when intending to use may demonstrate that these phenomena are associated with MDMA 
use however. Yet it would appear that craving and outcome expectancies have no bearing 
on attentional biases. Again, however, it is hard to draw firm conclusions about attentional 
biases as further research is required to establish whether fixed gaze inhibition task truly is a 
measure of attentional bias.
Theories concerning outcome expectancies and craving would have led to the 
prediction that it is possible that attentional biases can fluctuate. MDMA use has been 
found to lead to variations over time of craving and outcome expectancies, depending on 
when use was intended. Therefore, as these factors have been associated with attentional 
biases, it was thought that a within-subjects design experiment may lead to differing 
attentional biases. Also included was a group of alcohol users, as this was deemed a group 
whose outcome expectancies and craving would not vary so much, as alcohol is readily 
available. However the results observed could indicate that both MDMA and alcohol 
attentional biases are not associated with craving and outcome expectancies. This 
observation may be associated with the distinction between implicit and explicit measures 
o f substance abuse behaviour (see Stacy, 1997). MDMA was however found to indicate a 
potential development o f attentional biases. The reason why the fixed gaze inhibition task 
worked well with the MDMA users may be because of the difference in the way that MDMA 
stimuli are regarded by novice and heavy users, as some stimuli were found to lead to 
attentional avoidance. Similarly, alcohol was also found to lead to an attentional avoidance 
when not intending to use; however, this differs from the MDMA finding due to the 
observation that when intending to use, alcohol participants demonstrated an attentional 
bias towards alcohol-related stimuli, albeit, very weakly. This discrepancy in alcohol 
attentional bias may also be due to similar processes of trying to avoid the craving that has 
been associated with substance abuse (cf. Tiffany, 1990).
Within this experiment evidence has been found which may indicate that MDMA 
attentional biases may be present in MDMA users; it is a promising start, but it is hard to 
draw firm conclusions from the current experiment, due to the small number of 
participants. Further research is clearly needed. Regarding the attentional bias results; 
although not all of the correlations are significant, it would not be expected for all of the 
measures to be significant. It would also appear that a strong attentional bias was not
observed within the alcohol participants when use was intended. This very surprising result 
may indicate fundamental flaws in the study which may be the result of not utilising 
appropriate control groups. Future study would benefit from a control group containing low 
users or non-users; this would therefore replace the correlational design. The correlational 
design assumes meaningful differences between reported substance use. However, such 
estimates may be arbitrary. It would therefore be more empirically valid to place 
participants into broad categories of heavy and light/non-users in order to explore these 
attentional biases further. However, the correlational design of this study does form a 
promising start to within-subjects design attentional bias research. It would also appear that 
the fixed gaze measure of attentional bias may be the stronger of the attentional bias 
measures used within this chapter. However, more research is needed to validate this new 
measure of attentional bias before it is possible to draw firm conclusions from the utilisation 
of this task.
In conclusion, it would appear that evidence has been observed which may indicate 
an attentional bias for MDMA users. It was also observed that attentional biases could 
potentially be phenomena which, for substance users, do not fluctuate as a result of 
external factors such as craving, use intention, and outcome expectancies, suggesting that 
attentional biases may be fairly stable across time and not transient.
Summary: Within this chapter a within subjects design was used to explore attentional 
biases further. It was found that attentional biases did not vary to a great degree when use 
was intended or not. Tiffany (1990) would suggest that greater attentional bias may be 
observed when use was not intended whilst Robinson and Berridge (1993) would suggest a 
greater attentional bias when use was intended. The results of this chapter would not 
support one theory over another as attentional biases were not found to fluctuate to a large 
degree dependent upon use intention. Craving and outcome expectancies were also not 
found to be associated with attentional biases, again supporting the idea that attentional 
biases are a stable phenomenon. Evidence was also observed which may indicate an 
attentional bias for MDMA in MDMA users, a finding not previously reported.
Chapter 4: Cognitive Biases
The importance of attentional biases in substance users and how they are involved in the 
maintenance of continuing substance use have now been considered. Substance use can 
lead to the allocation of attentional resources being biased. Such biases in the allocation of 
attention can be seen using tasks such as the Dot-Probe or eye tracking tasks (e.g. Noel, et 
al., 2006). However, attentional biases are potentially only one aspect of a broader system 
of biases which can result from substance use. Cox and Klinger (1988; 1990) suggest that 
substance abuse can lead to a biased internal state that would lead to the facilitation of 
achieving a goal; in the case of a substance abuser, that goal may be substance seeking 
behaviour. This may be reflected in the substance abusers' cognitive functioning. Therefore, 
although attention may be affected, it may also be expected to find influences in higher 
level cognition as well. Such biases in cognition would therefore utilise different tasks than 
those employed in attentional bias measurement.
Here, an alternative perspective on attentional bias is sought, in terms of their role in 
memory activation. Models, such as semantic network theory, may be able to explain 
drinking decision processes. Substance abuse may lead to an 'accessibility bias', where 
positive expectancies are more readily available for a substance abuse. This may lead to a 
positive valuation of a substance, thus this bias would promote further substance abuse. 
This may be reflective of a more general bias in cognitive processes, rather than limited to a 
single aspect of cognition, such as that o f attention, as would be measured by the 
emotional-Stroop. This idea is in line with the motivational theory of current concerns 
(Klinger, 1987), where cognitive experience is structured in a way that leads to the 
attainment of goals. A person's current concern is their internal state and relates to the goal 
for which they are striving. This internal state is therefore critical for the achievement of 
their goal. A current concern would facilitate attention in the environment toward stimuli 
relevant to the current goal. However the theory postulates that a number of cognitive 
faculties would be affected; not merely attention. Current concerns for substance abuse 
could be maintained by biases in semantic memory activation. These cognitive biases may 
therefore impede on memory in substance abusers, when the task is related to their current 
concerns.
Representations of addiction-related behaviour (e.g. drinking, smoking) are paired in 
memory with associated propositions about outcome (e.g. relaxing, stimulating). These 
associations and expectancies, which can motivate behaviour, reside in neurocognitive 
structures, which can be broadly characterised as 'memory'. They are thought to develop 
automatically from abstraction of information from the environment (Tiffany, 1990), and 
may play a motivationally intrinsic aspect of behaviour, as the associations are likely to be 
positive and appetitive. The valence attributed to these associations is thought to be 
consistent with early experiences with the substance in question. The semantic associations 
between behaviour and outcome becomes strengthened through repeated use of the 
substance. As an association develops, activation at one point of the 'network' will 
automatically trigger propositional links across the network. This inevitably leads to an 
accessibility bias, where positive information regarding the behaviour will become 
increasingly strengthened.
An accessibility bias would be responsible for the between-group differences 
observed in positive outcome expectancies made between drinkers and non-drinkers 
(Meyer and colleagues, 1971; 1987). However, heavy and light drinkers vary in positive and 
negative endorsements, but also in relation to the reaction time to make these 
endorsements (Armstrong, 1997). These results suggest that heavy drinkers are more able 
to access positively motivating behaviour, and light drinkers have better access to more 
negative and inhibiting behaviours. This would suggest that there are also within-group 
differences for the accessibility o f alcohol associations. Litz et al. (1987) observed that 
smokers were also able to make both negative and positive evaluations about cigarette use; 
however they were better able to recall the positive ones. These studies are demonstrative 
of a memory and accessibility bias for positive information regarding specific substance 
abuse.
As discussed previously, Stacy (1997) proposed that memory activation would be 
automatic, but outcome expectancies may have a basis in decision making. Stacy makes a 
distinction between the two processes, claiming that the former is implicit whilst the latter 
is explicit. However as both are memory processes, an accessibility bias may affect both 
processes. This would be caused by current concerns leading to a cognitive bias which 
would have an effect upon memory activation. Stacy's theories could therefore be
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interpreted in terms of semantic networks. If outcome expectancies were to be organised 
within semantic networks (explicit), then how this network is accessed could represent 
automatic/memory activation processes (implicit). Therefore, the study of a memory-based 
cognitive bias task may help measure the association between the implicit and explicit 
components of substance abuse.
Rather et al. (1992) and Goldman and Rather (1993; 1994) used MDS to look at the 
organisation of endorsements regarding substance abuse. Endorsements are potentially 
analogous to outcome expectancies. Results suggested that the 'space' between positive 
endorsements was more tightly packed in heavy drinkers than light drinkers. This would 
lead to the suggestion that in light drinkers more negative endorsements are available 
which are motivationally inhibiting than in the heavy drinkers. These positive associations 
may therefore be intruding on memory, causing a cognitive bias for drinking behaviour.
Numerous studies using a multitude of tasks have shown that substance-specific 
stimuli are processed in a manner specific to previous substance use history. A heavy 
drinker will have a correspondingly high attentional bias for alcohol stimuli, but cognitive 
biases have also been observed when using substance-related stimuli (e.g. Pothos and Cox, 
2001). A number of different measures have been adopted for the measurement of 
cognitive biases. The modified-Stroop is by far the most common. However, cognitive biases 
should operate more generally, than just in relation to one aspect of cognition, like 
attention, as it could be argued that the modified-Stroop is measuring. Chapter 5 therefore 
attempts to explore whether heavy drinkers have a preferential bias for the encoding of 
alcohol-related information, as measured on a subsequent memory task.
Chapter 5: The Percentage Estimation Task: How Drinking Can Distort Environmental 
Statistics
5.1: Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a novel task to explore cognitive biases related to 
substance use, for example, excessive alcohol consumption. The task, called the Percentage 
Estimation Task (PET), simply involves presenting participants with a list of words, such that 
words can be in one of three categories: alcohol-related, a category of neutral related words 
(e.g., musical instruments), and a category of neutral unrelated words. Participants read the 
words and were then asked to state estimates for the percentage of words in each category. 
This simple measure was shown to be sensitive to differences between heavy and light 
drinkers and, moreover, to differences in BMI, emotional eating, and restraint eating, in an 
extension of the task related to eating behaviour. The PET is motivated in relation to 
intuitions regarding both the behaviour of interest and theory of cognitive biases in 
substance use. A less successful attempt to create a current concerns version of the task is 
also reported with potential reasons for its shortcomings.
Cognitive biases related to alcohol abuse (and, more generally, substance abuse) 
have been the focus of extensive research (Cox et al., 2006; Field & Cox, 2008; Hogarth et 
al., 2008; Williams et al., 1996). In an effort to understand the exact role of such biases in 
alcohol abuse, researchers have employed different kinds of cognitive tasks (e.g., Jones & 
Schulze, 2000; Palfai & Ostafin, 2003; Pothos & Cox, 2002; Stacy, 1997; MacLeod et al., 
1996; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). All this work has led to several key insights regarding the 
nature of cognitive biases. For example, in the case of attentional biases, it is now 
established that a bias can reflect a number of separate (in principle, independent) 
attentional processes, such as rapid initial attentional orientation and difficulty with 
disengaging attention. Other researchers have noted that cognitive biases can alter memory 
processes, so that positive alcohol expectancies or outcomes would be more readily 
associated with alcohol-related stimuli, for alcohol abusers (McCusker, 2001; Stacy, 1997). 
Rather et al. (1992) argued that the conceptual psychological space of alcohol abusers can 
be altered, so that positive alcohol outcomes would be more proximal to alcohol-related
concepts, compared to negative ones. Such work reveals the multifaceted nature of 
cognitive biases related to  alcohol abuse and the difficulty of explaining these biases 
comprehensively by reference to a single cognitive process (e.g., attention).
Research in the nature of cognitive biases has revealed several key insights regarding 
alcohol abuse. For example, if alcohol abusers have difficulty disengaging attention from 
alcohol-related stimuli (as indeed seems to be the case; Cox et al., 2006), then the additional 
processing of such stimuli plausibly makes it more likely that thought processes will likewise 
reflect a corresponding influence. If alcohol abusers have a lower attentional threshold for 
processing alcohol-related information (and, perhaps equivalently, find alcohol-related 
stimuli more attention-grabbing; Robinson & Berridge, 1993; cf. Field et al., 2008), then in 
an array of stimuli including an alcohol-related stimulus, alcohol-abusers will tend to focus 
on the alcohol-related stimulus. Some researchers hope that it will be possible to utilise 
such insights so as to develop cognitive-style interventions for ameliorating alcohol abuse 
problems (e.g., Wiers etal., 2006).
Most of the existing work on cognitive biases has been developed in the context of 
tasks representative of particular cognitive processes. For example, in order to demonstrate 
a cognitive bias in attention, a suitable version of the Stroop task has been employed (Cox et 
al., 2006) and biases in memory have been studied with typical association tasks (e.g., Stacy, 
1997; see also the review of McCusker, 2001). The motivation for the present project was to 
propose a task which might further help reveal insights into how, for example alcohol- 
related cognitive biases, alter the way an alcohol user perceives the world. In other words, 
how does the world 'appear' from the eyes of an excessive drinker?
Assuming that heavy drinkers both orient their attention more rapidly towards 
alcohol-related stimuli and find it hard to disengage their attention from such stimuli, then it 
would be expected that most cognitive processing will be focused on alcohol-related stimuli, 
at the expense of other stimuli in the person's environment. Moreover, research with 
memory paradigms has shown stronger associations between positive alcohol and 
marijuana outcomes for corresponding heavy users (Stacy et al., 1996), which suggests an 
increased salience of memory representations in relation to an abused substance (cf. 
McCusker, 2001; Rather et al., 1992). A related finding of verbal fluency was reported by 
Goldstein et al. (2007), in that participants who had used cocaine within the previous 72 
hours were better able to name drug-related words than cocaine users who hadn't used
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cocaine within the previous 72 hours. Likewise, Bock and Klinger (1986) reported that more 
emotionally arousing words could be recalled better, following various ratings tasks for 
these words. A greater degree of recall again suggests that emotionally charged stimuli have 
increased salience in relation to more neutral ones.
Therefore, existing research overwhelmingly suggests that for, e.g., an excessive 
drinker, the cognitive processing of individual alcohol-related stimuli is prioritised. An 
unaddressed, though key question, is whether this enhanced salience of individual stimuli 
might translate into a distorted perception regarding the availability or frequency of such 
stimuli in the environment. In other words, is it the case that the perception of alcohol- 
related stimuli 'crowds' that of unrelated stimuli, to an extent that distorts an excessive 
drinkers' sense of the relevant environmental statistics? If this were true, there would be 
potentially significant consequences. It would mean that, from the perspective of a heavy 
drinker, the frequency of alcohol-related stimuli is inflated. A perception of an increase in 
frequency would plausibly be linked with a sense of greater availability, further fuelling a 
desire to consume alcohol.
Interestingly, cognitive psychology research indicates that this may be the case. 
Goldstone (1993) showed that if a multiply-occurring feature of a stimulus is more salient 
(e.g., because of higher figural goodness), then its frequency would be overestimated. 
Goldstone (1993) performed research into 'overestimation biases'. He hypothesised that he 
could manipulate the salience of a feature by clustering displays or by altering task 
instructions. A number of slightly differing tasks were used, but the main principle of his 
experiments involved the presentation of two pictures presented simultaneously. The 
pictures contained white and black squares. On one of the pictures the white (or black) 
squares were grouped closer together. This, he observed, led to an increased chance of the 
participant selecting this image when asked to select the picture with the most white (or 
black) squares. Participants would overestimate the number of white (or black squares), as 
the target square would become more salient due to how the stimulus was presented to 
participants.
'Overestimation biases' can arise in a variety of ways. Goldstone's (1993) paper 
appears to show two ways, one from figural goodness, and another from basic priming 
mechanisms. His interpretation of the research led him to suggest that participants fail to 
search for negative evidence, in that, when hypothesis testing, participants are fairly rigid in
trying to support, rather than discredit their hypotheses i.e. a confirmation bias. He 
suggested that the mechanism taking place involved a participant's attention being directed 
to regions with larger amounts of confirming evidence. He therefore suggested that there is 
a perceptual system in place which may be biased by stimuli that are deemed salient. This 
system would then affect the perception of stimulus density. Goldstone suggests that the 
results can be interpreted in terms of attention as a spotlight (e.g. LaBerge, 1983). If this 
'beam' of attention falls on a region containing features of value, then this will affect results 
in a manner which corresponds with the number of features within the region. For example, 
if the region contains mostly black squares, then mostly black will be reported. Due to the 
framing of how the question is asked, a participant may be directed straight to a certain 
task-related region (note the similarities here with attentional bias). But when this region 
contains items that should be negatively appraised, then a lower estimation bias is reported 
than if the region were free of the stimuli. For example, if the region contains a cluster of 
black squares with a number of white also within the region, then this may lead to the over 
reporting of white squares.
These results highlight how attention can be 'modified' during task situations. 
However, o f interest here is whether overestimation biases can arise from the kind of 
attentional biases which have been postulated in substance use, eating behaviour, and 
current concerns. Goldstone (1993) suggests a confirmation bias. This form of bias may lead 
to attentional biases: If somebody's life is organised around alcohol, perhaps he is biased to 
seek confirmation of the 'importance' o f alcohol, by seeking alcohol stimuli in the 
environment.
A simple task was developed to explore this hypothesis, that is, that for heavy 
drinkers there is indeed a perception of increased frequency/availability of alcohol-related 
stimuli in their environment (cf. Tiffany, 1990). The task involves having participants read a 
list of words so as to subsequently provide an estimate of word frequency in each category. 
It can be called a Percentage Estimation Task (PET). The objective of this task is twofold. 
First, o f interest is assessing the prediction that, even when the objective frequency of 
alcohol-related stimuli is matched to that of neutral stimuli, heavy drinkers have an inflated 
sense regarding the former. Second, the PET can potentially serve as a novel measure of
cognitive bias, but which does not require precise reaction time measurement or computer- 
controlled presentation of stimuli.
As with all research relating to cognitive biases, it is currently unclear what is the 
range of behaviours over which one would expect cognitive biases. Some approaches would 
suggest that, as long as there is a particular important goal which causes preoccupation, 
corresponding cognitive biases would emerge (Cox & Klinger, 1988). Other research ties the 
emergence of cognitive biases to the biological impact of particular substances (e.g., 
Robinson & Berridge, 1993). For this first illustration of the PET, excessive drinking was 
chosen, as corresponding cognitive biases have been robustly demonstrated for even casual 
heavy drinkers (Cox et al., 2006). Also, methodologically, it is straightforward to identify 
heavy and light drinkers in a typical sample of university undergraduates. Another behaviour 
which robustly leads to cognitive biases is eating behaviour (e.g., Calitri et al., 2010; Tapper 
et al., 2010). Therefore, as an illustration of how this task can be extended to other kinds of 
behaviour, an example subsequently presented related to eating behaviour, followed by a 
current concerns version of the task.
5.2: Alcohol task
5.2.1: Methods
5.2.2: Participants
To avoid accidentally priming participants in relation to the hypotheses, recruitment was 
blind to  alcohol use level. Participants believed they were taking part in a reading task; 
however participants were fully debriefed at the end of the task. Full ethical approval was 
granted by the Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix V). 32 
participants (28F, 4M) were recruited, all undergraduate psychology students at Swansea 
University, who participated for course credit (mean age: 21.69 years; SD: 7.28). Participants 
were assigned to a heavy or light drinkers group, based on their reported weekly alcohol 
use, on the basis of the Department of Health guidelines (Shenker, Sorensen, & Davis, 
2009). Accordingly, light drinkers (LD; N=10; Average unit count=1.50; SD=1.65) were 
defined as males drinking on average less than 6 alcohol units/week and females less than 4 
alcohol units/week (one alcohol unit = 10 ml. of pure alcohol) and heavy drinkers (HD; N=8; 
Average unit count=26.25; SD=9.04) as males consuming more than 21 units of 
alcohol/week and females more than 14 units/week. The difference in LD HD group sizes 
observed here and in Chapter 2 may be reflective of the slightly higher increased average 
age of participants that participated in Chapter 5. Bewick, et al. (2008) notes that alcohol 
consumption decreases in undergraduates as they progress in their studies. This may be 
reflected in the sample size here where there is a larger LD group than HD group. However, 
it is unlikely that this would affect the relationship between the IVs and the DVs reported 
here. Note that analysing the results for all participants, perhaps by correlating number of 
units per week with the dependent variable from the PET task, is not appropriate. A 
correlational approach would assume that internal differences in weekly alcohol use are 
meaningful, yet this is extremely unlikely to be the case (both because of the inherent 
inaccuracy of self-report measures and the relative instability of drinking patterns of 
university undergraduates). Thus, such a correlational approach would introduce 
considerable noise in the data. By contrast, the coarse distinction into heavy and light 
drinkers is more likely to provide an accurate characterisation of drinking patterns, at least 
in relation to corresponding cognitive biases (cf. Cox et al., 2006).
5.2.3: Materials and procedure
A list was created of 60 words (taken from Cox, Yeates, & Regan, 1999), such that 10 words 
were presented on each page (see Appendix J). Three word categories were employed: 
alcohol (e.g., beer, vodka), neutral related (music; e.g., trombone, bass), and neutral 
unrelated (e.g., carpet, invitation). The category of music words was included so that there 
would be a category of control words as matched in semantic relatedness as the category of 
alcohol words (since semantic relatedness can increase attentional bias, e.g., Warren, 1972). 
The category of unrelated control stimuli was included as a filler category. The stimuli 
comprising the three categories were almost entirely common, concrete nouns. The order 
of words on each page was randomised. Participants were simply given the list of words and 
asked to read them aloud, without any instructions about the task to follow. After the word 
list, participants were given a sheet of paper, with questions regarding the percentage of 
words which were related to alcohol, music, or were neutral (see Appendix K). They were 
also asked whether they played a musical instrument (a variable that was not found to have 
an effect). Participants finally completed the AUDIT alcohol use questionnaire (Babor, de la 
Fuente, Saunders, & Grant, (1992) and were asked to estimate their weekly alcohol use (see 
Appendix I).
5.2.4: Results
The correct percentage response for each word category was 33%. An Alcohol Percentage 
Difference Score (APDS) was computed as the reported percentage for alcohol words minus 
those for the two other word categories. For example, if a participant reported there were 
30% music words, 40% alcohol words, and 30% neutral words, then their APDS be scored 
40-(30+30)=-20. Therefore, participants able to process the frequency information 
accurately would have APDS scores of -33; also, the more positive the APDS score, the more 
the bias to overestimate the frequency of alcohol-related words in the list. Note that APDS is 
an appropriate dependent variable, as opposed for example, to just the estimate produced 
for the alcohol stimuli, because participants sometimes provided percentage estimates for 
the different stimulus categories which did not add up to 100%.
A comparison between the APDS scores of heavy drinkers (M=-10.5; SD=33.58) with 
those of light drinkers (M=-37.00; SD=15.67) was performed. An independent samples t -test
showed this difference to be significant (t(16)=-2.223; p=.041). Indeed, on average, heavy 
drinkers estimated the percentage of alcohol words to be 44.75%, but light drinkers only 
32.00%, a striking difference (see Figure 5-1).
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Figure 5-1: Average heavy drinkers and light drinkers percentage alcohol-word estimation. 
The bars represent the 'difference scores' obtained by subtracting the percentages. The 
error bars show the standard error of the mean.
5.2.5: Discussion
A comparison of heavy and light drinkers demonstrated a significant difference in 
percentage scores. These results are consistent with other attentional bias studies in the 
literature, which often employ the definition of heavy vs. light alcohol use to compare one 
group of light drinkers against a group of heavy drinkers, rather than rely heavily upon an 
association between unit counts and a dependent variable (DV). A comparison of heavy and 
light drinkers within the current task leads to the observation that the two groups do report 
broad differences within their estimations of alcohol-related words.
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The results lead to the suggestion that attentional biases for substance-related 
stimuli can lead to overestimation biases. The implications of this are that heavy drinkers 
perceive an increased number of alcohol stimuli within their environment. Goldstone (1993) 
suggested a confirmation bias in interpreting his overestimation results. In terms of the 
current research, this confirmation bias could be that a heavy drinker, whose life is 
organised in a manner where alcohol is important, may seek confirmation within his/her 
environment to verify the 'importance' of his/her drinking habit. This may be expressed 
through an attentional bias for alcohol related stimuli which may lead to inflated reporting 
of alcohol words on the PET. The observation that heavy drinking undergraduates may 
perceive more alcohol-related stimuli suggests that a cognitive bias may be developing for 
alcohol. The sensitivity of the current task to make such observations is beneficial, as the 
previous chapter was unable to find an attentional bias within a similar population.
5.3: Eating behaviour task
Attentional biases related to excessive drinking are straightforwardly associated with the 
amount of alcohol consumed, the latter being an obvious marker of the degree to which 
drinking behaviour is problematic. In the case of eating, the distinction between adaptive 
and maladaptive behaviour is less straightforward and the quantity o f food consumed does 
not necessarily indicate maladaptive behaviour (Brunstrom et al., 2008). The Body Mass 
Index (BMI) can be an index of maladaptive eating behaviour. The Dutch Eating Behaviour 
Questionnaire (DEBQ; Van Strien et al., 1986) produces three indices of eating behaviour, 
external, restraint, and emotion eating, which have been associated with food-related 
attentional biases (e.g., Tapper et al., 2008) and eating behaviour in general. Therefore, 
results were explored from a food PET with BMI results and the DEBQ indices.
Cognitive biases for food are thought to operate in a similar manner, as cognitive 
biases for other substances, as they may reflect a preferential processing for food-related 
stimuli. There are thought to be a number of contrasting mechanisms which could 
potentially explain the nature of such preferential processing. Biases may be the result of 
automatic associations between food and positive food expectancies (cf. Tiffany, 1990), or 
an increased salience of food stimuli (Robinson and Berridge, 1993), or an increased 
preoccupation with food (Cox and Klinger, 2004). Although these theories of the underlying 
mechanism of preferential processing of food stimuli may be contrasting, they all basically 
suggest that an increase in consumption is associated with a corresponding attentional bias. 
The link between increased consumption and attentional biases has been demonstrated by, 
for example, Braet and Crombez (2003) who observed higher interference on the food- 
Stroop for obese children than non-obese children. This observation could be likened to the 
effects that are observed in heavy drinkers, who also have a corresponding attentional bias. 
The way in which food related attention biases could differ from those associated with 
substance use may be regarding the implicit attitudes that may underlie consumption, 
however, this is complete speculation. For example, Craeynest et al. (2005) observed that 
obese children were more likely to have positive implicit attitudes towards food, whereas 
Roefs et al. (2005) reported a contrary association (albeit in an anorexia nervosa patient 
population). This dissociation in results may be the cause of the diminished attentional 
biases that have been associated with eating behaviour. Indeed Pothos, Tapper, and Calitri
(2009) reported using a number of measures for the assessment of food-related cognitive 
biases, but were unable to find any reliable association with body mass index (BMI). They 
made the suggestion that, although cognitive paradigms are well established in substance 
abuse, extending the application of these paradigms to eating behaviour should be treated 
with caution.
BMI is seen as a useful variable for establishing whether a person's weight is 
adaptive or not. High BMI may be associated with preferential processing of food-related 
information. Such preferential processing may be due to high incentive salience of food 
stimuli (Robinson and Berridge, 1993), automatic associations between food and positive 
food expectancies (cf. Tiffany, 1990), or an increase in the preoccupation with food (Cox and 
Klinger, 2004). The above theories would all predict an attentional bias that is associated 
with food information.
A useful tool for the measurement of eating behaviour is the DEBQ (Van Strien et al., 
1986). The indices obtained from the DEBQ namely external eating, emotional eating, and 
restraint, have all been supported as indicators of eating behaviour (Braet and Van Strien, 
1997). External eating is eating in response to external food cues, such as sight and smell of 
food. Emotional eating is eating in response to emotional arousal states, such as fear, anger, 
or anxiety; therefore, emotional eating can be a coping mechanism. Restraint eating 
concerns restricting one's food intake.
Research has demonstrated that people characterised by the DEBQ as external 
eaters, may exhibit a cognitive bias for food-related information, due to the appetitive 
qualities of food (e.g. Dreyna, 2005; Franken and Muris, 2005; Robinson and Berridge, 
1993). Such biases have also been observed in those who aim to decrease their food 
consumption i.e. restraint eaters (Tapper, et al., 2008). Currently, however, there does not 
appear to be an association between Stroop performance, attentional bias, and BMI (e.g. 
Boon, Vogelzang, and Jansen, 2000).
It is hypothesised that the PET task will be associated with the BMI and the three forms 
of eating behaviour.
5.3.1: Methods
5.3.2: Participants
19 (3M, 16F) participants were recruited, all undergraduates at Swansea University, who 
took part for course credit. Participants believed they were taking part in a reading task; 
however participants were fully debriefed at the end of the task. Full ethical approval was 
granted by the Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix V).
5.3.3: Materials and procedure
A food PET was created, such that 20 words were food-related, 20 were related to 
transport, and 20 were neutral unrelated words (see Appendix L). The food- and transport- 
related words were taken from Tapper et al. (2008). The neutral words were obtained using 
an online random word generator (http://www.datavis.ca/online/paivio/). Neutral words 
were matched in terms of length and syllables to the food and transport-related words.
Neutral words were also deemed to be of similar frequency to those of food and transport- 
related words. Following the reading of the list, participants were given a separate sheet on 
which they were asked to state their estimated percentage for the frequency of each word 
category (see Appendix M). Finally, participants were asked to complete the DEBQ 
questionnaire, which included questions to compute the BMI (Van Strien et al., 1986). 
Information about the weight and height of the participants was based on self-reports.
5.3.4: Results
A Food Percentage Difference Score (FPDS) was computed, in a way analogous to that in 
Section 5.2.4. Also, external, restraint, and emotional eating indices were computed 
following Van Strien et al. (1986). The distribution of BMIs was approximately normal, so a 
meaningful dichotomisation in low-BMI and high-BMI participants was not possible. 
However, for illustration, participants were allocated into groups based on World Health 
Organisation guidelines, so that BMIs 18.5-25 were assigned to the low-BMI and BMIs of 25- 
BO to the high-BMI group and participants were divided into these two groups accordingly 
(N=15 and N=4, respectively). The FPDS value for the high BMI participants (M=-5; 
SD=37.859) differed significantly from that of the low BMI ones (M=-48; SD=16.125), with 
high BMI participants overestimating the percentage of food-related words to a greater
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extent (t(17)=-3.536; p=.003). Indeed, the average food-related percentage estimation for 
the high BMI participants was 45.00%, but the low BMI participants estimated 26.33%, 
again, a striking difference (see Figure 5-2).
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Figure 5-2: Average high body mass index group and low body mass index group percentage 
food-word estimation. The bars represent the 'difference scores' obtained by subtracting 
the percentages. The error bars show the standard error of the mean.
Regarding the DEBQ indices, there are no guidelines which can motivate a separation of 
participants into groups and, moreover, the distribution of scores was approximately 
normally distributed, thus making an arbitrary dichotomisation inappropriate (MacCallum e t 
al., 2002). Therefore pairwise correlations were computed between the FPDS scores and the 
DEBQ indices. Significant correlations were identified in the case of restraint eating 
(r(19)=.453; p=.052) and emotional eating (r(19)=.552; p=.014), but not external eating 
(r(19)=.130; p=.595). Note that in all cases, a positive correlation means that more positive 
FPDS scores (which mean a greater overestimate of the frequency of food-related words) 
were associated with a higher degree of restraint and emotional eating.
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5.3.5: Discussion
The results of this version of the PET further demonstrate the PET's usefulness. Correlations 
between the eating variables and the percentage score demonstrate the association of 
attentional bias and food stimuli. Previous studies into attentional bias and food-related 
stimuli have failed to show an association between BMI and attentional bias (e.g. Pothos, et 
al., 2009). However, this task revealed a significant association here, further supported by 
comparing overweight to normal-weight participants, with a t-test analysis. As a food- 
related Stroop has failed to predict BMI in previous studies, this result would lead to the 
suggestion that the current study may be more sensitive at measuring attentional bias than 
the Stroop.
Emotional eating was also found to correlate with the percentage score. Emotional 
eating is eating in response to emotional situations, such as feelings of fear or anxiety. 
Previously, attentional biases have not been found to correlate with emotional eating. One 
explanation for why it might be significant here is that the PET may be more sensitive than 
other tasks as a measure of attentional bias. A lack of awareness of reasons for overeating 
has been observed for emotional eaters (e.g. Bruch, 1973; Van Strien & Ouwens, 2007). 
Therefore the PET may be more sensitive to the implicit cognitions involved in emotional 
eating, i.e., if causes for overeating are outside of awareness, then explicit measures may 
lack the sensitivity for measuring putative implicit causes. Restraint eating was also found to 
marginally correlate (p = .052) with the percentage score. Restraint eating, when 
accompanied by being underweight, may be indicative of anorexia nervosa. However, when 
restraint eating is accompanied by high weight fluctuation, it may be reflective of a rebound 
type of dieting, where, if one were to abandon dieting, then this may lead to some form of 
binge eating (potentially leading to bulimia nervosa in some cases). Within the current study 
the marginal correlation between restraint eating and the PET is consistent with other 
evidence for a high degree of dieting-behaviour amongst university students (e.g. Forman- 
Hoffman, 2004).
Within previous research, an attentional bias for external eating has been observed 
(e.g. Drayna, 2005). However, this result has not been supported when using the PET. This is
surprising, as external eating is eating in response to food stimuli. Therefore one would 
predict that a list o f food-related words may elicit a similar response.
It would appear that the PET is sensitive to various indices of eating behaviour. The 
observation that the PET also correlates with BMI suggests that the current measure may 
have advantages over other measures when measuring attentional bias for food.
5.4: Current Concerns Task
The theory of current concerns (Klinger, 1975, 1977, 1987, 1996b; Klinger and Cox, 2004) 
posits that people structure their lives in pursuit of a number of goals. To have a goal leads 
to a preoccupation about achievement of said goal. A current concern is the product of 
becoming committed to a goal and its eventual attainment or disengagement from; that is, 
a current concern is a persistent motivational state. This motivational state may lead to 
relevant information within the environment to become sensitised and increasingly salient, 
e.g. substance abusers have a current concern for substance abuse. Therefore, they would 
have a corresponding attentional bias. A current concern will implicitly bias attention 
towards goal-related stimuli. Within any population there may be current concerns which 
are poignant to each individual e.g. educational matters or health matters.
The next step for exploring the PET was to examine undergraduate students7 current 
concerns and examine whether the PET would be able to reveal attentional biases for such 
concerns. Pilot research was first performed in order to establish current concerns within 
such a population. Following this, the PET was performed with a number of related 
categories.
5.4.1: Method
5.4.2: Pilot Experiment
Pilot research was performed in order to ascertain the current concerns most relevant to 
students. This was performed by first putting together 8 word categories, representative of 
various current concerns. Categories were taken from Cox and Klinger (2000). Next, words 
relating to each of these categories were also created. Participants were then asked to 
decide to which category each word belonged. This pilot study was performed by 12 
undergraduate students. Results of the pilot study showed that of the 72 words employed, 
an average of 4.2 words (5.8% of the word list) were miscategorised by the 12 participants. 
Participants did not consistently make errors on any word in particular, so no word was 
changed for the percentage task (see Appendix N). Different participants were used for the 
main PET.
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5.4.3: Main Task
5.4.3.1: Participants
A further 20 undergraduate psychology students were recruited in return for course credit. 
Eight of which were male. The mean age of the group was 21.9 (4.3). Participants believed 
they were taking part in a reading task; however participants were fully debriefed at the end 
of the task. Full ethical approval was granted by the Department of Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee (see Appendix V).
5.4.3.2: Materials and Procedure
72 words were used to create the list. There were eight categories of words, each with 9 
words. Words and categories were selected through pilot research (see above). They were 
thought to be categories most related to an undergraduate students' life/current concerns 
(e.g. household matters, and economic and financial issues).
Following the reading of the words, participants were asked the percentage of words 
for each of the 8 categories. They were then given a questionnaire about their 'current 
concerns'. Questions included 'How preoccupied with the following topics have you been 
over the last week?', 'How important will these areas be to you over the forthcoming 
week?', 'Typically, how important to you are each of these areas?', and 'How committed are 
you to increasing your time available for each of the following aspects of your life?' (see 
Appendix O). Participants responded to each of the questions on a 7 point Likert scale for 
each of the 8 categories. Participants were also asked for each of the above questions to 
rate whether this aspect of their life was positive or negative (see Appendix P). These 
questions were based on similar current concern questions from Klinger, Barta, and Max 
(1980).
5.4.4: Results
Correlation analyses were performed to observe the association between the percentage 
estimation scores and the current concerns question responses and the positive/neutral 
responses. The Household question total significantly correlated with the household 
percentage score, r(20) = .447; p = .048. This suggests that there was an association 
between household current concerns and household percentage estimates. Employment
and finances percentage scores marginally correlated the positive/negative score, r[20) = 
.461; p = .068. Recreation percentage score and question total correlated marginally, r[20) = 
.388; p = .091. Age was found to lead to positive correlations with percentage household 
(r(20) = .521; p = .018) and percentage partner, family, and relatives (r(20) = .477; p = .033). 
Interestingly, age was found to be negatively correlated with reported importance of 
alcohol matters, r(20) = -.752; p = .0005. It would appear that this version of the PET, 
although led to some significant results, did not lead to as robust findings as the alcohol and 
food PETs.
5.4.5: Discussion
The results from this task have not revealed as many significant associations as previous 
PETs. Age was found to be associated with a number of variables within the task, perhaps 
age may be a factor which needs to be manipulated directly in current concern research. 
Perhaps for older participants the current concerns are more likely to be associated with 
attentional biases, as current concerns have been in place for longer. Yet, to suggest that 
the younger undergraduates have no current concerns would be erroneous. It may, 
however, be that undergraduate students within their first year away from home, are still 
adjusting to, e.g., household matters and transportation issues. Yet as significance was also 
not found for other concerns, for example, alcohol related matters and educational matters, 
issues that most undergraduates (potentially) preoccupy themselves with, then this 
argument is hard to support.
A small number of significant associations were observed. These could imply that the 
current concerns PET is sensitive to the current concerns of the participants. If this is the 
case, then it would appear that the participants within the sample who reported having the 
most household current concerns also estimated a higher proportion of household-related 
words than other participants. However, although there are a small number of significant 
associations, these are outweighed by the associations which are not significant. This may 
have been because the method for measuring current concerns was not sensitive enough or 
it may have been that the undergraduate population did not have sufficiently developed 
current concerns to elicit a cognitive bias.
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The previous PETs worked by having two categories, and an 'everything else' 
category. It could be that significant findings were not observed on the current concerns PET 
due to the noise created from having too many categories. Participants may have 
overestimated their current concerns, but then, due to the number of categories, just 
randomly allocated the remaining percentages between the remaining categories. In future 
research it may be better to use fewer categories in order to minimise noise when allocating 
percentages.
The concerns may have also been too general to 'activate' attentional biases. The 
pilot research may have successfully confirmed that words were associated with their 
designated categories. However, these words may not have been high enough in current 
concern-relatedness enough to elicit a cognitive bias. For example, one of the eight words 
from the 'home and household matters' category was 'laundry'. Now, I may have laundry to 
do, and it may be a current concern of mine, therefore potentially making the word more 
salient in the list. But, this does not mean that one word will lead to me scoring highly on a 
scale of how preoccupied I have been with household matters. This issue of the concerns 
being too general may lead to the suggestion that if specific tasks were created for 
participants, based upon a participant's perceived current concerns, then this may result in 
a more robust attentional bias.
5.5: General Discussion and Conclusions Regarding PET
The purpose in developing the PET was to provide a measure of cognitive bias which can 
test the intuition that for excessive drinkers alcohol-related stimuli crowds that of other 
stimuli. Thus, alcohol-related stimuli are not only attended to more rapidly and are harder 
to disengage attention from, they also appear more numerous, in an excessive drinkers' 
environment (cf. Tiffany, 1990). It is believed this is a novel insight regarding cognitive 
biases, which informs in an interesting way understanding of how cognitive biases can 
potentially contribute to a state of substance abuse. Also, the results show that the PET is 
sensitive to behavioural distinctions (between heavy, light drinkers; restrained, unrestrained 
eaters; emotional, not emotional eaters). The PET is able to capture how the environment 
would plausibly appear to, for example a heavy drinker, in terms of a perception of 
increased frequency/availability of alcohol-related stimuli. One could say that PET bias is the 
result o f a persistent focus on drinking by those who drink too much (and likewise for other 
behaviours of interest).
From a practical point of view, the increase of interest for cognitive-style 
interventions (e.g., Wiers et a!., 2006) has created a need for easy to administer measures of 
cognitive bias, which do not require specialised equipment (e.g., a computer with the 
capacity for measuring reaction times with up to ms accuracy). The PET, if further validated 
in future research, is an exceptionally easy to administer task and the results are extremely 
easy to analyse too. The PET can easily produce an index of emphasis for a particular word 
category, relative to another, even if there are baseline differences in the relative salience 
of the word categories. Also, significant differences in relation to the behavioural 
distinctions of interest were identified even with small sample sizes.
Of course, this first presentation of the PET has several limitations, which it is hoped 
is addressed in future work. Regarding the potential of the PET to serve as a general, easy to 
administer measure of cognitive bias, it is important to explore its relation to other 
measures of cognitive bias, such as the emotional-Stroop task. Note that such examinations 
are not without problems, since within-participant designs with several cognitive bias tasks 
can result in cross-priming between the tasks, making it hard to extract an objective 
measure of task relatedness (Pothos et al., 2009). However, this is not a problem for the 
PET, however, if the task was to be administered within-subjects, then the percentage of
words within each list would need to be varied, otherwise the participant may not respond 
in the anticipated way due to previous exposure. It is also important to explore the PET in 
relation to other dependent variables regarding the behaviour of interest (e.g., for alcohol, 
typical vs. atypical alcohol consumption, craving, binge drinking, changes in alcohol use).
It is recommended for future use of the PET that one should use three word 
categories: an emotional category (e.g. alcohol, food), a control word category (e.g. 
transport words, musical instrument words), and a collection of random words that do not 
belong to a category (i.e. an 'everything else' category). This suggestion is due to the non­
significant findings obtained using the current concerns task: too many word categories 
could potentially be a confounding variable. However, such limitations are to be expected 
when using a new measure such as this one, as there was no prior knowledge regarding the 
amount of word categories which would need to be utilised in order to obtain the strongest 
of effects. Yet the exploratory nature of this chapter is beneficial for the development of the 
PET. It is also suggested that future PET studies contain words of similar syllables between 
categories and the words should be matched in terms of distinctiveness and frequency of 
use within the lexicon. Participants should also not be presented with a test card containing 
no more than 10 words per page. And test card administration should be counterbalanced. 
It is also recommended that following administration of the test cards, the participant 
should immediately be given the questions regarding the percentages. It would also seem 
appropriate that the participant should not be primed to the nature of the study. If they 
were to understand that the task is regarding e.g. alcohol use, then this may bias results. It 
would therefore be advised that whatever other measures are used (e.g. AUDIT, DEBQ, etc.) 
should wait until after the reading list and after the percentage estimation task.
There are more general questions one can ask. For example, does a cognitive bias 
indexed by the PET exist prior to the relevant drinking or eating behaviour or is it a result of 
engaging frequently in these behaviours? Is the PET bias perhaps an epiphenomenon o f e.g. 
excessive drinking with no relevance to developing or changing the problem behaviour? 
These are valid questions, but they apply to any cognitive bias measure, not to the PET bias 
specifically. Cognitive bias researchers have sought to explore the predictive value of 
cognitive biases and so imply a causal role of such biases for the behaviours of interest (e.g.,
Calitri et a!., 2010; Cox et of., 2002; Cox et al., 2007; Mogg et al., 2000). Can PET provide a 
unique perspective to this debate? It is hoped the encouraging results reported here will at 
least warrant interest in the further investigation of the PET regarding these important 
questions.
Summary: Within the alcohol task it was found that HDs were more likely to overestimate 
the number of alcohol words within the 'environment'. Within the food task it was found 
that those with a high BMI overestimated the number of food words within the 
'environment'. A significant correlation was also observed for the percentage estimation 
and restraint eater scores as well as emotional eater scores. A correlation was not observed 
for the percentage score and external eater scores. These results are interpreted as being 
indicative of a cognitive bias. It is suggested that this task may have uses for future 
screening methods. A current concerns version of the task was not found to lead to as 
robust findings. This may be due to a flawed methodology.
Chapter 6: Automaticity and Dyslexia
Attentional biases and cognitive biases play an integral role within substance abuse. These 
biases develop following decisions to use substances on numerous occasions over a 
prolonged period of time. Tiffany (1990) suggests that for someone who increasingly 
engages in alcohol use, his/her environment would increasingly become occupied by stimuli 
related to alcohol. That is, the more someone engages in substance abuse, the more 
associations are automatically made between substances and other related stimuli which 
may lead to more of an environment becoming associated with substance abuse. This is 
arguably what the PET measured in the previous chapter, as the perceived amount of 
substance related stimuli within an 'environment' was examined, in this case, the word list. 
This process of forming associations between substances and other stimuli probably occurs 
automatically. Therefore, automatic skill learning would appear to play an important role in 
the development of substance abuse and related cognitive and attentional biases.
The following chapter involves automaticity, so begins by reviewing theories 
associated with automaticity development. Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) proposed a model 
that differentiated between controlled and automatic processes. They suggested that 
controlled processes were associated with capacity limitations, required attention, and can 
be used in circumstances which are not consistent with previous experience. They argued 
that, through practice, it is possible for automatic processes to develop. These processes 
differ in that they do not have capacity limitations, do not require attention, and are hard to 
modify once they have been learned. Indeed within their experiments (Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977), it took nearly 1000 trials of their task for performance to revert back to a level which 
was associated with the 'unautomatised-level' at the start of the task. This notion of rigidity 
of automatic processes is integral to the model. However, this approach is more a 
description than an explanation, as Shiffrin & Schneider (1977) make no attempt to explain 
how automatic processes develop, other than through the general idea that repetition 
eventually leads to automaticity. Jansma et al. (2001) have tried to elaborate on Shiffrin and 
Schneider's (1977) model, by suggesting that automaticity development leads to a reduced 
usage of the central executive.
Logan (1988) suggested that the above approach to automaticity does not indicate 
clearly enough how practice can lead to automaticity development. Logan's (1988) theory 
suggests that automaticity is a memory phenomenon, rather than related to resource 
limitations. 'Automaticity is memory retrieval: Performance is automatic when it is based on 
single-step direct-access retrieval of past solutions from memory' (Logan, 1988; p493). A 
skill may become automatic if a stimulus triggers the retrieval of a practiced response from 
memory. A novice will begin with an algorithm for a specific task. Through experience, 
he/she would learn specific solutions to specific problems, which are called upon again 
when a similar situation is encountered. The developing learner will either respond with an 
algorithm or a solution retrieved from memory. Eventually, through experience, the 
algorithm will be abandoned, as memory will readily provide the solution; at such a point, 
the process has become automatic. Automatisation is the transition from algorithm-based 
performance to memory-based performance.
The theory assumes that each encounter with a stimulus is encoded, stored, and 
later retrieved. This is assumed to be enacted through a processing episode. A processing 
episode is therefore stored after each encounter (or trial). Such episodes consist of different 
representations of expressing the stimulus, i.e. the interpretation given to the stimulus, the 
associated response, and the task goal: If the stimulus were to be encountered again, within 
the same context as in the previous encounter, then, from memory, aspects of the previous 
processing episode can be retrieved. An observer can then respond on the basis of the 
retrieved information if it is coherent and consistent with the goals of the current task. Or 
they can initiate the relevant algorithm and compute a corresponding interpretation and 
response. Logan (1988) suggests that a person undergoing such a process would, at this 
point, be able to explicitly 'veto' such responses, but should the stimulus, goal, and 
response continue to  be associated, automaticity would develop.
This theory would allow for automatisation to come into effect after a relatively 
small number of trials. This is contrary to modal, lack of resources, accounts of automaticity 
where, often, thousands of trials are assumed to be required to produce automaticity (e.g., 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). There may be a number of reasons for this difference. First, the 
definition of automaticity may vary between theories. Indeed, within Shiffrin and 
Schneider's (1977) theory, the criterion for automatisation was judged on an all-or-nothing
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basis. By contrast, a memory account may suggest that automatisation is never complete, as 
subsequent processing episodes could be contributing further to responses. Secondly, the 
number of trials per session is important in automaticity research, as is the size of the 
stimulus pool. The latter can have an effect upon memory performance, regardless of 
whether the rate of learning of individual items. Thirdly, the memorability of the stimuli 
could have an effect on the rate of automatisation. Those stimuli that are more easily 
remembered will show a quicker onset of automaticity, whereas stimuli that are hard to 
remember will become automatised more slowly (Logan, 1988).
The importance of such processes regarding automatic learning is clear. Therefore 
disruption of these processes may lead to drastically impoverished learning. It is deficits 
with such automaticity development that some (see Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990) have 
theorised is what leads to the deficits associated with dyslexia. Reported next are a number 
of experiments designed to explore attentional biases further, by examining a population 
impaired in automatic skill learning, i.e. dyslexics. First reported is a questionnaire study 
designed to measure whether there are differences between dyslexics and controls in terms 
of substance use.
Chapter 6.1: The Co-morbidity of Dyslexia and Substance Use: Automaticity
The automatisation hypothesis of dyslexia has been thoroughly examined within the 
dyslexia literature; however, automaticity is a term which also appears within the addiction 
literature. During the current questionnaire-based study, the hypothesis was that people 
with dyslexia would demonstrate less substance use than non-dyslexic controls. If dyslexics 
are impaired in automaticity development, then they may subsequently be impaired in the 
automatising properties of substance abuse. Automaticity has been found to be important 
in the development and maintenance of substance abuse through cognitive biases. As 
dyslexics may be less able to automatically form substance abuse cognitive biases, this, 
therefore, may lead to less reported substance use. Results supported the hypothesis; 
dyslexics were found to have used substances less than non-dyslexic controls. These results 
are interpreted in terms of the automatisation hypothesis o f dyslexia and with reference to 
the cognitive model of substance abuse.
6.2: Experiment 1: The Co-morbidity of Dyslexia and Substance Use: Automaticity
Dyslexia is a condition which is affecting 5 -  17.5% of the population (Shaywitz, 1998). 
However, there have been very few studies of co-morbidity between dyslexia and other 
population characteristics. For example, some controversial research appear to suggest that 
dyslexia has a positive relationship with criminality (e.g. Critchley and Critchley, 1978). 
Indeed Kirk and Reid (2001) observed that 50% of a sample of young offenders from a young 
offender's institution in Scotland had dyslexic traits. The presence of dyslexia is higher 
amongst young offenders than what is typically the case in a non-dyslexic normal 
population. Of course, in such observations no causal link is implied, nonetheless they are 
quite important for relevant practice.
Of interest here is the co-morbidity between dyslexia and substance use (the latter 
broadly defined). In general, substance use has been found to be higher amongst youth 
offenders than a comparative non-offender sample (Hammersley, Marsland, and Reid,
2003), so perhaps the above observations might lead to an expectation of an association 
(perhaps weak, overall) between substance use and dyslexia. As demonstrated later, 
speculative theoretical reasons might lead to the opposite prediction as well. Either way, the
idea that dyslexia could lead to different patterns of substance use, if supported, would 
have implications for current clinical practice. As far as the author is aware, there have been 
no previous examinations between dyslexia and substance use. The main objective is to 
provide pilot data which bear on this issue, as well as a preliminary theoretical background 
which can motivate some relevant predictions. It is important to start with a brief overview 
of relevant theory.
Having reviewed in Chapter 1 some of the relevant literature regarding a putative 
link between dyslexia and deficits in automatising behaviour, here the thesis considers some 
further key elements of automatic behaviour (in turn, this would lead to a formulation of a 
prediction regarding dyslexia and substance use). Bargh (1989) states that automaticity 
should be defined as a feature of a process which can run to completion once started 
without the need of conscious monitoring; examples of automatic processes are reading 
and writing. Conscious monitoring, in this definition, refers to intentionally initiating 
processing with regard to  a goal and the intentional evaluation of its outputs. Thus, 
accordingly, a process is automatic if it has, due to genetic predeterminism or due to 
practice, acquired the ability to run without monitoring. Tzelgov (1997b) argued that Stroop- 
like phenomena and (unintended) processing support this explanation of automatic 
processing. Once a process has become automatic, it can occur either autonomously or 
'intentionally'. Automatic processing is autonomous when it is not part of the task 
requirements, such as interference in the Stroop effect. It is intentional when it is a 
component of a more general task which is performed intentionally, like in the case of 
processing of individual words when a sentence is read for meaning. Yet monitoring (in the 
case of skilled readers) applies to the processing of the sentence, while the components are 
processed without monitoring.
Due to a history of substance abuse, substance use is thought to become effortless, 
with little attention on constituent actions, fast, and triggered by external cues. The 
substance abuse of an addict eventually becomes associated with automatic processes. By 
contrast, urges are thought to be the result of nonautomatic behaviour, as they are 
conscious, slow, intentional, and require effort. These urges will act independently of the 
automatic processes in relation to substance abuse, and may not necessarily activate
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substance abuse action plans. Tiffany (1990) suggests that urges are not necessary for 
substance abuse. Therefore compulsive substance abuse may be an automatised behaviour 
itself, as substance taking behaviour is, in effect, 'practiced', due to a repetition of 
substance-specific motor and cognitive actions; 'drug compulsion is the manifestation of 
automaticity rather than craving' (Tiffany and Carter, 1998; p23).
The above discussion suggests that in the presence of a triggering stimulus, a 
substance abuser may spontaneously engage in substance abuse behaviour, as this pattern 
of behaviour has become automatic. But here is an interesting (though of course highly 
speculative) possibility; if dyslexic people have difficulty in automatising behaviour, then it is 
possible that dyslexic substance abusers may display less automaticity in relation to 
substance-taking actions. A dyslexic may be unable to fully automatise action schemata for 
substance abuse situations, so may therefore not experience the automatic aspect of 
engaging in substance abuse behaviour.
Moreover, attentional bias is a characteristic of addiction, which is thought to relate 
to automatically activated information relevant to an abused substance. By the reasoning 
above, it might be expected that dyslexic participants, because of their difficulty with 
automatising behaviour, would be less likely to develop attentional biases related to 
substance abuse. Of course there may very well be other possible explanations for any 
observed differences between dyslexics and non-dyslexics in substance use, such as 
motivation, memory deficits, or depression. Previous research into these fields may lead to 
the suggestion that dyslexics differ to non-dyslexics in a number of psycho-social ways. 
Therefore it would be unreasonable to attribute any difference in substance use behaviour 
to automatisation-deficits without first discussing how these psycho-social factors could also 
explain any observed discrepancies. These issues will be discussed and contrasted to the 
automatisation hypothesis in due course.
To sum up, 'The scope and coherence of any action plan should depend on the 
previous learning history of the individual' (Tiffany 1990; pl55); this suggests that those 
with learning disabilities who have difficulty in automatising behaviour may not show the 
same degree of substance use to those from a non-dyslexic population. Therefore, from 
research on attentional biases in substance abuse and research into automatisation
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problems in dyslexia, the hypothesis can be motivated, namely that persons with difficulty 
in automatising behaviour (such as dyslexics) may be less susceptible to substance use 
problems.
6.3: Method
6.3.1: Participants
98 participants were recruited (35 dyslexic, 63 non-dyslexic controls; 29 males, 69 female). 
All participants were university students (mean age for males: 21.5 years, for females 22.3 
years). Dyslexic participants were recruited with the help of the Swansea University 
Disability Office. The dyslexic participants had all been previously diagnosed with dyslexia by 
an educational psychologist. Controls were obtained by offering psychology students 
subject pool credit. Dyslexic participants volunteered to take part in the study. Full ethical 
approval was granted by the Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (see 
Appendix V).
6.3.2: Materials
The questionnaires were implemented on a computer to ensure consistency of 
administration and accuracy of data collection.
Substance Use Questionnaire: This was a slightly modified version of the UEL (University of 
East London) Drug History Questionnaire (Parrott et al., 2000a). This questionnaire asks 
participants to self-report the frequency with which they have taken a list o f substances (see 
Appendix Q). An advantage of this questionnaire is that it is brief and easy to use. There are 
however two disadvantages. First, there is no reliability data and, second, Cole et al., (2002) 
criticises it for not asking participants about potentially dangerously potent dosages, and 
the dates of when substances were taken. However, for the purposes of the current study, 
the questionnaire was deemed suitable for collecting information about substance use, as of 
primary concern was frequency. Also incorporated were some minor modifications. It was 
decided to include the question 'Have you ever smoked?'. This was included as it was 
deemed to be distinct from the other smoking question ('Do you smoke now?'). The only
other modification was in the 'Other Drug Use' section. This was mostly kept intact, except 
for the inclusion o f a 'Prefer Not to Say' column.
Potential fo r  Alcohol Addiction/ CAGE: The CAGE questionnaire (Ewing, 1984; O'Brien, 2008) 
is a short, simple but effective measure of alcohol abuse. It consists of four questions: 'Have 
you ever: a) Felt the need to cut down on your drinking; b) Felt annoyed by criticism of your 
drinking; c) Had guilty feelings of your drinking; d) Taken a morning eye opener?' This 
questionnaire was designed as a screening tool for drinking, and is used as a measure of 
potential for addiction to  alcohol. The questionnaire may not enquire about quantity or 
frequency, but it is still useful for establishing some behavioural effects of drinking. 
Reliability for this questionnaire is generally good. Its sensitivity for lifetime alcohol 
dependence is 78.0% with a specificity of 76.1% (Ewing, 1984).
Dyslexia Questionnaire: The Adult Dyslexia Checklist (Vinegrad, 1994) was administered. 
This measure is often used within the literature, as it has been found to correlate strongly 
with dyslexia (e.g. Turner, 1997). This measure consists of a list of 20 questions which can be 
answered with either a 'Yes' or 'No' response. 'Yes' responses are associated with dyslexic 
traits and the overall number of 'Yes' responses indicates a higher likelihood of dyslexia. For 
example, 60% of dyslexics will respond with four 'Yes' answers, whilst 90% give eight 'Yes' 
responses (see Appendix R).
6.3.3: Procedure
Participants were emailed the questionnaires and a consent form. The questionnaires were 
implemented in Excel spreadsheets, and participants recorded their responses within these 
spreadsheets. The questionnaires took between 5-10 minutes to complete. Upon 
completion of the questionnaires, participants could either email their responses to the 
experimenter or print them and send them via mail. Results were calculated on each 
questionnaire through the use of Excel formulas to ease data collection, but these formulas 
were not visible to participants.
6.4: Results
Participants who had previously been diagnosed with dyslexia scored differently to controls 
on the Adult Dyslexia Checklist (Vinegrad, 1994). 'Yes' responses, normally associated with 
dyslexia, were 11.4 (SD: 3.69) for dyslexics and 3.40 (SD: 2.95) for controls. The difference in 
mean 'Yes' responses between dyslexics and controls was assessed by an independent 
samples t-test, which was highly significant: t(96) = 11.754; p<0.0005. This demonstrates the 
Adult Dyslexia Questionnaires sensitivity to dyslexia.
Participants' substance use patterns were measured in terms of a number of 
dependent variables. Alcohol use was measured as weekly unit consumption. Participants 
were asked if they had ever smoked tobacco, which led to a binary variable relating to ever 
having tried cigarettes or not. Those currently smoking were asked about cigarette use, and 
this was measured by the number of daily cigarettes smoked. The cannabis variable was a 
measurement of how many occasions, within a month, cannabis was used. Substance use 
was measured by providing participants with a list containing 13 types of substances (note, 
alcohol, cannabis, and nicotine were not included in this list of 13 substances due to the 
questionnaire considering these substances in more detail in an earlier section of the 
questionnaire). Participants responded with a 'Yes' or 'No' response, together with an 
estimate of how many occasions the substances had been taken. This provided information 
regarding each substance in the list and led to variables for how many substances had been 
tried, together with corresponding frequency information. The CAGE questionnaire is a 
measure of potential for alcohol addiction. This is a clinical measure used to screen patients 
for an addict-type personality, but it may be a useful tool for ascertaining whether a person 
has the potential for alcohol addiction. The main variable for the analysis was created using 
the z-score of each of the 13 substance frequencies (individually) and the z-scores of the 
alcohol, tobacco and cannabis frequencies. The first z-score variable is referred to as 
'substance use', whilst the second is referred to as 'casual substance use'. Note that within 
this chapter these analyses are exploratory. The aim was not to reach a conclusion that non- 
dyslexic controls have higher levels o f substance use than dyslexics. Rather, the aim was to 
obtain some preliminary results regarding an intriguing, but admittedly ambitious, 
hypothesis; that dyslexics would report less substance use than controls. Therefore, there
are no correction for multiple dependent variables (i.e. the use of Bonferroni corrections) as 
the aim of this chapter is to gather preliminary evidence of a potentially diminished pattern 
substance use within dyslexics.
The distinction between dyslexic and non-dyslexic controls was used in order to 
examine its effect on substance use. This distinction was based on the classification from 
the Disability Office at Swansea University. Thus, it would not be sensitive to participants 
with a large number of dyslexic traits, who have not been through the Disability Office, or, 
conversely, participants who might have been through the Disability Office but have a 
milder form of dyslexia. Therefore the analysis performed was a mixed design ANOVA, 
which included a within participants factor of 'substance use' (consisting of the 13 different 
substance frequencies, which were all measured on the same scale i.e. incidents o f use) and 
also included dyslexia as a between-subjects factor. There is strong evidence to suggest 
substance use differs between males and females (e.g. Becker and Hu, 2008). Thus, gender 
was used as a second between-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction between 
'substance use', dyslexia, and gender; F(12, 1128) = 9.272; p<.0005. The main effects of 
gender (F(l,96) = 10.075; p =.002) and dyslexia (F(l,96) = 10.002; p=.002) were significant. 
Figure 6-1 further demonstrates the interaction of dyslexia and gender on substance use. As 
Figure 6-1 shows, females showed a similar substance use profile regardless of dyslexia 
status. By contrast, male dyslexic participants had a much lower substance use pattern than 
non-dyslexic ones.
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Figure 6-1. The main effects and interaction of gender and dyslexia with substance use. The 
bars represent the mean total z-scores of the substances for both dyslexic and control males 
and females. A large positive score would be indicative of higher substance use compared to 
the other groups. The error bars show the standard error of the mean.
A second mixed design ANOVA was performed with a new factor 'casual substance 
use'; with weekly alcohol use, daily cigarette use, and monthly cannabis use as the different 
levels. Dyslexia and gender were the between subjects factors. There was not a significant 
interaction between 'casual substance use', dyslexia, and gender; F(2, 188) = 5.897; p=.853. 
But the main effects of gender (F(l,94) = 7.639; p =.007) and dyslexia (F(l,94) = 5.669; 
p=.019) were significant.
Regarding CAGE, which, recall, measures an individual's potential for addiction, no 
significant differences were identified between dyslexics and non-dyslexics, f(96) = .962; 
p=.338). This may have been due to the clinical nature of the questionnaire, as this measure 
is usually used for chronic addiction problems, so may therefore not be sensitive enough for 
detecting differences in the drinking behaviour of undergraduate students.
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In summary, it appears that differences in dyslexia and dyslexic traits can lead to 
different patterns of substance use. It would seem that those with dyslexia or with lower 
dyslexic-type traits have a decreased likelihood of using substances.
6.5: Discussion
Results from this questionnaire study would suggest that participants with dyslexia did 
demonstrate a different pattern of substance use compared to controls. This provides some 
support for the speculative suggestion that an impaired ability to automatise behaviour 
might also undermine those aspects of substance use which depend on the activation of 
automatic action sequences (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990; Tiffany, 1990). Nicolson etal. (1990) 
argued that dyslexia was an impairment in fully automatising behaviour. As Tiffany's (1990) 
account o f substance abuse encompasses a component related to automaticity, it seems in 
principle possible that dyslexics would show diminished substance use behaviour. This 
hypothesis o f course does not mean that those with dyslexia will not show any substance 
use. It merely implies that dyslexic substance users are somewhat different to substance 
users who are not dyslexic. However, these results do not necessarily transfer to other 
dyslexic populations, such as offenders, but may merely reflect a difference in the student 
population. It should be acknowledged that the student population adopted in this chapter 
may have led to this questionnaire study being inherently biased, due to the population not 
being cross-sectionally representative of dyslexics who have not progressed through 
education due to, e.g., motivational issues. This assumption is discussed further below.
Dyslexics scored differently to non-dyslexic controls on substance use measures. If it 
is assumed that this result relates to whichever processes lead to a dyslexic condition as 
well, then an explanation for this result is possible with Fawcett and Nicolson's theory, 
based on the automaticity hypothesis, which suggests that dyslexia involves an impairment 
with automatising behaviour. By contrast, for example, the results obtained from this study 
could not be comprehended by the traditional lexical skills deficit hypothesis of dyslexia 
(e.g. Snowling, 1987).
Although the results indicate strongly that dyslexic people report less substance use 
than non-dyslexic people, the hypothesis that this is due to a difficulty with automatising
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  .  . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _       I  141 L
behaviour may not be the only explanation. It is possible that dyslexic people simply report 
lower levels of substance use. Perhaps dyslexic people are more self-conscious and so less 
likely to report socially undesirable behaviours. However, this explanation is unlikely as 
Frederickson and Jacobs (2001) suggest that the self-perception of dyslexics is the same as 
their non-dyslexic peers. On a number of tests which measured core beliefs including social 
acceptance, behavioural conduct, and global self-worth, eight to eleven year old dyslexics 
were found not to be significantly lower in these self-perception domains. Only in perceived 
scholastic competence were dyslexics significantly lower than their peers.
It may be that this perceived scholastic competence may also have caused the 
results of the present study. It is possible that dyslexic people do have lower substance use 
behaviour. But perhaps instead of this being due to a problem with automatising behaviour, 
they engage in such substance use behaviour less so because they try harder than their non- 
dyslexic peers, due to the perceived weakness in their own academic abilities. Therefore 
dyslexic students may be more motivated than non-dyslexics whilst studying at university, 
so they would be more likely to consciously avoid substance use (note a broadly analogous 
conclusion was reached in Pothos & Kirk, 2004). However, Bosworth and Murray (1983) 
observed a relationship between internal locus of control and achievement motivation in 
dyslexic children. They suggest feelings of learned helplessness and depression have a 
negative effect upon a dyslexic's motivation. Motivation to learn foreign languages has been 
found to be diminished in dyslexics (Csizer and Kormos, 2010; Kormos and Kontra, 2008). 
Sparks et al. (2008), however, found no difference in motivation between dyslexics and non- 
dyslexics in foreign language learning. Yet children with reading impairments have been 
shown to have low motivation for reading (van Kraayenoord & Schneider, 1999) and usually 
attribute their reading failures to personal causes; this being potentially motivationally 
damaging (Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992; Chan, 1994; Palladino et al., 2000). This has 
also been supported within the dyslexia literature (Humphrey & Mullins, 2002; Thomson & 
Hartley, 1980; Kavale, 1988; Lamm & Epstein, 1992). The results from the above motivation 
and dyslexia research would appear to suggest that those with dyslexia would not be 
motivated to a greater extent than their peers to perform well at university. It would 
therefore appear that if dyslexics do report lower levels of substance use, then this cannot 
be explained in terms of increased motivation for higher achievement. However it could also
be argued that the population examined in the current study may be extra motivated, as not 
only do they have dyslexia, they also achieved university placement.
It is also necessary to consider these results with regard to the memory deficits 
associated with dyslexia (Berninger et al., 2008). It is possible that the results of this task 
were the product of a maladaptive memory system within the dyslexic population. Those 
with dyslexia may be less able to  recall past incidences of substance use than non-dyslexic 
controls, therefore the results o f this task may be a product of memory alone. However, 
Maehler and Schuchardt (2009) found a significant difference between memory deficits 
between controls and two groups of children with reading problems (general learning 
disabilities and low IQ), but there was no significant difference in memory between the 
learning impaired and the low IQ group. This suggests that intelligence is a better predictor 
o f working memory deficits than learning ability. Or, at least, this suggests that intelligence 
is a moderating variable that needs to  be considered. However, in the current study 
university students were used, so it is likely that most o f the participants were not o f low 
intelligence, rendering a memory-deficit hypothesis for explaining these results redundant.
Depression can also be discounted as a contributing variable towards the results. 
Alexander-Passe (2006) did observe a gender difference concerning depression in dyslexics. 
Females were found to be more likely to suffer from depression than their male equivalents. 
If depression were to lead to higher substance use (e.g. Davis et al., 2008), then, 
accordingly, it would be expected that female dyslexics would show more substance use 
behaviour than male dyslexics (cf. Alexander-Passe, 2006). As this was not found to be the 
case in the current study, the idea cannot be supported that dyslexia, due to increased 
depression, leads to more substance use.
The hypothesis that dyslexic people do use substances to a lesser degree than non- 
dyslexic people, because of a difficulty with automatising behaviour, would thus appear a 
preferred plausible explanation. The strength of these conclusions, of course, is moderated 
by the constraints o f the pilot investigation that it was possible to carry out. It is important 
to note that in a limited sample of dyslexic participants it is unlikely that a range of 
substance use behaviour will be observed rich enough to confidently support a difference
between dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants for all types of substance use. The purpose 
has not been to reach such a conclusion. Rather, the wish was to provide a preliminary 
exploration of the issue of substance use and dyslexia and a, likewise preliminary, 
corresponding theoretical perspective.
Further study is required in order to ascertain whether this observed pattern of 
substance taking behaviour associated with dyslexia is the result of an attentional bias, or 
due to other variables (e.g. social demographical differences). In order to explore the 
hypothesis further, attentional bias tasks will need to be included in an experimental 
protocol similar to the one employed in this study. Only using attentional bias 
methodologies can truly explore the hypothesis of an automaticity deficit affecting 
substance use. However, this should not be seen as a limitation of the current questionnaire 
study, as it was important to establish pilot data relating to the incidences of substance use 
in dyslexic participants. As substance use seems to be decreased within a dyslexic 
population, it has thus far been unable to refute the hypothesis of an automatisation deficit 
affecting substance use.
In conclusion, the results have demonstrated that dyslexia leads to different patterns 
of substance use in the studied population. This could be attributable to a hypothesised 
impairment of dyslexic participants with respect to automaticity, but further research is 
needed to confirm these findings.
Summary: Distinctions between dyslexics and non-dyslexic controls were observed on a 
substance use measure. The results are interpreted as automaticity development being 
responsible for the lower reporting of substance use behaviour. This idea is further explored 
in the next experiment by measuring attentional biases.
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6.6: Experiment 2: Attentional Bias for Substance-Related Stimuli in a Population 
Potentially Impaired in Automaticity: Dyslexia, Automaticity, Attentional Bias, and 
Substance Use
As discussed above, dyslexia is suggested as being a problem associated with more than 
merely problems with phonology. It is also suggested as a learning deficit, a view that has 
been well supported within the literature (Nicolson and Fawcett, 2008). The development of 
knowledge and skills from the environment often occurs without awareness, and such 
implicit skill learning can involve the learning of complex information. Compare this to 
automaticity: automaticity also does not require a great deal of cognitive effort. However, 
automatic behaviour may occur both implicitly and/or explicitly. When a skill has become 
automatic, then it is possible to complete the automatised task without placing significant 
demand on cognitive resources. Dyslexia as a learning deficit has been suggested to be the 
product o f discrepancies in an ability to be able to convert a task, which is highly practised (a 
key concept relating to the development of automaticity), into an automatic process. This 
would lead to the suggestion that reading problems in dyslexia are the result of not being 
able to fully automate the decoding aspect of reading (cf. LaBerge and Samuels, 1974).
Within this example, such a skill would normally develop into an automatic process through 
incidental learning, as continuous practice of reading is generally thought to lead to 
automatisation of performance with the task (i.e. automatisation in the process of decoding 
words). Such learning can be incidental, and unavailable to awareness, in nature (Anderson,
1993). Eventually, when presented with a word, as decoding is automatic, the reader would 
be able to devote their cognitive resources to comprehending the word. According to 
Nicolson and Fawcett (2008) dyslexia is hypothesised to be the result of a problem in this 
automatisation process. Therefore dyslexics would have difficulty with being able to 
automatise reading, as well as any other skill which can normally be automatised. An 
example of processes which can be automatised relates to attentional biases, and this is the 
focus of this chapter.
Serial reaction time tasks are often used to measure incidental learning. A sequence 
is hidden within pseudo-random trials. Incidental learning is reflected by decreased reaction 
time for the constituent elements of the sequence. Participants have been found to show a 
decreased reaction time for the constituent elements of the sequence without awareness of
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the sequence. The SRTT is also used as a measure of implicit learning, due to implicit 
learning and incidental learning sharing a number of characteristics. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, there is evidence to suggest that dyslexics have intact performance on such tasks 
(e.g. Kelly, Griffiths, and Frith, 2002). However, there is also research to suggest that SRTT 
performance is impaired (e.g. Vicari, Marotta, Menghini, Molinari, and Petrosini, 2003). In 
yet another study with the SRTT, Stoodley, Harrison and Stein (2006) reported a discrepancy 
in implicit learning within dyslexic students. Also, Pothos and Kirk (2004), through their 
research on AGL and dyslexia, suggest that dyslexics and controls may differ in terms of 
explicit strategy formation, a finding which may explain such performance differences with 
the SRTT.
The finding of Pothos and Kirk could be the result of conscious compensation 
strategies. Data obtained from dyslexics performing dual-task experiments indicate a deficit 
in automaticity, as the data would suggest that dyslexics have to allocate more cognitive 
resources than others to perform a primary task, therefore resulting in any secondary task 
becoming impaired (Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990). However, as previously mentioned, 
learning and automaticity are not completely analogous, as dyslexics who are impaired in 
automaticity may still demonstrate intact learning (albeit learning which does not involve a 
task becoming automatic). Nicolson and Fawcett's (1990) theory for dyslexia would suggest 
that people with dyslexia have deficits in automatising behaviour.
Automatic skill learning has also been suggested to be an integral feature in 
appetitive substance abuse (Tiffany, 1990), and may be the mechanism leading to 
corresponding attentional biases. Therefore an interesting hypothesis arises regarding 
dyslexia and substance use. Would a population impaired in automaticity, i.e. dyslexics, 
demonstrate corresponding deficits associated with automaticity in another domain, e.g. 
substance use attentional biases. Therefore, dyslexic substance users may not show an 
attentional bias for substance-related stimuli, compared to non-dyslexic matched controls.
Decisions about substance abuse can be highly automatic (e.g. Marlatt, 1985; 
Tiffany, 1990), with users being unaware of the factors that influence their decisions. 
Addicts will continue to engage in substance abusing behaviour despite consciously 
expressed intentions to abstain from, or moderate, the behaviour. This may suggest that
these behaviours are partly outside volitional control (McCusker et al. 1997; 1999). As 
suggested previously, self-report of substance abuse may not necessarily be the most 
reliable of measures, as, due to the nature of automaticity, behaviour may occur without 
conscious awareness or voluntary control, so a drinker may not be fully aware of how much 
they are preoccupied about drinking. Sayette et al. (1994) interpreted their findings that 
smokers were distracted by task irrelevant stimuli as an automatic diversion of cognitive 
resources from intentional activity towards stimuli related to addictive behaviours.
Attentional biases for anxiety have been found to have inherent motivational 
properties. The properties which lead to attentional bias in anxiety-stimuli are not 
equivalent to those in addiction-stimuli. This suggests that attentional biases need to be 
learned. So as attentional biases need to be learned and dyslexia has been suggested to be a 
deficit in automatising learning (cf. Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990), it is possible substance use 
behaviour may be diminished.
There is not currently any research exploring the relation between substance use- 
related attentional bias and dyslexia. Yet if automaticity is impaired in dyslexics, then it 
would follow that attentional biases for substance-related stimuli would be impaired (that 
is, not as developed, compared to a control population). Within the previous experiment it 
was observed that people with dyslexia showed a somewhat reduced pattern of substance 
use. Perhaps this is due to corresponding attentional bias differences for substance-related 
stimuli. The aim of the current experiment is to test this assumption directly using an eye 
tracking attentional bias task with substance-related stimuli and also with an implicit 
learning measure.
This experiment will explore the differences between dyslexic participants and 
controls in terms of their substance use and corresponding attentional bias. Whether SRTT 
performance varies between the two groups will be examined, and if so, whether there is an 
associated difference with attentional biases. The rationale for this relates to the idea that 
attentional biases are potentially the product of automatic associations (see Tiffany, 1990). 
If this is the case then it would be important to measure automaticity development in a 
group that is potentially impaired in relation to automaticity (i.e. dyslexics). In order to
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measure automaticity the SRTT has been adopted, as the rate of learning in the SRTT should 
be a marker of a person's ability to (eventually) automatise processes.
It is predicted that there may be an association between SRTT performance and 
attentional biases. It is also predicted that those who state that they are heavy substance 
users will show an attentional bias in the non-dyslexic control group, but not the dyslexic 
group. The attentional bias for alcohol, cigarettes, and cannabis will be examined. 
Corresponding attentional biases should be found for the non-dyslexic control participants, 
but not the dyslexic participants.
6.7: Method
6.7.1: Design
The experiment involved a between-participants factor of group and a within-participants 
factor of task performance: 2(group: dyslexia vs. controls) x 2(task: SRTT, attentional bias 
task). A number of psychometric tests were also included (DAST, ADHD questionnaire, ADC, 
UEL Drug history questionnaire, and AUDIT).
6.7.2: Participants
60 participants were recruited (20 dyslexic (10 male), 40 non-dyslexic controls (8 male)). All 
participants were university students (mean age for dyslexics: 21.15 years; SD: 4.89, for 
controls 22.95 years; SD: 5.58). Dyslexic participants were recruited with the help of the 
Swansea University Disability Office. The dyslexic participants had all been previously 
diagnosed with dyslexia by an educational psychologist. Controls were obtained by offering 
psychology students subject pool credit. Dyslexic participants volunteered to take part in 
the study. Using DAST results, dyslexic participants were removed if they scored lower than 
1 ARQ (at risk quotient) and control participants that score over 1 ARQ (cf. Harrison and 
Nichols, 2005), as higher ARQ scores on the DAST are associated with dyslexia, whilst low 
scores are associated with normal reading and writing skills. Full ethical approval was 
granted by the Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix V).
6.7.3: Materials/Procedure
UEL Drug History Questionnaire: This was a slightly modified version of the UEL (University 
of East London) Drug History Questionnaire (Parrott et al., 2000a). The questionnaire used
here adopted the same modifications that was used in Experiment 1 in this chapter (see 
Appendix Q).
AUDIT Questionnaire: The AUDIT has shown to be accurate in detecting alcohol 
dependence in university students. AUDIT scores were found to correlate well with 
measures of drinking consequences, attitudes toward drinking, vulnerability to alcohol 
dependence, negative mood states after drinking, and reasons for drinking. This therefore 
makes the questionnaire a useful gauge of alcohol use. The questionnaire was again 
administered on a computer (see Appendix I).
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder questionnaire: Jasper/Goldberg Adult ADD 
Screening Examination (Jasper and Goldberg, 1995) consists o f 24 items, according to  the 
DSM-IV criteria for ADHD. Items are scored on a Likert scale. This questionnaire was 
included due to a perceived high incidence of ADHD in dyslexics, as attentional 
abnormalities may affect results on an attentional bias task. This questionnaire was again 
administered on a computer (see Appendix S).
Adult Dyslexia Checklist: The ADC was again administered to participants. Details of which 
can be found in the Experiment 1 in this chapter. This questionnaire was again administered 
on a computer (see Appendix R).
Dyslexia Adult Screening Test: A second measure of dyslexia was used in order to produce a 
robust categorisation of dyslexia. The DAST was used to characterise the severity of dyslexia 
problems for all the participants. The DAST is used as a screening tool for people over 16.6 
years old. It is composed of 11 subtests which test fluency and accuracy of reading, writing, 
and spelling. Five subtests from the DAST were used in this study: the rapid naming task, 
one minute reading task, two minute spelling task, nonsense passage reading, and the one 
minute writing task. The ARQ is calculated by obtaining the respective scores from each of 
the subtests and comparing this to a table of population means for the specific age of the 
participant. High ARQs are associated with dyslexia, whilst low are not. The ADC and the 
DAST were found to correlate significantly, r(53) = .739; p < .0005.
Attentional bias task: The attentional bias task made use of an eye tracking device and was 
created using EyeLink Experiment Builder. The task comprised of presenting two pictures
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presented simultaneously on the screen. One picture related to substance use (alcohol, 
tobacco, or cannabis) whilst the second picture was of a control stimulus. Pictures were 
obtained from the Normative Appetitive Picture System (NAPS) database (Stritzke, et al.,
2004) and Hogarth, Dickinson, and Duka (2009). All pictures measured 105mm x 105mm and 
picture pairs were separated by 105mm. There were 28 events, each consisting of two 
pictures. Picture presentation was randomised. Pictures were presented for four seconds 
and were interspersed with a fixation cross. Participants were instructed to fixate on the 
fixation cross between events. Participants were instructed to study the pictures for a 
memory test. This ensured both pictures would be attended to. However no subsequent 
memory test occurred. The attentional bias variables measured were initial fixations, dwell 
times, number of fixations, and duration of first fixation. For the eye tracking task, 
participants sat 550mm from the screen and were placed in a head clamp.
For the analysis the picture stimuli was divided according to whether they were 
pictures of alcohol (10 pictures), tobacco (10 pictures), or cannabis (8 pictures). Each 
analysis was then performed separately, i.e. only the attentional bias measures obtained 
from the alcohol-related stimuli were used for the heavy drinker/ light drinker distinction 
analysis.
Serial Reaction Time Task: The SRTT was produced using SuperLab and used as a measure of 
implicit learning. Coloured circles (red, blue, green, yellow) were presented in the centre of 
the screen, similarly to Vicari et al. (2003). Participants had to respond by pressing the 
correct coloured key (one of four keys) which corresponded to the colour on the screen. 
Reaction time and accuracy were measured. Ten circles were shown per trial. The first 20 
trials were random. The next ten trials were a repetition of a sequence. An example of the 
sequence can be seen in Figure 6-2. The same sequence was used as the one in Stoodley et 
al. (2006) which was ten circles in length, except that, where Stoodley et al. (2006) used 
numbers, here the use of different coloured circles was adopted. The correct sequence 
response was yellow, blue, green, red, blue, yellow, green, blue, red, green.
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Figure 6-2. The sequence of coloured circles employed in the serial reaction time task. Note, 
only one colour appeared on the screen at any one time.
The sequence block was shown three times, each time interspersed with 20 random 
trials. The last ten trials, following the third and final presentation of the sequence, were 
also random (see Table 6-1 for a representation of the SRTT structure). At the end of each 
trial, the participant was presented with a screen instructing him/her to wait for the next 
trial to begin. This lasted 3000ms. Participants were only able to respond by use of the 
correct response key. Following each correct response there was a brief blank screen 
(300ms), before the next circle appeared. After the SRTT, participants were immediately 
asked if they were aware of the sequence; this lead to an 'explicit awareness' variable. 
Participants were asked if they could recite the 10 digit sequence. If they could recall the 
first five or more digits in the correct order, then they were deemed to have had explicit 
awareness of the sequence. This produced a binary variable; those with awareness and 
those without. This variable was subsequently used to measure any difference between 
those with explicit awareness and those without, in terms of their performance throughout 
the entire task.
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Table 6-1. Representation of serial reaction time task structure.
Block
Number
Number 
of Trials
Trial
Type
1 20 Random
2 10 Sequence
3 20 Random
4 10 Sequence
5 20 Random
6 10 Sequence
7 10 Random
Note. There were a total of 100 presentations of trials. 30 of these presentations involved 
the same repeating sequence.
6.7.4: Procedure
The experiment components took place in the following order: DAST; attentional bias task; 
SRTT; ADHD questionnaire; ADC questionnaire; UEL Drug History Questionnaire; AUDIT 
questionnaire. The entire experiment took between 45 and 60 minutes to complete.
6.7.5: Apparatus
The EyeLink Desktop 1000 eye tracker (SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada) was used. The 
eye tracking apparatus was identical to that of Chapter 2.
6.8: Results
There was a significant difference between dyslexics (M = 1.825; .388) and controls (M= 
.135; SD = .353) on the DAST, t(51) = -15.659; p <.0005. This result demonstrates that the 
distinction between dyslexic and non-dyslexic control groups was supported by the DAST. 
The previous diagnosis of dyslexia also suggests a difference between dyslexics (M = 50.19; 
SD = 23.14) and controls (M = 32.78; SD = 17.09) for the ADHD measure, t(51) = -3.051; p = 
.004.
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6.8.1: SRTT
First looked at were the differences between the dyslexic group and the control group in 
terms of their SRTT performance. Note that the difference between the number of random 
and sequence trials was accounted for in the analysis by dividing the random trials by two. 
This was performed in order to account for the difference in the number of trials between 
random and sequenced blocks. Figure 6-3 below, shows that for the blocks containing the 
sequence (SI, S2, S3) average RT decreases over the duration of the experiment, whilst for 
the random blocks (Rl, R2, R3, R4) average RT does not appear to vary. Also the graph 
shows that the dyslexic group had increased reaction times for each block in relation to the 
controls.
A mixed ANOVA with two within-participants factors and one between-participants 
factor was performed. The block-type was the first within-participants factor and had two 
levels; random or sequence block. Each random block was followed by a sequence block. 
Therefore the blocks were paired; random block 1 and sequence block 1, random block 2 
and sequence block 2, and random block 3 and sequence block 3. This then formed the 
second within-participants factor, and had three levels: block pair 1, 2, and 3. The between- 
participants variable was dyslexic/control group. The within-participants main effect for 
block-type was significant, F( 1, 51) = 2014.335; p <.0005, yet the interaction effect with 
dyslexia/control group was marginally significant, F{ 1, 51) = 3.838; p -  .056, suggesting that, 
although there was a difference between random and sequenced blocks, this difference 
may have been affected by the dyslexia status of participants. The within-participants main 
effect for the block pairings (random and sequence 1, 2, and 3) was significant, F[2, 102) = 
10.270; p <.0005, whereas the interaction effect with dyslexic/control groups was again not 
significant, F{2, 102) = .157; p = .855. This suggests that the block pairings did differ during 
the study, but this difference was not specifically associated with the dyslexic/control 
groups. The between-subjects main effect was also not found significant, F{ 1, 51) = 1.901; p 
=.174, suggesting no difference between the two groups. The interaction effect between 
block-type and block pairs was significant, F(2, 102) = 15.637; p <.0005, whereas the 
interaction effect of block-type, block pairings, and dyslexic/control group was not found 
significant, F{2,102) = .133; p = .876. The results would appear to demonstrate that learning
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is taking place within the task; however there is no difference between dyslexics and 
controls.
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Figure 6-3. Average reaction time during random and sequence blocks for dyslexics and 
controls during the serial reaction time task. The error bars show the standard error of the 
mean.
Next considered were the difference between each random block and its 
corresponding sequence block, i.e. random block 1 paired with sequence block 1, etc. This 
resulted in the creation of three 'difference' variables (subsequently referred to as the RS 
difference variables). Note that random block 4 was not included in this analysis. Average 
reaction times were taken from the 'sequence' blocks and subtracted them from the 
corresponding random blocks. Thus, the higher the difference, the less the time spent on 
the structured sequence. Figure 6-4 demonstrates the difference between controls and 
dyslexics with regard to their difference scores. It appears from the graph as if the dyslexics 
may have a larger difference between random and sequence blocks. However, a mixed 
ANOVA with the three differences as a within-subjects variable and dyslexic/control as the 
between-subjects variable did not yield a significant result for the subjects main effect F( 1,
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51) = .793; p = .377, nor a significant interaction effect F(2, 102) = .148; p =.863. There was a 
significant within-subjects main effect, however, F( 1, 102) = 19.097; p < .0005, suggesting 
that the difference between random and sequenced reaction times did increase for both 
control and dyslexic participants, across training, as one would expect if learning is taking 
place.
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Figure 6-4. Difference between average random and average sequence blocks for both 
controls and dyslexics. The error bars show the standard error of the mean.
Now the performance on the structured sequence is considered in more detail by 
examining individual trials. Figure 6-5 demonstrates the average RT of dyslexics and controls 
over the first occurrences of the sequence. As one can see, there is not much variation. 
However, dyslexic's RTs seem to be higher. A mixed ANOVA was carried out for the average 
reaction times for each trial in sequence block one, with trial being the within-participants 
variable, and dyslexic/control the between-participants variable. The analysis yielded a 
significant main effect for average reaction time across trials, F(9, 459) = 10.899; p < .0005, 
such that the average time for each trial decreased. The main effect of dyslexic/control was 
non-significant, F( 1, 51) = .963; p = .331, such that dyslexics and controls did not perform
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differently. The interaction effect was also non-significant, F(9, 459) = .661; p =.744. These 
results suggest that within the first occurrences of the sequence, learning did not differ 
between dyslexics and controls.
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Figure 6-5. Average reaction times for dyslexics and controls over sequence block 1 trials
Figure 6-6 demonstrates the average RT of dyslexics and controls over the second 
occurrence of the sequence. A mixed ANOVA was carried out for the average reaction times 
for each trial in sequence block two, with trial being the within-participants variable, and 
dyslexic/control the between-participants variable. The analysis yielded a significant main 
effect for average reaction time across trials F[9, 459) = 17.404; p < .0005, such that the 
average time for each trial decreased. The main effect of dyslexic/control was non­
significant, F( 1, 51) = .346; p = .559, such that dyslexics and controls did not perform 
differently. The interaction effect was also non-significant, F(9, 459) = .565; p  =.826. These 
results are obviously analogous to those above.
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Figure 6-6. Average reaction times for dyslexics and controls over sequence block 2 trials
Figure 6-7 demonstrates the average RT of dyslexics and controls over the third 
occurrence of the sequence. As can be seen, there is not much difference between RTs for 
dyslexic and control participants. A mixed ANOVA was carried out for the average reaction 
times for each trial in sequence block three, with trial being the within-participants variable, 
and dyslexic/control the between-participants variable. The analysis yielded a significant 
main effect for average reaction time across trials F(9, 459) = 17.043; p < .0005, such that 
the average time for each trial decreased. The main effect of dyslexic/control was non­
significant, F( 1, 51) = .075; p = .786, such that dyslexics and controls did not perform 
differently. The interaction effect was also non-significant, F(9, 459) = 1.550; p =.128. Again, 
the results are as above, so that within the third occurrence of the sequence, learning did 
not differ between dyslexics and controls.
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Figure 6-7. Average reaction times for dyslexics and controls over sequence block 3 trials
Now the errors that each participant made during the SRTT is considered. As can be 
seen from Figure 6-8, on average, dyslexics made more errors than controls for both the 
random trials and the trials in the structured sequence. However, independent samples t- 
tests do not show any significant differences between the random errors for sequence two 
(t(51) = .447; p = .656) and three (f(51) = -1.069; p = .290) errors. However there is a 
significant difference between dyslexics (M= 8.0; SD= 7.78) and controls (M= 4.16; SD= 
3.87,) regarding errors within the first block when the sequence is encountered, t(51) = - 
2.408; p  = .020. These results suggest that, thus far in the analyses, dyslexics and controls 
only differ in terms of the number of errors they produce on the first occurrence of the 
sequence.
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Figure 6-8. Average errors for dyslexics and controls in each block of the serial reaction time 
task. The error bars show the standard error of the mean.
Next taken into consideration was whether participants become explicitly aware of 
the sequence, and if so whether dyslexics and controls differ in this regard. Awareness of 
the SRTT sequence was ascertained by asking participants if they had noticed the embedded 
sequence. The overall explicit awareness score was found to correlate with the RS 
difference score for each block. A significant correlation was found between the explicit 
awareness score and the total RS difference score for block 2 (r(51) = .351; p = .012) but not 
the total RS difference score for block 1 (r(51) = .242; p =.087), and block 3 (r(51) = .233; p = 
.099) or the four random blocks. The results may suggest that explicit awareness emerged in 
the second sequence block. First, an independent samples f-test was used in order to see 
whether dyslexics and controls differed in terms of their explicit awareness of the sequence. 
It was observed that there was a significant difference between dyslexics (M = .467; SD = 
.516) and controls (M = .833; SD = .378), in terms of their reported explicit awareness of the 
sequence, f(49) = 2.826; p = .007. However, by excluding those explicitly aware of the 
sequence from the analyses on RTs, no significant differences between dyslexics and 
controls is observed. The same is true by excluding those who did not become explicitly 
aware of the sequence. This suggests that, aside from a slight difference in the reporting in
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explicit awareness, this distinction had no bearing on SRTT performance. A 4-way factorial 
ANOVA with two within-participants factors (block-number and block pairs) and two 
between-participants factors (dyslexic/control and explicit awareness) found a significant 
main effect of block pairs, F[2, 94) = 7.246; p = .001, as reported above. There was a 
significant main effect of block-type, F{ 1, 47) = 30.101; p < .0005, as reported above. The 
main effect o f dyslexia group was not significant, F[ 1, 47) = .116; p = .735, nor was the main 
effect of explicit awareness, F[ 1, 47) = .096; p = .758. The interaction of block pairs and 
dyslexia group was not significant, F{2, 94) = 1.120; p = .331. The interaction between block 
pairs and explicit awareness was, however, significant, F[2, 94) = 3.290; p = .042, suggesting 
that performance over the trials was somewhat affected by awareness of sequence. The 
interaction between block pairs, dyslexia group, and explicit awareness was not significant, 
F{2, 94) = .309; p = .735. The interaction effect between block-type and dyslexia was 
marginally significant, F[1, 47) = 3.404; p = .071, suggesting a slight difference between 
dyslexics and controls, with regard to their scores between random and sequenced blocks. 
The interaction effect between block-type and explicit awareness was significant, F[ 1, 47) = 
7.487; p = .009, indicating that explicit awareness of the sequence effect was greater for 
the sequenced scores.
The interaction between block-type, dyslexia group, and explicit awareness was not 
significant, F{ 1, 47) = 1.225; p = .274. The interaction effect of block pairs, block-type, 
dyslexia group, and explicit awareness was not found to be significant, F{2, 94) = 2.005; p 
=.140. The between-subjects interaction between dyslexia group and explicit awareness was 
found to be marginally significant, F[ 1, 47) = 3.390; p = .072, suggesting a trend that dyslexia 
may be associated with explicit awareness development.
In summary, it would appear that dyslexics and controls demonstrate very similar 
learning performance. Errors within the first sequence appear to result in the only 
significant difference between the two groups of participants, yet the lack of significant 
differences far outweigh the significant results, suggesting that dyslexics and controls do not 
differ in terms of SRTT performance and potentially learning performance in general. The 
results regarding explicit awareness, however, suggest that dyslexics may differ, relative to 
controls, in this respect. Does this perhaps indicate a difference in learning strategies
between dyslexics and controls? The present results make plausible this intriguing 
suggestion, but additional tests would be required to explore it further.
6.8.2: Eye Tracking
The eye tracking variables which are used in these analyses are based on interest area 
reports from the two stimuli that were presented simultaneously. Each trial contained a 
substance-related stimulus and a control stimulus. Thus, the difference between fixations 
between the corresponding areas of interest are the variables that are adopted for these 
analyses. Specifically, measured here were the differences in the number of fixations for 
each interest area, dwell time within each interest area, first fixation made (either for a 
control or substance-related interest area), and first fixation duration for the substance- 
related interest area.
First to be performed were ANOVA analyses in order to explore the differences 
between the dyslexics and controls regarding their substance use attentional biases. For any 
significant dyslexic group main effects observed using an ANOVA the relationship between 
substance use and attentional bias is examined for substance-related stimuli by examining 
whether an attentional bias exists within the control and dyslexic population (recall that, 
according to the hypothesis, it would be expected to observe substance-related attentional 
biases more so for the control group than the dyslexic one).
6.8.2.1: Alcohol-Related Stimuli
First performed is a comparison of the two groups (control and dyslexic participants) 
reporting heavy use of a substance. Here a difference is expected. This sequence of analyses 
is performed for each of the three substance-related stimulus sets separately. Should a 
significant difference be found between dyslexic and non-dyslexic controls, then a sequence 
of t-tests is performed in order to establish whether, as predicted, the difference is due to 
the dyslexics lacking attentional biases whilst the non-dyslexic controls should demonstrate 
attentional biases.
The analyses are started by considering alcohol use. Participants were assigned to a 
heavy or light drinkers group based on their reported weekly alcohol use frequency 
(obtained from their UEL questionnaire responses), on the basis of the Department of 
Health guidelines (Shenker, Sorensen, and Davis, 2009). Accordingly, light drinkers (LD) were
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defined as males drinking on average less than 6 alcohol units/week and females less than 4 
alcohol units/week (one alcohol unit = 10 ml. of pure alcohol)(N=12; Average unit 
count=2.241; SD=2.11). Heavy drinkers (HD) are defined as males consuming more than 21 
units of alcohol/week and females more than 14 units/week (N=25; Average unit 
count=22.84; SD=7.61).
A 2 (dyslexic vs. control) x 2 (HD vs. LD) ANOVA was performed for the alcohol- 
related eye tracking variables. For first fixation duration, the participant type main effect 
was not significant (F( 1, 31) =.423; p =.521), the drinking group main effect was also not 
significant (F(l, 31) = 2.406; p = .132), and there was no significant interaction (F(l, 31) = 
.532; p =.472). For differences in number of fixations, the participant type main effect was 
not found to be significant (F(l, 31) = .010; p =.922), likewise for drinking group (F(l, 31) = 
.094; p =.762), and there was no significant interaction (F(l, 31) = .539; p =.469). For dwell 
time, the participant type main effect was not significant (F(l, 31) = .025; p =.874), likewise 
for drinking group (F(l, 31) = .710; p = .407), and there was no significant interaction (F(l, 
31) = .038; p =.847). For first fixation made, the participant type main effect was not 
significant (F(l, 31) = .362; p =.552), likewise for the drinking group ( F(l, 31) = .002; p 
=.968), and there was no significant interaction (F(l, 31) = 2.450; p =.129). Therefore, it 
would appear that there was no significant difference between dyslexics and controls 
regarding this analysis.
The results indicate that dyslexics and controls do not differ in terms of their 
attentional biases towards alcohol related stimuli.
6.8.2.2: Smoking-Related Stimuli
Participants were asked if they had ever smoked tobacco. First a 2 (dyslexic vs. control) by 2 
(current and ex-smokers vs. non-smokers) ANOVA was performed for the tobacco eye 
tracking variables. For first fixation duration, the participant type main effect was not 
significant (F(l, 49) =.188; p =.666), the smoking group main effect was also not significant 
(F(l, 49) = .398; p = .531), and there was no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = .053; p =.819). 
For differences in number of fixations, the participant type main effect was not found to be 
significant (F(l, 49) = .302; p =.585), smoking group was significant (F(l, 49) = 6.830; p 
=.012), but there was no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = .009; p =.925). Suggesting that
smokers (current and ex-smokers) differed from non-smokers in terms of number of 
fixations. For dwell time, the participant type main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) = .229; 
p =.634), smoking group was significant (F(l, 49) = 4.933; p = .031), but there was no 
significant interaction (F(l, 49) = .000; p =.985). For first fixation made, the participant type 
main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) = .238; p =.628), likewise for the smoking group (F(l, 
49) = .710; p =.403), and there was a no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = 1.041; p =.313). 
Therefore, it would appear that there was no significant difference between dyslexics and 
controls regarding this analysis.
The aim was to explore the differences between dyslexics and controls in terms of 
eye tracking. However, the previous ANOVA did not reveal any significant differences 
between the dyslexics and controls. Next a 2 (dyslexic vs. control) by 2 (current vs. non- 
smokers) ANOVA was performed for the tobacco eye tracking variables. For first fixation 
duration, the participant type main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) =.023; p =.881), the 
smoking group main effect was also not significant (F(l, 49) = 153; p = .697), and there was 
no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = .048; p =.828). For differences in number of fixations, 
the participant type main effect was not found to be significant (F(l, 49) = .345; p =.560), 
smoking group was significant (F(l, 49) = 8.675; p =.005), but there was no significant 
interaction (F(l, 49) = .365; p =.548). Suggesting that current smokers differed from non- 
smokers in terms of number of fixations. For dwell time, the participant type main effect 
was not significant (F(l, 49) = .053; p =.820), smoking group was significant (F(l, 49) = 6.613; 
p = .013), but there was no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = .025; p =.876). For first fixation 
made, the participant type main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) = 2.810; p =.100), 
likewise for the smoking group (F(l, 49) = 1.512; p =.225), but there was a marginally 
significant interaction (F(l, 49) = 3.518; p =.067). Therefore, it would appear that there was 
no significant difference between dyslexics and controls regarding this analysis. However, 
for first fixation there appears to be a trend to suggest that dyslexic and control smokers 
and non-smokers may differ.
The results indicate that dyslexics and controls did not differ in terms of their 
attentional biases toward tobacco smoking-related stimuli.
6.8.2.3: Cannabis-Related Stimuli
Participants were asked if they had ever been a cannabis user (N=18). First a 2 (dyslexic vs. 
control) by 2 (current cannabis and ex-cannabis smokers vs. non-smokers) ANOVA was 
performed for the cannabis eye tracking variables. For first fixation duration, the participant 
type main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) = .030; p =.862), likewise for the cannabis 
smoking group (F(l, 49) = .348; p =.558), and there was a no significant interaction (F(l, 49) 
= .016; p =.900). For differences in number of fixations, the participant type main effect was 
not found to be significant (F(l, 49) = .083; p =.774), cannabis smoking group was not 
significant (F(l, 49) =2.061; p =.157), and there was no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = 
.432; p =.514). For dwell time, the participant type main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) = 
.863; p =.358), cannabis smoking group was marginally significant (F(l, 49) = 3.091; p = 
.085), but there was no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = .405; p =.527). For first fixation 
made, the participant type main effect was not a significant (F(l, 49) =.408; p =.526), the 
cannabis smoking group main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) = .157; p = .694), but there 
was a significant interaction (F(l, 49) = 4.140; p =.047). Suggesting an interaction between 
cannabis smoking group and participant-type group for first fixation made for cannabis 
stimuli.
Next a t-test was performed on the cannabis users (current and ex-users) from both 
the control and dyslexic groups, in order to examine the difference between the two 
cannabis user populations. An independent samples t-test showed a significant difference 
between control cannabis users (M= .118; SD = .364) and dyslexic cannabis users (M= -.188; 
SD = .313), in terms of whether their first fixation was for the cannabis stimuli or control 
stimuli, t(25) = 2.069; p = .049.
First a 2 (dyslexic vs. control) by 2 (current cannabis smokers vs. non-smokers) 
ANOVA was performed for the cannabis eye tracking variables. For first fixation duration, 
the participant type main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) = .025; p =.874), likewise for the 
cannabis smoking group (F(l, 49) = .249; p =.620), and there was a no significant interaction 
(F(l, 49) = 004; p =.950). For differences in number of fixations, the participant type main 
effect was not found to be significant (F(l, 49) = .064; p =.801), cannabis smoking group was 
significant (F(l, 49) = 7.155; p =.010), but there was no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = 
.000; p =.998). Suggesting that current cannabis smokers differed from non-smokers in
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terms of number of fixations. For dwell time, the participant type main effect was not 
significant {F[1, 49) = .787; p =.379), cannabis smoking group was significant (F(l, 49) = 
3.993; p = .051), but there was no significant interaction (F(l, 49) = .090; p =.766). For first 
fixation made, the participant type main effect was significant (F(l, 49) =4.115; p =.048), the 
cannabis smoking group main effect was not significant (F(l, 49) = .408; p = .526), and there 
was a significant interaction (F(l, 49) = 4.247; p =.045). Suggesting that dyslexics and 
controls have different first fixation durations for cannabis stimuli.
Next a t-test was performed on the current cannabis users from both the control and 
dyslexic groups, in order to examine the difference between the two cannabis user 
populations. An independent samples t-test failed to show a significant difference between 
control cannabis users (M= -.406; SD = .344) and dyslexic cannabis users (M= .313; SD = 
.619), in terms of whether their first fixation was for the cannabis stimuli or control stimuli, 
t(4) =-1.932; p = .126.
The results indicate that dyslexics and controls did only differ in terms of their 
attentional biases toward cannabis smoking-related stimuli in terms of the first fixation 
made.
6.8.3: SRTT and Eye Tracking
The RS difference variable was used as an index of learning in the SRTT. As noted, this 
measure of incidental learning may have been associated with substance use attentional 
biases. Correlations were sought between the RS difference variable and all the eye tracking 
variables, but no significant result was identified, for either dyslexic participants or control 
ones. Specifically, RS difference did not significantly correlate with the following variables 
for alcohol related stimuli: first fixation duration (r(53) = .107; p = .446), number of fixations 
(r(53) = -.013; p = .927), dwell time within each interest area differences (r(53) = .056; p = 
.689), and first fixation made (r(53) = -.083; p =.553). Also, RS difference did not significantly 
correlate with the following variables for nicotine related stimuli: first fixation duration 
(r(53) = .048; p = .733), number of fixations (r(53) = .003; p = .985), dwell time within each 
interest area differences (r(53) = -.057; p = .683), and first fixation made (r(53) = .001; p 
=.996). Finally, RS difference did not significantly correlate with cannabis related stimuli for 
first fixation duration (r(53) = .052; p = .711), number of fixations (r(53) = -.008; p = .955),
dwell time within each interest area differences (r(53) = 112; p = .426), and first fixation 
made (r(53) = -.020; p =.888).
6.8.4: Summary
The results broadly suggest that dyslexics and controls do vary slightly in terms of their 
attentional bias toward cannabis related stimuli, but not alcohol nor nicotine. However, the 
results are not consistent enough to allow confidence in a conclusion that there is smaller 
degree of attentional biases related to substance use between dyslexic and non-dyslexic 
participants.
6.9: Discussion
This is the first known study that has explored substance use-related attentional bias 
differences between dyslexics and controls. The second experiment reported in this chapter 
would indicate that dyslexics are perhaps less susceptible to the substance-related 
attentional biases, at least under some circumstances. It is uncertain whether attentional 
biases are a cause or an effect of substance use, but they have been found to have a 
predictive value. Therefore, if dyslexics are impaired in the formation of substance use- 
related attentional biases, then it stands to reason that dyslexia may provide an 'advantage' 
in relation to the susceptibility of substance use behaviour. This suggestion could serve as 
an explanation of the different pattern of substance use found between dyslexics and 
controls in the previous experiment, where dyslexics were found to report reduced 
substance use behaviours, when compared to non-dyslexic controls. Though it is important 
to stress that any such conclusions largely reflect speculation at this point.
The results of the SRTT would suggest that dyslexics and controls have analogous 
incidental learning. Reaction times seem to decrease for the sequenced trials to the same 
degree for both dyslexics and controls. Dyslexics and controls do appear to differ in terms of 
the number of errors produced on the first sequence presentations. However, it could be 
argued that this is too early for the onset of incidental learning anyway. Overall, it would 
appear that incidental learning, and potentially, automaticity development as well, do not 
differ between dyslexics and controls. Interestingly a slight difference was found in terms of 
explicit awareness of the sequence between dyslexics and controls. It would appear that,
although incidental learning results between dyslexics and controls did not vary, results for 
explicit awareness of the incidental learning did differ between groups. Dyslexics were 
found to  report less explicit awareness than controls. This may indicate a difference in 
learning strategy in that dyslexics may learn in a different manner to non-dyslexics. It may 
be that the same performance is observed between the two groups, but a difference in 
awareness is apparent due to the dyslexic participants learning the sequence procedurally 
rather than in a manner that would result in awareness. This idea could be examined further 
by performing a procedural learning task on dyslexics and non-dyslexic controls. The task 
could be manipulated in a way that explicit strategy formation would be advantageous. 
Therefore, accordingly, dyslexics may be impaired on such a task when compared to 
controls.
The discrepancy in the results on the SRTT in terms of implicit and explicit learning 
would appear to support Pothos and Kirk (2004) who suggested that dyslexics may be 
impaired in explicit strategy formation. This idea may not necessarily be contrary to theories 
of automaticity in dyslexia (cf. Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990), as automatised skills can be 
both implicit and explicit.
However, the disadvantage that the dyslexic participants displayed concerning 
explicit awareness demonstrates that learning could indeed be impaired, though at a level 
which is too subtle for the SRTT to  pick up. This, combined with the attentional bias results, 
would suggest that the automatisation-deficit hypothesis is slightly supported here (cf. 
Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990). Yet this conclusion is not very robust, as there was very little 
difference in the learning pattern for dyslexics vs. that for non-dyslexic controls. A deficit 
was observed in terms of implicit learning on the SRTT, suggesting that, although explicit 
awareness may be marginally impaired, implicit learning may be intact. However, it is worth 
noting that SRTT is only one task for examining the development of automatic performance 
and, moreover, the version employed here was limited in terms of the total number of trials 
included. Perhaps, differences between dyslexics and controls would have emerged after 
more trials.
It was wanted to  explore the role that automaticity development plays in attentional 
bias. This was performed by measuring the attentional biases of a dyslexic population, as
they are putatively impaired in automatic skill development (see Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). 
A comparison was performed of the substance use-related attentional biases of dyslexics 
and controls who were both users and non-users of substances; alcohol, nicotine, and 
cannabis. It was found that there was no difference between dyslexics and controls in terms 
of their attentional biases for alcohol-related stimuli nor nicotine-related stimuli. Dyslexics 
and controls differed in terms of their attentional biases toward cannabis-related stimuli, 
but only for the first fixation made DV. This suggests that control cannabis users (current 
and ex-users) would be more likely to orient their attention toward cannabis-related 
information at the start of each trial than corresponding dyslexic participants. Overall some 
limited evidence was found to suggest that dyslexics do differ from controls in terms of 
attentional biases toward substance-related stimuli. However, the overall impression from 
the current results was that difference between the two groups was minimal.
Dyslexics and controls were not found to differ in terms of any of the alcohol 
variables nor with respect to the nicotine DVs. Alcohol attentional biases are thought to be a 
robust phenomenon, so the lack of a difference between dyslexics and non-dyslexic controls 
clearly undermines the hypothesis of this study. However, nicotine may not be the clearest 
measure of attentional bias. Due to the nature of smokers, they may have a varied 
attentional bias due to the stress-diathesis account of nicotine dependency (Parrott, 2005). 
Parrott suggests that nicotine can have an adverse effect upon both mood and cognition. In 
a number of different studies, he has suggested that smoking can cause many forms of 
psychological distress. Parrott (1999; 2000; 2001) suggests that a smoker's mood would 
deteriorate between cigarettes and they may only feel 'normal' when replete with nicotine. 
Therefore, nicotine dependence actually causes a range of mood and cognitive problems, 
rather than the subjective feeling that the smoker may have of smoking being relaxing. 
Smokers have been found to have more stress a year after starting to smoke (Parrott, 2004). 
Nicotine dependence has also been found to be associated with memory problems (Ernst, et 
al., 2001). Parrott has also observed that smokers have decreased arousal when depleted of 
nicotine (Jones & Parrott, 1997). Parrott and Garnham (1998) found cognitive skills were 
also affected in smokers. Whilst Parrott, Thurkle and Ward (2000) suggest that one hour 
without a cigarette would lead to cognitive discrepancies. Therefore, the very nature of 
smokers may lead to inconsistent results dependent upon when the smoker last engaged
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with cigarette use. It is suggested that nicotine-related stimuli may therefore not be a 
suitable attentional bias measure, due to a number of inconsistencies between smokers 
which may affect attentional bias. However, this limitation is not specific for this thesis 
alone, and would apply to all attentional bias tasks which adopt nicotine-related stimuli. 
Careful measurement and control of cigarette usage and withdrawal-effects is required in 
order to obtain conclusive nicotine-related attentional bias results. Such control of these 
extraneous variables was however not performed during this experiment, which therefore 
would suggest that the nicotine-related aspect of the experiment is unreliable.
For the cannabis trials, first fixation dwell time, number of fixations, and overall 
dwell time were not found to differ. This would suggest that the vast majority o f results 
would indicate no difference between groups. However, it could be argued that the first 
fixation made DV that did lead to between group differences for cannabis stimuli is the most 
robust measure. This is potentially the only true automatic attentional bias DV in this study, 
as this is the initial orienting of attention following stimuli presentation. Subsequent 
attentional processes, and indeed the other attentional bias measures in this study, may be 
influenced by the task instructions to study the picture-stimuli for a memory test. As explicit 
processes could have overridden any automatic attentional processes. Therefore these 
results may support an automaticity deficit hypothesis (see Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990), and 
may also suggest that dyslexics do indeed have diminished attentional bias. This would 
therefore lead to the suggestion that future attentional bias investigations should screen for 
dyslexia. However, these results are merely speculation and further research is clearly 
needed as a completely conclusive result was not observed as a number of DVs, and indeed 
the nicotine measure, were not significant.
The first fixation made result for cannabis is consistent with the theory of an 
automaticity deficit hypothesis for dyslexia (see Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). However, the 
goal was not to study dyslexia per se, rather it was intended to explore the role that 
automaticity plays in attentional bias. If it were to be assumed that the automaticity deficit 
hypothesis of dyslexia is correct, then the results of the current study would demonstrate 
the importance of automaticity in the development of attentional biases for substance- 
related stimuli (in this case cannabis stimuli). The results would therefore provide minimal 
support for Tiffany (1990) who suggests that motivation to abuse substances is maintained
by automatic associations that develop between a substance-related stimulus and, e.g., 
positive expectancies with repeated exposure. Therefore, in a population who have a deficit 
in automaticity development it would be expected that there would be a decrease in 
automatic association development and subsequent attentional biases. If this is the case 
then further study of the factors that affect automaticity development in substance abuse 
may lead to novel approaches to substance abuse interventions which could target such 
automatic aspects of substance abuse behaviour.
However, it was a major challenge to recruit a sufficient number of participants who 
were both dyslexic and using various substances. Thus the number of substance using 
participants within the study could be improved. The somewhat conflicting conclusions from 
the various approaches to the statistical analyses simply imply that there is no strong 
conclusion regarding a difference in attentional bias relating to substance use between 
dyslexics and non-dyslexic controls. However, clearly the results indicate that further study 
may be warranted in this area.
The aim of the current experiment was to explore the importance of automaticity in 
the formation of attentional bias. In order to do this, a population putatively impaired in 
automatisation development was adopted, dyslexics. However, a more suitable approach to 
measure automaticity and its effect on attentional bias formation would not rely upon the 
theory of dyslexia automatisation deficit being correct (Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990). This 
theory has not been entirely accepted within the literature (e.g. Beaton, 2002; Bishop, 
2002). Therefore, the grouping of participants as being good automatisers and bad 
automatisers, on this basis, might be flawed. A more suitable approach would be to 
measure automaticity development directly, for example, on a rule learning task, and then 
look at these results in relation to attentional bias. Attentional biases and automaticity 
development could then be more directly compared, using this alternative method to 
measure ability with automaticity, rather than by comparing good automatisers to bad 
automatisers, on the basis of dyslexia groups. This approach still has the effect of measuring 
automaticity development and attentional bias, but it does so without the need of involving 
an assumption that dyslexic participants might have a deficit in automaticity development.
Overall, it would appear that attentional biases for substance-related stimuli were in 
some cases identified within control participants, which were not as readily apparent within 
dyslexic participants. Between-groups comparisons lend some support to claims that 
dyslexics are impaired in attentional bias formation. The results of the SRTT would however 
suggest that the hypothesis that dyslexics are impaired in automaticity formation, the 
theory that underlies the hypothesis regarding diminished attentional biases within such a 
population, is not supported. The current experiment may perhaps suggest avenues for 
further research, such as in relation to explicit awareness discrepancies, potentially small 
yet meaningful differences in attentional bias for substance use and, together with the 
results of the previous chapter, substance use in general.
Summary: A further exploration of the affects that automaticity has on substance use was 
performed by measuring substance-related attentional biases in dyslexics. It was observed 
on an SRTT that dyslexics have analogous learning rates to controls. However, the results 
may suggest that dyslexics have a different learning strategy to controls. Learning ability was 
not found to be associated with subsequent attentional biases. However slight differences 
were observed between dyslexics and controls regarding substance use-related attentional 
biases. Yet these results were not robust enough to fully accept the hypothesis that there 
would be attentional bias differences between dyslexics and non-dyslexic controls. 
However, the results may suggest that automaticity may be playing a small role within 
attentional bias formation here.
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6.10: Experiment 3: Dyslexia, Priming, and Craving.
As previously discussed in this chapter, dyslexia has been theorised to be a deficit in 
automatic skill learning (e.g. Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990). This theory may help to explain 
some of the broad range of problems that have been associated with dyslexia, such as 
balance, motor skill, phonological skill, and rapid processing. That is, a skill fluency problem 
is found for those skills that should become automatic through extensive practice, including 
reading and writing. It is however worth noting that not all the evidence supports this 
theory (e.g. Beaton, 2002; Bishop, 2002). Yet, if it is indeed the case that an automatisation 
deficit is evident then the use of dyslexic participants may be beneficial for the study of 
behaviours which are thought to operate automatically. In the previous experiment, this 
automaticity deficit was considered in terms of substance use related to attentional biases. 
However, substance use has also been speculated to be a 'goal' that can be automatically 
activated when a participant encounters relevant stimuli (e.g. Sheeran et al., 2005). This 
research normally takes the form of priming tasks and there is a vast body of evidence to 
support such automatically activated behaviours (see Bargh and Chartrand, 1999, for a 
review). Therefore, by adopting a dyslexic population who are putatively impaired in 
automatisation, it is possible to explore this aspect of substance use and goal activation in a 
novel way.
Certain goals or desired states can be activated automatically from environmental 
cues; behaviours such as, turning on a light switch when one walks into a dark room or 
looking for one's glasses when needing to read. These are learned sequences of behaviours 
that have become automatic in response to certain situations. Aarts and colleagues suggest 
that habits are a form of goal-dependent automatic behaviour, where the mere activation of 
a goal in the presence of a triggering stimulus is capable of automatically eliciting an action 
related to the goal's attainment (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000a; 2000b; Aarts, Verplanken, 
& van Knippenberg, 1998; see also Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). This chapter aims to explore 
the idea that such habitual goal-states can be automatically activated by comparing a 
control group to a group of participants that are potentially impaired in automatic skill 
development, i.e. dyslexics.
It has been assumed that the situation, goal, and action are mentally represented. 
The perception o f a situation is capable of automatically activating the representation of a 
goal and action. This idea is central to Bargh's model of the perception-behaviour link. Bargh 
found that mere priming alone could be enough to elicit a behaviour automatically. 
Behaviour can be non-consciously activated by the external environment. The perception- 
behavioural link does not rely on a role for conscious choice in the production of behaviour. 
Automatic perceptual activity itself can be enough to automatically induce a behaviour. 
Berkowitz (1984; 1997) suggested that such a process is fundamental to the effects o f media 
on behaviour. He observed that exposing someone to a video depicting someone acting in 
an aggressive manner, led to participants displaying increased likelihood of aggression 
themselves. This finding was supported by Carver et al. (1983) who found increased 
aggressive behaviour followed the priming of hostility-related words. This finding 
demonstrates how behaviour can be affected by primes within the environment.
However people are not just passively experiencing the environment. People also 
have their own goals and motivations. Such goals, as well as the environment, influence 
behaviours. In this way, environmentally driven influences may be analogous to automatic 
processes. Bargh (1990; 1997) suggests that the environment itself is able to activate goals, 
which could themselves be mentally represented. If this is the case then, like other mentally 
represented characteristics, goals could become capable of being triggered by the 
environment. Like other forms of automaticity, increased practice and consistent pairing is 
required for automaticity development between external events and internal responses 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). When a behaviour truly becomes automatic, then conscious 
control for the behaviour can become diminished. In this way the environment may cause a 
non-conscious behavioural or internal response (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, & Lee-Chai (1999) primed participants with either achievement synonyms or 
control words using an 'unrelated' initial word search task. They found subsequent 
performance on a secondary task for those primed with the achievement was greater than 
those primed with control words. Participants reported no awareness of any potential 
association between the prime task and the secondary task. These results further 
demonstrate the potential for behaviour to be automatically affected by the environment; 
in this case, the automatic effects are in the form of priming.
It would seem apparent from the above research that environmental cues are able 
to automatically activate goals, which in turn, can automatically elicit behaviour. This 
process has also been suggested to be extended to habits. Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000a; 
2000b) performed experiments involving priming a goal, which was travel-related. They 
then measured response latencies to an action word associated with travel, specifically 
'cycling'. They suggested that fast response latencies would indicate a higher readiness to 
engage with the behaviour. Further, the participants were then divided into habitual cyclists 
and non-habitual cyclists by enquiring about cycle habits. Participants were not aware of the 
link between these manipulations. The results obtained from the study were consistent with 
the theory that habits are goal-dependent, as habitual cyclists showed significantly faster 
response latencies than the non-habitual cyclists, but this effect was only observed for those 
participants who had been previously been primed to travel in the initial task.
Within habit learning the general consensus is that a habit is the acquisition of 
actions which are instrumental in the obtaining of a rewarding event. This is a stimulus- 
response/reinforcement operation (e.g. Hull, 1943). However, it is worth noting that there is 
a distinction between habits and goal-directed behaviour. When rewarding events are 
consistent then habits may develop, but when reward is proportional to performance, then 
actions may become goal-directed (Adams & Dickinson, 1981). However Balleine (2005) 
would suggest that both habit and goal-directed processes run concurrently, but that any 
predomination would be due to discrepancies during initial learning. This would therefore 
suggest that substance-seeking can be accomplished either habitually which would result 
through a reinforced response by access to a substance (cf. Tiffany, 1990) or by goal- 
directed actions aimed at achieving specific rewarding events (cf. Robinson & Berridge, 
1993).
The nature of alcohol abuse as a goal dependent automatic habit has been studied 
on numerous occasions. A number of studies have shown that previous drinking behaviour 
is a better predictor of future drinking behaviour than intentions to drink (e.g. Murgraff, 
White & Philips, 1999). Such a finding may lead to the suggestion that alcohol abuse could 
be controlled by habit modification (cf. Verplanken et al., 1998). Within the current 
experiment university students' drinking habits were studied. Note that a university lifestyle 
has been found to be associated with excessive alcohol consumption (e.g. Norman, Bennett
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& Lewis, 1998). Further evidence would suggest that amongst university students, 
socialising is seen as a primary goal which is heavily associated with drinking (e.g. Senchak, 
Leonard, & Green, 1998). Treise, Wohburg and Otnes (1999) observed that amongst 
university students the goal of socialising with one's friends would lead to  increased alcohol 
consumption, regardless of previous intention to drink. Such research supports the model of 
habits proposed by Aarts and colleagues and suggests that, for students, socialising is a 
motivating goal guiding alcohol consumption. Therefore the goal o f socialising may 
automatically prime readiness to drink.
Sheeran etal. (2005) investigated whether drinking habits are goal-dependent within 
a cognitive-motivational model of habit processes. They measured readiness to drink using a 
response latency paradigm after heavy and light drinkers were either primed with the goal 
of socialising or not. Participants indicated whether drinking (amongst other words) was an 
action word or not; faster responses were associated with readiness to drink (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000a,b). They observed an interaction between activation of the goal to 
socialise and the strength of drinking habits; drinking habits were only increased when the 
socialising goal was activated; when the unrelated goal was activated, habit was not 
affected. Socialising goal activation automatically led to an increase in alcohol use behaviour 
(as measured within the task). This result is intriguing in light of the current chapter, as 
previously discussed, dyslexics may be impaired in automatic skill development (cf. Nicolson 
and Fawcett, 1990). Therefore this experiment aims to investigate whether the priming of 
socialising can automatically lead to an increase in drinking behaviour (as measured in the 
current study using a craving measure).
The current experiment is a modified version of Sheeran et al. (2005). There are two 
questionnaires. One contains socialising cues, the other studying cues. Sheeran found that 
when alcohol use was measured, those exposed to socialising cues reported higher alcohol 
use than the control group. This experiment aims to see if dyslexics are as susceptible to 
priming as controls. This is because priming is thought to be an automatic process and 
dyslexics are thought to be impaired in automatising skills. One would therefore expect a 
lower degree of priming in dyslexic participants.
6.11: Method
6.11.1: Participants and Design
One hundred undergraduates participated in this study. Of these participants 69 were 
control participants (13 males; mean age = 21.52 years; SD = 4.82) and 31 participants were 
dyslexic (14 males; mean age = 22.06 years; SD = 7.18). Participants were randomly assigned 
to prime-type condition and alcohol craving was subsequently measured. The experiment 
had a 2 (group: dyslexia vs. control) x 2 (prime: study vs. socialising) between-groups design. 
15 dyslexic and 37 control participants were in the study prime group. Control participants 
were psychology undergraduates. Dyslexic participants were identified through the Swansea 
University Disability Office.
Participants were assigned to heavy or light drinkers group based on their reported 
weekly alcohol use. Again the Department of Health guidelines were used for the basis of 
the distinction (Shenker, Sorensen, & Davis, 2009). Accordingly, light drinkers (LD; N= 34; 
Average unit count=3.27; SD=1.79) were defined as males drinking on average less than 6 
alcohol units/week and females less than 4 alcohol units/week (one alcohol unit = 10 ml. of 
pure alcohol) and heavy drinkers (HD; N= 20; Average unit count=20.98; SD=6.25) as males 
consuming more than 21 units of alcohol/week and females more than 14 units/week. Full 
ethical approval was granted by the Department o f Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
(see Appendix V).
6.11.2: Procedure and Materials
Participants were randomly given one of two envelopes which contained the Adult Dyslexia 
Checklist (ADC; Vinegrad, 1994), and either of the two questionnaires enquiring about either 
study habits or socialising behaviour (see Appendix T & U). The ADC was on one A4 page, 
whilst the priming questionnaire was on a separate one-sided A4 page. The pages were 
stapled together and participants were instructed to complete the ADC on the front before 
starting the second page. Participants were given as much time as they required answering 
the questionnaires, due to the potential problems that dyslexics may have reading the 
questionnaires. The priming questionnaire was based upon Sheeran et al. (2005). The first 
half o f the questionnaire focused on either studying or socialising. The questions in the two 
questionnaires were matched e.g. 'Do you socialise as much as you would like to?' or 'Do
you study as much as you would like to?'. Seven questions were balanced in this manner 
with the word socialising and studying used interchangeably. It was these seven questions 
which were based on Sheeran et al. (2005), the rest of the questionnaire focused on alcohol 
use. Alcohol use was also enquired about for each participant on the same side of the 
questionnaire as the socialising/study prime questions. These questions were the same on 
each questionnaire and there were four such questions. The questions related to: how often 
the participant had drank in the last two weeks, how many times they had drunk to excess 
in the last two weeks, when did they last drink, and how many units they consumed last 
time they drank. Participants were then presented with a visual analogue scale and told to 
place an X on the line relating to their typical urge to drink alcohol, ranging from a strong 
urge to a weak urge. Therefore, a lower score indicated more craving. This scale was 
measured in millimetres using a ruler after the participant had completed the task.
6.12: Results
Firstly, there was a significant difference between dyslexics and controls in terms of their 
scores on the ADC (t(98) = -10.181; p < .0005), showing that the initial dyslexia distinction 
was supported.
Secondly, there was no difference in drinking behaviour between dyslexics and 
controls, as measured by the four alcohol questions on the questionnaire: how often the 
participant had drank in the last two weeks (t(98) = -.376; p = .708), how many times they 
had been drunk in the last two weeks (t(98) = -.445; p = .657), when they last drank (t(98) = 
.271; p = .787), and how many units they consumed last time they drank (t(98) = .485; p = 
.269). These results suggest that the groups did not differ in terms of drinking behaviour, so 
any differences in reported urges/craving would be due to prime-type or dyslexia group.
Next the differences were compared for the urges/craving measure between the 
groups. A 2 (group: dyslexia vs. control) x 2 (prime: study vs. socialising) x 2 (alcohol use: HD 
vs. LD) between-participants ANOVA was performed with response on the craving scale as 
the dependent variable. The main effects of group (F(l,53)=1.461; p=.233) was not 
significant. The main effect of prime (F(l,53)=8.201;p=.006) and alcohol use 
(F(l,53)=9.122;p=.004) were significant. There was not a significant interaction between
group, prime, and alcohol use, F(l,53) = 1.628;p=.208. This suggests that dyslexia did not 
affect performance on the craving scale.
6.13: Discussion
The findings of this experiment were consistent with those of Sheeran et al. (2005), as 
prime-type and reported alcohol use were found to affect participants' responses. However, 
contrary to the hypothesis, dyslexia was not found to affect participants' responses. The 
dyslexia finding either suggests that automaticity is not involved in priming or that dyslexics 
are not impaired in automaticity development.
It was found that prime-type was found to lead to different craving responses 
between participants. This suggests that priming a participant can affect their self-reported 
craving for alcohol. Participants' craving was affected by prime-type. The results suggest 
that the mere perception of a goal, in this case socialising, is capable of automatically 
eliciting a behaviour, in this case affecting craving (cf. Bargh and Chartrand, 1999). The work 
of Sheeran et al. (2005) has been supported by the difference between the prime-type 
conditions.
The dyslexia results suggest that dyslexics responded the same as non-dyslexic 
controls on this task. This is contrary to the hypothesis that dyslexics would not be so readily 
primed. There could be a number of reasons that could explain these results. This may 
suggest that theories that suggest that goal states can be automatically elicited in relevant 
situations may be flawed (e.g. Bargh and Chartrand, 1999). However, as the results o f the 
current experiment are consistent with results from the previous experiment in this chapter, 
it may be that dyslexics are not impaired in automatic skill development. This would suggest 
that the automatisation deficit hypothesis of dyslexia (Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990) may not 
apply to a population of dyslexics who attend university, potentially, as they have learnt to 
consciously compensate to a degree that means their automaticity development skills are 
analogous with those of non-dyslexics (cf. Pothos and Kirk, 2004). However, the results may 
also indicate that dyslexics do not suffer from automaticity deficits. A third possibility is that 
this may not be an automatic process, as priming in this manner may lead to explicitly 
thinking about drinking, a criticism cited by Sheeran et al. (2005) in their own paper. They
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suggested that their procedure could have led participants to think explicitly about drinking, 
which would therefore lead to increased accessibility to the mental representation of 
drinking behaviour. Such an effect would not be entirely representative of the automatic 
nature of habits, due to the fact that there may have been an awareness of the goal driving 
the habitual action. Therefore, explicit awareness of the nature of the task may lead to 
biased responding. This may be reflected in the manner of the HDs responding, who may 
have indicated more craving as they knew the nature of the study (cf. Stacy, 1997). 
However, if the task is not a true measurement of automaticity, then conclusions regarding 
the automaticity deficit hypothesis of dyslexia (Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990) cannot be fully 
accepted.
Overall, it would appear that dyslexics are just as susceptible to priming as non- 
dyslexic controls. This was contrary to the hypothesis. But this result may be due to using a 
methodology which is potentially flawed, due to its debatable ability to 'capture' automatic 
processes. However, the results may indicate that dyslexics do not have a deficit in 
automatisation (cf. Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990).
Summary: As there is automaticity involved in the priming of a goal-state, the effects of this 
were investigated by measuring whether dyslexics were as readily primed as controls on an 
alcohol craving measure. It was observed, contrary to the hypothesis, that dyslexics were as 
readily primed as controls. The results may reflect a dissociation between the automatic 
nature of habits and an awareness of the goal driving behaviour. As the lack of difference 
between the groups may be explained by an awareness of the alcohol-nature of the study. 
However, it may be that dyslexics are not impaired in automatic skill learning.
6.14: Dyslexia Conclusions
The results with the dyslexic participants revealed that automaticity may play a role within 
substance use. In Experiment 1 it was observed that there are differences between dyslexics 
and non-dyslexic controls in terms of substance use. These results are attributed to 
automaticity and attentional bias deficits. This notion was continued with by further 
investigating automaticity and attentional bias in Experiment 2. Here SRTT and eye tracking 
techniques were used to expand upon the results of the first experiment. However, 
although the SRTT did not indicate differences in incidental learning, it did indicate that 
there may be differences in explicit strategy formation when learning. The eye tracking task 
results would indicate that there may be differences between dyslexics and non-dyslexic 
controls in terms of attentional biases for substance related stimuli. However the results 
were not consistent enough to draw any firm conclusions. It does appear that further 
research in terms of dyslexia and attentional bias is warranted as cannabis stimuli led to 
between group differences. Experiment 3 examined whether the automatic process of 
priming is as apparent in dyslexics as in non-dyslexic controls. It was observed that dyslexics 
were affected by primes the same as controls. Primes from the environment could 
potentially trigger automatic responses to take substances, should automatic associations 
be in place. Therefore, dyslexics would be affected in the same manner as controls by these 
triggers. These results, when taken together, broadly indicate that an automatisation deficit 
was not present within the dyslexic sample (cf. Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990). More research 
is clearly needed in the automatic components of substance abuse. However, the use of a 
dyslexic population to do this would seem flawed.
Chapter 7: Making Associations Automatic
7.1: Introduction
The contrast between processes which are automatic and ones that are (usually referred to 
as) controlled or more accurately consciously monitored (Bargh 1992; Tzelgov, 1997) is one 
of the most influential in psychology. Automatic processes can be carried out while a subject 
may be simultaneously engaged in some other task and triggering events always elicit the 
behaviour (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Controlled processes require intentional guidance 
and conscious monitoring (Bargh 1992, Tzelgov 1997), they are more flexible, but also 
typically slower, more effortful, and more susceptible to interference. How does 
automaticity develop? Since the early days, cognitive scientists have emphasised the 
importance of practice (e.g., Sherington, 1906). Logan's (1988) model for the development 
of automaticity provides one formalisation for the impact of practice on automaticity. 
Specifically, he proposed a power law for how practice trials asymptotically reduce the 
reaction time for a corresponding task. The greater the number the trials, the closer the 
reaction to its asymptotic limit.
Practice is obviously a key aspect of automaticity. This work, sought to provide an 
exploratory examination of factors which might affect the development of automaticity, 
beyond just practice. First a motivation for doing so is provided. Then review some relevant 
previous research. However, this previous research is limited. Finally, the manipulations in 
the present work are outlined. Note that, while much of the discussion in this chapter are 
framed in terms of automaticity, empirically the main dependent variable rather concerns 
strength of association. This is because it is much easier to measure strength of association 
between two stimuli (e.g., in terms of reaction time or number of errors) than automatic 
behaviour as such. However, it is minimally assumed that stronger associations are more 
automatic than weaker ones -  note, the exact distinction between a 'strong' association and 
an automatic one is not relevant to this discussion.
Theories of automaticity have (fairly) recently played a prominent role in 
psychopathology and especially in models of substance abuse. An influential proposal is that 
of Tiffany (1990), according to which habitual behaviour in the context of substance abuse 
eventually makes many of the corresponding action sequences automatic. Thus, for
example, an alcohol abuser going into the kitchen to get some breakfast may instead find 
himself picking out a bottle of alcohol from a cupboard, without even realising it. Equally, 
the habitual consideration of positive alcohol expectancies with alcohol may lead to 
automatic links between the two, so that, for example, for an alcohol abuser, a 'good mood' 
or 'relaxation', may automatically lead to thoughts of using alcohol and vice versa (cf. 
Richard, 1997). Convergent results support this perspective. For example, Rather et al. 
(1992) showed that positive alcohol expectancies were closer to alcohol-related concepts in 
a psychological space, compared to negative alcohol expectancies, but only for alcohol 
abusers. Also, memory priming tasks typically reveal stronger associations between alcohol 
concepts and positive expectancies for alcohol abusers (Jones & Schulze, 2000; Stacy, 1997).
Some researchers have suggested that such development of automatic associations 
relating to substance abuse is partly what makes such behaviour so resistant to change. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that automatic associations between, for example, alcohol 
and positive alcohol expectancies or actions relating to alcohol abuse are partly responsible 
for alcohol-related attentional biases (Cox et al., 2006; Tiffany, 1990). Attentional biases, in 
turn, have strongly been implicated in the maintenance and further development of 
substance abuse behaviour. For example, Cox et al. (2002) showed that alcoholics in a 
treatment centre who showed an increased alcohol Stroop bias during their treatment were 
more likely to relapse three months later. Cox, Pothos, and Flosier (2007) found that 
alcohol-Stroop bias prospectively predicted a reduction in the number of drinking days in a 
group of excessive drinkers. Similar findings have been reported for corresponding 
attentional biases for other kinds of psychopathology (e.g., Calitri et al., 2010; Mogg et al., 
1995).
Employing the concept of automaticity in substance abuse has, without doubt, led to 
some very powerful intuitions (Tiffany, 1990). Flowever, a key question concerns the precise 
mechanism which translates a commonly occurring sequence of actions into an 
automatically activated and executed schema, as would be the case, for example, for an 
alcohol abuser obtaining and drinking alcohol. Likewise, questions remain regarding the way 
associations between, for example, alcohol-related concepts and corresponding positive 
expectancies or outcomes develop to be automatic. Frequency and practice are unlikely to 
be the whole story. For example, when we are thirsty, we go through a sequence of actions 
which would often be very similar (e.g., when we are at home) and there is a particular
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association between particular cues (being thirsty in general, obviously, but also, for 
example, having a large bag of crisps or other savoury foods) and a response (e.g., drinking 
water). Clearly, people, in general, do not have an attentional bias for drinking water. By 
contrast, seemingly similar circumstances (repeating sequence of actions, consistent 
associations between cues and responses) in the case of, for example, drinking alcohol can 
lead to persistent and substantial related attentional biases. Thus, for example, the 
frequency of going to the kitchen to obtain alcohol (for an alcohol abuser) vs. the frequency 
of going to the kitchen to obtain water are unlikely to be all that different. Likewise, for the 
frequency of an association between drinking alcohol and a positive emotional outcome 
(e.g., relaxation) and the corresponding frequency involving drinking water.
There is however evidence to suggest that attentional biases may fluctuate 
dependent on a current need-state suggesting that more attention may be paid to goal- 
congruent cues when deprived/satiated (e.g. Field et al., 2004). However, for an alcohol 
abuser, once an attentional bias has been established, it is very hard to modify, and may not 
readily fluctuate to the same degree as an attentional bias borne of a deprived need-state. 
This chapter therefore explores potential reasons why some attentional biases can become 
persistent and substantial due to the formation of automatic associations whilst other 
putative attentional biases may fluctuate dependent upon current consciously monitored 
need-states.
Overall, let it be accepted that, for example, for an alcohol abuser there are 
automatic associations between drinking alcohol and positive alcohol expectancies (and 
correspondingly for the sequence of actions relating to drinking alcohol; Cox et al., 2006; 
Tiffany, 1990). Then, there is a question as to why it is such associations which become 
more readily automatised, as opposed to fairly equivalent ones in a person's everyday life, 
which do not involve, for example, alcohol-related behaviour. Of course, if there is a 
behavioural difference, then any perception of equivalence may be only superficial.
There is some potentially related work from the extensive research tradition on 
associative learning. For example, associative learning theory would suggest that a cue more 
strongly associated with a target will attract more attention (Mackintosh, 1975; Kruschke et 
al., 2005). Likewise, Tzelgov et al.'s (1997) research suggests that when an association 
between words and meaning is stronger, then a corresponding Stroop effect would also be 
stronger. Pothos and Tapper (2010) attempted to systematically examine strength of
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association in terms of teaching an association between a meaningless label and either a 
single concept or several related concepts. They observed a stronger attentional bias (as 
assessed with a Stroop task) in the former case, than in the latter. This finding corroborates 
the conclusion that a stronger association can lead to a stronger attentional bias (see also 
Orbell & Verplanken, 2010). It still does not help explain how an association becomes strong 
in the first place, other than through extensive practice. However, as previously argued, 
while practice is clearly a key factor, there are reasons to suspect there may be other factors 
which are relevant as well.
According to Logan's (1988) theory, the transition from controlled to automatic 
behaviour is a transition from algorithmic-based cognitive processing to processing which 
depends on the retrieval of previous instances. Thus, for a process which has been 
automatised, a cognitive agent no longer needs to work through a relevant algorithm, 
rather it can employ existing memory to retrieve a ready solution. An implication of this 
account is when a process involves that stimuli which are more memorable, such a process 
may be easier to automatise (Logan, 1988). In cognitive paradigms, memorability is often 
manipulated in terms of confusability or perceptual salience of stimuli. In the situations of 
present interest, stimulus variations which are more pertinent would include emotional 
salience.
To sum up, the present experiment is concerned with what causes or contributes to 
the emergence of (apparently) automatic associations for some stimuli (e.g. alcohol) and not 
others (e.g. water). Why do we not develop an attentional bias for drinking water? No one 
seems to have automatic links between 'water' and, e.g., pleasurable emotions. It would 
appear that for some associations, but not others, an increased frequency would lead to 
automaticity, and a corresponding attentional bias (e.g., Logan, 1988). What are factors that 
might affect whether links become automatic or not? Three kinds of characteristics of 
stimuli are explored, which may impact on the degree to which associations between them 
are learned, all motivated from exploratory intuitions on how excessive drinkers potentially 
perceive alcohol-related stimuli.
First, perhaps associations are learned more quickly if they involve stimuli which are 
emotionally more salient (Experiment 1 in this chapter). Perhaps, alcohol-related stimuli are 
more emotionally salient for an excessive drinker and it is this which enables the putative 
faster development of automatic associations between such stimuli and positive emotions,
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everyday concepts etc. For example, MacKay et al.'s (2004) theory assumes that emotional 
information activates prioritised learning mechanisms. Conversely, Easterbrook's (1959) 
theory would lead to the expectation that associations involving more emotional stimuli 
would be learned more poorly, as participants disproportionately focus on the emotional 
content of the stimuli, at the expense of learning the associations (cf. Murray & Kensinger, 
2012). Second, rather than emotional salience, perhaps it is the perceptual richness or 
complexity of the presented stimuli, which is the critical factor (Experiment 2 in this 
chapter). Perhaps, an excessive drinker processes alcohol-related stimuli in a more 
elaborate way, revealing a perceptual richness which is not (or less) obvious to non-drinkers. 
A third possibility that was examined concerns whether thinking about the associations may 
speed up the learning of the associations (Experiment 3). Such a possibility can be motivated 
from the theory of current concerns (Klinger and Cox, 2004), according to which having a 
goal implies that attentional resources are focused on this goal. While this assumption in the 
theory of current concerns can be considered in itself sufficient for explaining an attentional 
bias, there is still a missing link in relation to the Tiffany's (1990) explanation for how 
attentional biases arise. This third experiment could potentially explain the relation 
between having a current concern and the development of automatic associations involving 
an abused substance and related aspects of everyday life.
7.2: Experiment 1: Emotional salience of stimuli
7.2.1: Participan ts
20 participants were recruited (8 male), aged 18 -  34 years (mean=21.90; SD=4.27), from 
the undergraduate population within the psychology department at Swansea University. 
Course credit was offered in return for participation. Full ethical approval was granted by 
the Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix V).
7.2.2; Stimuli and Apparatus
There are several ways in which to potentially manipulate the emotional salience of stimuli. 
However, a challenge is to identify one which is expected to be as much relevant to the 
participants as possible. Given that recruitment took place within a university 
undergraduate population, manipulating emotional salience was opted for in terms of the
attractiveness of faces. 84 faces were selected from www.hotornot.com, subject to the 
criteria that the faces shown would not have any headwear or glasses. The same number of 
male and female faces were selected. Additionally, to simplify stimulus control, only faces of 
white persons were selected in order to avoid race effects. Then, a brief pilot study with a 
sample from the same population as the main study, was carried out to separate out the 
most and least attractive faces in this selection. Specifically, 19 (8 male) participants, aged 
between 19-40 (mean=25.58; SD=5.59), rated the attractiveness on a 5-point Likert scale. 
The 10 most attractive male and female (5 male; 5 female) faces were selected for the main 
experiment as well as the 10 least attractive male and female (5 male; 5 female) faces. Male 
and female participants in the pilot were not found to significantly differ in their 
attractiveness ratings for the faces. For female faces, an independent samples t-test 
comparing male and female participants in the pilot was not significant (t(17)=1.075; 
p=.297) and, likewise, for male faces (t(17)= -.136; p=.893). Henceforth, the judged 
attractive and judged unattractive faces are referred to as just attractive and unattractive 
faces.
The attractive and unattractive faces were arranged into 30 pairs, such that for 15 of 
which the faces could be considered more attractive (these pairs are labelled as More 
Attractive, or MA) and for the other 15 pairs the faces could be considered less attractive 
(these pairs are labelled as Less Attractive, or LA; Figure 6-1 and 6-2). The two faces in each 
pair would be of equivalent attractiveness (based on the pilot study results) and all pairs 
involved a male and female face. There were 10 face pairs that formed the basis of the 
experiment, five LA and five MA. These are the pairs that the participants would see during 
the training phase. For the test phase, 10 MA and 10 LA distracter face pairs were also 
created by splitting the original face pairs apart and randomly pairing them with another 
image from their respective attractiveness group. Therefore, each face was presented in 
three different pairs: one pair was the correct trained pair and two pairs of distracter faces.
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Remember this pairing
Figure 7-1. An example of and LA face pair in the training phase. The faces are smudged to 
protect the identity of the individuals, but participants to the experiments saw the pictures 
intact.
Is this a correct  pairing?
S = Correct K = Incorrect
Figure 7-2. An example of an MA pair during the test phase.
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7.2.3: Procedure
In the first phase of the experiment, the training phase, the MA pairs were presented in an 
alternate way with LA pairs. That is, an LA pair would always follow an MA one and vice 
versa. Participants were instructed that they were about to see several pairs of faces and 
that they would have to study these pairs. Participants were also informed that there would 
be a subsequent test phase, in which they would be tested on their knowledge of face pairs. 
Each trial involved presenting a pair of faces on a computer screen and participants were 
allowed as much time as they desired to view it. They were instructed to press the spacebar 
when they were ready to proceed to the next trial. There were 10 trials in the training 
phase, so that each of the correct MA and LA pairs (five in each category) were presented 
once.
After the training phase, participants received new instructions (on the computer 
screen), such that they were told that in the next phase of the experiment they would, 
again, see pairs o f faces. Their task would be to decide whether each presented pair had 
been studied before or not. Participants were also told to respond as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. The response keys for correct, incorrect answers were shown on the 
screen for the duration of the test phase.
The test phase consisted of 30 trials. Each trial involved presenting a pair of faces, 
which would either be one of the MA, LA pairs in the training phase or a new pair. The pair 
presentation included the prompt 'Is this a correct pairing?' and participants had to indicate 
their response by pressing the appropriate key (see Figure 6-2). During test, corrective 
feedback was provided for participants' responses. Of the 30 trials in the test phase, 10 (5 
MA and 5 LA) involved pairings from the training phase and 20 involved new pairings (10 MA 
and 10 LA). The 20 new pairs were constructed by randomly re-allocating the faces 
employed in training to each other, so that, as in the training phase, faces of equal 
attractiveness would be paired together. Therefore the probability of choosing a false face 
pairing was 2/3. The probability of 2/3 for selecting the wrong face pair by chance, applied 
to all the experiments reported in this paper
The training and test phase as described were repeated three times. That is, after 
the first test phase, participants saw instructions on the screen, informing them that the 
experiment would continue with the training phase they had already seen. They were also
instructed that this second training phase would be the same as the original. The training 
phase was repeated, and then the test phase was repeated etc. In this way, the experiment 
was composed of three identical training and test phases. Each set of training -  test phases 
are referred to as one session. Note that the structure of Experiment 1 is identical to the 
structure o f the other two experiments in this chapter.
7.3: Results
In all experiments in this work, participant performance can be explored in terms of three 
dependent variables: reaction times in training; reaction times in test; and correct responses 
(hits and correct rejections). This variable is equivalent to false responses (false positives 
and misses), as correct responses (hits and correct rejections) + false responses (false 
positives and misses) = 15 for LA pairs and 15 for MA pairs. Since the training phase was self- 
paced, reaction times in training are perhaps indicative of study times. However, some 
caution is needed in this assumption, since high reaction times may indicate processing of 
the individual stimuli, rather than the association. An analysis of reaction times was carried 
out to explore any possible effects of disproportionate processing of the actual stimuli, 
perhaps at the expense of learning the associations as such (Easterbrook, 1959). All 
dependent variables are meant to measure the strength of the learned associations. 
Moreover, by comparing these variables between sessions, it will be possible to  consider 
how the knowledge of associations develops. The main independent variables concerns the 
stimulus type, in Experiment 1, this would be the MA vs. LA variable. Of course, the 
frequency of MA and LA pairs is identical. Therefore, it is the differences in how well MA vs. 
LA pairs are learned which is of interest, which might arise from the (assumed) difference in 
emotional salience of the stimuli.
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Figure 7-3. Graphs that illustrate the data from Experiment 1. The sessions axis denotes 
which session the data is obtained from. The vertical axes are indicative of the dependent 
variable that is currently being considered. A: The average training reaction time for LA and 
MA face pairs over the three training sessions. B: The average test reaction time for LA and 
MA face pairs over the three test sessions. C: The average of correct responses during the 
test for LA and MA face pairs over the three test sessions. The maximum number of possible 
correct responses for LA and MA pairs was 15 (for a total of 30). The error bars show the 
standard error of the mean.
7.3.1: Reaction tim e  in tra in in g
Figure 7-3A shows that participants tended to spend more time studying the MA pairs, than 
the LA ones, especially in later sessions. A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out for 
the average reaction times in training, with session one within participants variable, and 
stimulus condition another. The analysis yielded a significant main effect for session,
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F(2,38)=23.546; p<.0005, such that the average time spent on each session decreased. The 
main effect of attractiveness was also significant, F(l,19)=5.130; p=.035, showing that 
participants spent more time studying the MA pairs than the LA ones. Finally, the interaction 
effect was only marginally significant, F(2,38)=2.986; p=.062.
Paired samples t-tests were performed in order to localise the significant differences.
Despite the lack of an interaction effect, these comparisons are carried out for each session 
separately, as this is an intuitive way to understand the pattern of results. When comparing 
study times between MA and LA pairs in each session, a significant difference was identified 
only in the case of the second session, t(19)=-4.108; p=.001, and not on the first (t(19)=- 
.124; p=.902) or third (t(19) =-.621; p=.542).
7.3.2: Reaction times in test
Here and elsewhere the analyses were carried out only for the correct responses. Response 
time for each trial in test may well be indicative of the ease or fluency with which 
participants were able to determine whether a pair was one of the studied one or not.
Figure 7-3B reveals a weak trend for LA pairs to be associated with a lower reaction time. A 
repeated measures ANOVA for reaction times in test, with session being a within 
participants variable, and stimulus type another within participants variable, showed a 
significant main effect of session (F(2,38)=10.539; p<.0005) but not stimulus type 
(F(l,19)=.239; p=.631) or an interaction (F(2,38)=.533; p=.591).
7.3.3: Correct Responses
The number of correct responses during the three different test sessions is a variable highly 
relevant to assessing the extent to which the MA or LA pairs results in stronger and better 
learned associations. Figure 7-3C indicates lower error rates for the LA pairs compared to 
the MA ones. However, a repeated measures ANOVA, with session and stimulus type as the 
within participants variables, did not confirm this impression. Note first that there was a 
significant main effect of session, as expected (F(2,38)=30.565; p<.0005). Importantly, the 
main effect o f stimulus type failed to reach significance (F(l,19)=2.11; p=.163) and likewise 
for the interaction effect (F(2,38)=2.958; p=.064). However, the interaction indicates a trend 
in the expected direction. These results indicate that any differences in the correct
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responses between MA and LA pairs were not consistent enough across participants to 
enable a corresponding significant main effect.
7.4: Discussion
This experiment was motivated from the assumption that pictures of more attractive faces 
would be more emotionally salient for the population (undergraduate university students). 
It was believed that this would be appropriate stimuli as evidence suggests that attractive 
faces activate areas within the orbito-frontal cortex, the nucleus accumbens, or the ventral 
striatum (Aharon et al., 2001; Ishai, 2007; Kampe, Frith, Dolan, & Frith, 2001; Kranz & Ishai, 
2006; O'Doherty et al., 2003). These neural activations are associated with reward systems 
and can be interpreted as reflecting the emotional valence attached to attractive faces 
(Senior, 2003). The MA pairs were consistently studied for longer than the LA pairs, which is 
in line with Easterbrook's (1959) suggestion regarding the attentional impact of emotional 
stimuli. Also consistently with Easterbrook's (1959) hypothesis, the results indicate that this 
additional study time did not reinforce knowledge of the presented associations (though 
note that, strictly speaking, Easterbrook's hypothesis would predict a lower performance for 
MA pairs, compared to LA ones, which were not observed). There were no main effects of 
stimulus type (MA vs. LA) for two of the key dependent variables, reaction times in the test 
trials and the rate of correct responses. Overall, this result in itself does not provide enough 
confidence to conclude that MA associations were learned more quickly or ended up 
stronger than LA ones. Murray and Kensinger (2012) also identified no difference in 
association learning between neutral and emotional stimuli. Note, however, that in one of 
their conditions (where participants had to imagine the associates in a pair as somehow 
integrated), undertime pressure, a facilitative effect of emotional content was revealed.
7.5: Experiment 2: Richness of representation
7.5.1: Participants
22 (11 male) participants were recruited, aged 18 -  42 (mean= 24.00; SD=6.27), from the 
undergraduate population within the psychology department at Swansea University. Course 
credit was offered in return for participation. Full ethical approval was granted by the 
Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix V).
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7.5.2 ; Stimuli and Procedure
It was important to identify stimuli which could be intuitively considered as more 
perceptually rich, in terms, for example, of the complexity of colour patterns and shapes. A 
random selection of pictures were obtained from Microsoft Clip Art. Image complexity was 
then analysed using a program which measured the number of unique colours within each 
image. The program was created using MatLab. It examined red, green, and blue intensity 
for each pixel of the image. Each pixel of the image consisted of three numbers between 0 
to 255, measuring how red, green, and blue each pixel was. The various RGB pixel numbers 
were then put in a list and duplicates were removed. The number of unique colours was 
then counted and a value for each image was produced. Complexity was therefore 
considered to be based on the number of unique colours in each image. The logarithm of 
the complexity data was used as the measure of image complexity (see Figure 7-4). From 
the image it can be seen that there is a distinction between rich and basic pictures in terms 
of unique colours, and intuitively, complexity.
3O
Ou
<v3O'
’ED
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
‘Image Complexity'
Basic Rich
Figure 7-4. Demonstration of the differences between rich and basic stimuli in terms of 
image complexity. Note, pictures 1 -1 0  were considered basic; and 11-20 were considered 
rich.
In this way, 10 pictures were identified which could be considered perceptually rich 
(subsequently referred to as 'rich') and 10 pictures which, in comparison, could be said to be 
perceptually impoverished (subsequently referred to as 'basic'). Rich and basic pairs were
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formed by randomly assigning two randomly selected rich pictures together or randomly 
selected two basic pictures together (Figure 7-5 and 7-6). All other aspects of Experiment 2 
were as in Experiment 1.
Is this a correct pairing?
S = Correct K = Incorrect
Figure 7-5. Example of basic (least unique colours) picture stimuli.
Is this a correct pairing?
S = Correct K = Incorrect
Figure 7-6. Example of rich (most unique colours) picture stimuli.
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7.6: Results
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Figure 7-7. The results in Experiment 2. The sessions axis denotes which session the data is 
obtained from. The vertical axes are indicative of the dependent variable that is currently 
being considered. A: The difference in average training reaction time between rich and 
basic picture pairs over the three training sessions. B: The difference in average test reaction 
time between rich and basic picture pairs over the three test sessions. C: The difference in 
average correct responses between rich and basic picture pairs over the three test sessions. 
The maximum number of possible correct responses for rich and basic pairs were 15 for 
each category. The error bars show the standard error of the mean.
7.6.1: Reaction tim es in tra in ing
Figure 7-7A shows reaction times during training, for the rich and basic stimulus pairs, 
across the three sessions. As in Experiment 1, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed 
with session a within participants variable and stimulus type (rich vs. basic) as a within 
participants variable. The main effect of session was significant (F(2,42)=16.433; p<.0005),
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showing that the average reaction time decreased across sessions. However, neither the 
stimulus type main effect nor the interaction were significant (respectively, F(l,21)=.388; 
p=.540, F(2,42)^1.878; p=.166). These results show that, at least in the study phases, 
participants' performance was not differentiated between the rich and basic pairs (at least, 
as far as this can be established by examining reaction times).
7.6.2: Reaction times in test
Figure 7-7B shows a very slight trend for reaction times to be lower for rich pairs, compared 
to basic ones. However, a repeated measures ANOVA as above revealed a significant main 
effect only for session (F(2,42)=10.361; p<.0005) and not for stimulus type (F(l,21)=1.125; 
p=.281) or an interaction (F(2, 42)=.121; p=.886).
7.6.3: Correct Responses
Accuracy was measured with a dependent variable exactly analogous to that of Experiment 
1, so that correct responses (hits plus correct rejections) were tracked. Figure 7-7C indicates 
that participants make more correct responses in trials involving rich stimuli, than ones with 
basic stimuli. However, the main effect of stimulus type was not significant (F(l,21)=.047; 
p=.830) nor was the interaction between stimulus type and session (F(2, 42)=.046; p=.955). 
The main effect of session was significant, as expected (F(2,42)=16.849; p<.0005).
7.7: Discussion
In Experiment 2 the possibility was explored that perceptual richness of stimuli may impact 
on the ability to learn corresponding associations more or less easily i.e. representative of 
more/less elaborate processing of stimuli. In alcohol heavy users perhaps the perceptual 
properties of alcohol stimuli may be more salient/ processed more extensively. Therefore, 
this was hypothesised to be analogous to manipulation of the perceptual richness of the 
stimuli in this task. While for all dependent variables of interest, the expected main effect of 
session was identified (showing that knowledge of the associations improved across the 
sessions), there was no evidence for a main effect of stimulus type or corresponding 
interactions.
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7.8: Experiment 3: Thinking about the associations
7.8.1: Participants
20 (3 male) participants were recruited, aged 19 -  31 (mean=23.55; SD=4.136), from the 
undergraduate population of the psychology department at Swansea University. Course 
credit was offered in return for participation. Full ethical approval was granted by the 
Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix V).
7.8.2: Stimuli and Procedure
In this experiment the actual type of stimuli was not of interest and so randomly selected 
pictures from Microsoft Clip Art were used, but in this case ensuring that all images were of 
a similar complexity. Here, Microsoft Clip Art was used to select pictures of a similar style. 
Instead there were two conditions; one where participants were instructed to name the 
stimuli (verbalise), and another where participants had to think of a way of associating the 
pictures (associate). The pictures in the verbalise and associate conditions were then 
counterbalanced in order to minimise any effects due to the particular pictures themselves. 
This counterbalancing should ensure that the pattern of results would be due to verbalise 
vs. associate manipulation only. The critical condition involved a procedure manipulation, 
according to which for half of the picture pairs in the training phase participants saw the 
word 'association' written above the stimuli, whilst for the other half the word 'verbalise'. 
The association label indicated that participants should try to think of, and tell the 
experimenter, an association between the two stimuli in the pair. Participants were told 
that any interpretation of the association between the two pictures was acceptable. By 
contrast, the verbalise label prompted participants to simply say a word which best 
described each picture. For example, if a picture of a cat and a dog appeared on the screen, 
participants would have to respond in the verbalise condition, by saying 'cat -  dog'. In the 
association condition, participants could offer a response along the lines of, 'the cat was 
being chased by the dog' (Figure 7-8). The association vs. verbalise manipulation was 
counterbalanced, therefore, although all participants associated and verbalised the same 
number of items, half would associate one half of the stimuli and verbalise the other,
whereas the other half of the participants would verbalise and associate the opposite pairs. 
All other aspects of Experiment 3 were as in Experiment 1.
Example
Figure 7-8. Example of stimuli from Experiment 3. Note, that where the text 'Example' is 
displayed is the location of where the instruction 'association' or 'verbalise' would appear.
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Figure 7-9. Graphs that demonstrate the results in Experiment 3. The sessions axis denotes 
which session the data is obtained from. The vertical axes are indicative of the dependent 
variable that is currently being considered. A: The average training reaction time for 
verbalise and association picture pairs over the three training sessions B: The average test 
reaction time for verbalise and association picture pairs over the three test sessions C: The 
average of test correct responses for verbalise (greatest number possible 15) and 
association (greatest number possible 15) picture pairs over the three test sessions. The 
error bars show the standard error of the mean.
7.9.1: Reaction tim es in tra in ing
Figure 7-9A demonstrates an intuitive pattern of results, with the difference between 
reaction time for the association pairs and the verbalise pairs being very high in the first 
session (when, presumably, participants require more time to think of an appropriate 
association), but this difference dropping almost to nothingness in the subsequent sessions.
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As in previous experiments, all analyses are based on a repeated measures ANOVA, with 
session as a within participants variable and stimulus condition (association vs. verbalise) as 
a second within participants variable. The main effect of session was significant 
(F(2,38)=57.875; p<.0005), the main effect of stimulus condition was significant 
(F(l,19)=12.391; p=.002), and the interaction was significant (F(2,38)=17.609; p<.0005).
Independent samples t-tests were employed to explore the main effects and the 
interaction in more detail. There was a significant difference between verbalise (32.05 
seconds) and association (56.93 seconds) picture pairs for the first training session (t(19)=- 
4.081; p=.001). However, no corresponding difference was identified in the second training 
session (t(19)=-1.714; p=.103) or the third one (t(19)=-.140; p=.890).
7.9.2: Reaction times in test
Figure 7-9B shows consistently lower reaction times for association pairs in the test phases, 
compared to verbalise pairs. An ANOVA as demonstrated a marginal significant main effect 
for session (F(2,38)=2.944; p=.065) and stimulus condition (F(l,19)=14.631; p=.001), but no 
interaction (F(2,38)=.256; p=.776). These effects are more carefully explored with post hoc 
independent samples t-tests. There was a marginally significant difference between 
verbalise (2.54, 2.43, 2.15 seconds, respectively) and association (1.97, 1.69, 1.61 seconds, 
respectively) pairs in all of the three sessions (t(19)=3.210; p=.005, t(19)=2.374; p=.028, 
t(19)=2.833; p=.011, respectively). Thus, even though the initial study time for association 
pairs was higher, association pairs were consistently responded to more quickly in all study 
phases.
7.9.3: Correct Responses
As before, the dependent variable for accuracy of responding was computed as the sum of 
hits and correct rejections, for verbalise pairs (maximum 15) and association pairs 
(maximum 15). The reaction time data for the test phases of Experiment 3 show that 
association pairs were responded to more fluently, indicating better learning for these pairs, 
compared to verbalise pairs. This conclusion is corroborated by the results on correct 
responses (Figure 7-9C). A repeated measures ANOVA with session and stimulus condition 
as a within participants variables, yielded a significant main effect o f session (F(2,38)=4.019;
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p=.026), a significant main effect of stimulus condition (F(l,19)=72.361; p<.0005), and a 
significant interaction (F(2,38)=8.332; p =.001).
With post hoc paired samples t-tests significant differences were identified between 
the association and verbalise stimulus conditions for all three sessions. For the first session, 
correct responses means were observed for the verbalise and association conditions of 9.65 
and 14.05 respectively (t(19)=-8.543; p<.0005), for the second session 10.95 and 13.95 
(t(19)=-5.015; p<.0005), and for the third session 12.00 and 13.90 (t(19) =-4.872; p<.0005).
7.10: Discussion
The theory of current concerns (e.g., Cox & Klinger, 2004) might lead to the expectation that 
thinking more about a particular association (that is, being pre-occupied by it) might 
reinforce the strength of the association. In this experiment a laboratory approximation of 
this idea is provided, with the association vs. verbalise stimulus condition. The analyses on 
all test phase variables consistently showed that the association pairs had been learned 
better and were responded to more fluently, compared to the verbalise pairs.
7.11: General Discussion
The goal o f the present experiments was to explore some factors which may contribute to 
the speed of learning. The degree of learning of associations was characterised by the speed 
and accuracy of responding to different stimulus types, across different sessions. Note that 
the theory for attentional biases motivating the present work (e.g., Tiffany, 1990) concerns 
automatic associations between an abused substance and relevant thoughts, rather than 
the issue of whether particular associations can be learned more quickly than others. 
However, empirically it is much more straightforward to study the latter, rather than the 
former, due to the ambiguities of establishing whether an association is automatic or not. 
Moreover, it seems a fairly mild assumption to expect that associations which can be 
learned more speedily are the ones which become automatic more quickly as well. The key 
question in the present work is this: is the development of automatic associations primarily 
a function of (just) frequency, or do certain kinds of associations become learned more 
quickly than others? For example, in substance abuse automatic associations do not appear 
to develop for drinking water, to the same extent as they do for drinking alcohol, even the 
relevant frequencies for the two types of behaviour would always at least be equivalent
(even for excessive drinkers). Then, the empirical challenge becomes to identify the 
characteristics which makes some associations more likely to become automatic (or, more 
simply, be learned more quickly) than others.
Three aspects of stimuli were explored which may have an effect on how effectively 
associations are learned. Experiment 1 was concerned with the emotional salience of the 
stimuli, in terms of the attractiveness of randomly selected faces. Emotional salience did not 
appear to impact on learning. In Experiment 2 the perceptual richness of the stimuli was 
manipulated, but no differences were identified for any of the test phase dependent 
variables. Finally, Experiment 3 examined the possibility that thinking about an association 
might reinforce it. In this case, the stimulus pairs for which participants had to think of an 
association were learned much better than the ones for which participants simply had to 
identify a verbal description.
The perceptual richness hypothesis of Experiment 2 is perhaps the easiest one to 
reject with confidence. Perceptual richness was manipulated in a fairly objective way, so 
that for all participants the stimuli intended as perceptual richer should indeed appear so 
etc. The emotionality hypothesis is more difficult to reject. Inevitably, it is a challenge to 
identify stimuli which would be emotionally salient (or not) to a fairly uniform degree across 
all members of a population sample. It was opted to employ pictures of faces which varied 
in attractiveness, because it is straightforward to identify large collections of eligible images, 
it was not wished to employ images which might be emotionally salient, but perhaps in an 
offensive way, and because employing such images would perhaps make the experimental 
task less onerous. However, the use of attractiveness may have been seen as a limitation, as 
there may have been a more suited way of manipulating emotionality. With future work, it 
is hoped to clarify in more detail whether emotional salience can have an effect on learning, 
but emotional salience is not captured adequately by attractiveness, or that attractiveness 
can be a relevant variable in this context, but it needs a stronger manipulation. One 
suggestion for alleviating this limitation is to tailor stimuli to suit individual participants i.e. 
use stimuli that is personally emotional for each participant e.g. picture stimuli o f pets or 
partners. However, such an approach would require thorough pre-test procedural 
considerations. Notwithstanding these methodological qualifications, the lack of difference 
between the (assumed) emotional and non-emotional stimuli is broadly consistent with 
Easterbrook's (1959) proposal and the empirical findings of Murray and Kensinger (2012).
The advantage of the association vs. verbalise pairs in Experiment 3 is consistent 
with Craik and Tulving's (1975) proposal, that semantic elaboration of some studied 
material typically leads to better recall. According to their level of processing theory, a 
stimulus can be processed in several different ways, which can be characterised in terms of 
'levels'. These levels can vary from fairly superficial perceptual analysis (shallow processing) 
to semantic analysis (deep processing). The resulting memory representations thus occur on 
a continuum between shallow to deep, so that deep processing results in a stronger and 
more durable representation. Therefore, by thinking of the association between stimuli, 
rather than merely verbalising the content of the stimuli, a stronger memory representation 
emerges. A putative relation between the levels of processing account of memory and the 
current concerns approach to attentional biases in substance abuse would merit further 
examination. Perhaps, having a current concern leads to  corresponding attentional biases, 
exactly because this deeper processing leads to stronger representations and associations 
with positive expectancies.
The finding that thinking of associations led to an improvement in the learning of the 
pairs is perhaps intuitive, though note that in at least one case (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), a 
levels of processing manipulation did not impact on memory performance, which may 
underlie the emergence of automaticity (as measured in a perceptual identification task, see 
Logan, (1988). Also, it is interesting that the thinking of associations led to better 
performance, over and above manipulations involving the emotional salience or perceptual 
richness of the stimuli, especially given that a higher emotional salience and a greater 
perceptual richness are both variables plausibly increasing the memorability of associations 
(regarding the latter, cf. Bock & Klinger, 1986).
Summing up, the issue of how cognitive processes support or underlie the 
psychological state relevant in substance abuse and addiction is a fascinating question, both 
because of possible practical implications (e.g., for cognitive-style interventions; e.g., Wiers 
et al., 2006), but also because of their potential to inform cognitive theory of learning and 
the automaticity (e.g., which factors other than frequency of practice impact on the 
development of associations?).
Summary: Within this chapter factors were explored which may affect the development of 
automatic associations. Three factors were considered which may affect the strength of
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association between stimuli. Looked at were emotionality, richness of representation, and 
thinking about the association. The dependent variable was the strength of the association 
between different stimuli. It was reasoned that stronger associations are more automatic 
than weaker ones. If something is more memorable then would such a process be easier to 
automatise? Would a stronger association lead to a stronger attentional bias? First 
considered was emotionality; would salient stimuli be learnt more readily? However there 
were no significant differences in the learning between emotionality groups. Then 
considered was the richness of representation; are readily-automatised stimuli processed in 
a more elaborate way? Again there was no evidence of this being the case. Finally it was 
considered whether thinking about an association; would a preoccupation with the stimuli 
affect memorability? It was observed that associated pairs were responded to more fluently 
than verbalise pairs. It was reasoned that deeper processing leads to a stronger 
representation and association with positive expectancies. Therefore a deeper thinking 
about, or preoccupation with, alcohol rather than, e.g., water, may lead to stronger 
representations and associations with positive expectancies and may subsequently lead to 
stronger attentional biases.
Chapter 8: Conclusions and General Discussion
8.1: Motivation
Do psychological aspects of addiction play a causal role in substance abuse, or are they a by­
product? Answering this question may aid in the development of effective interventions. 
Previous research would suggest that substance abuse is maintained by attentional biases. 
These attentional biases may be due to the development of automaticity for the 
associations and habits concerned with substance abuse. Such automatic behaviours may 
operate without awareness. This would have implications for the types of screening 
measures that would be used to quantify substance abuse behaviours, as implicit measures 
may be more reliable than measures based on self-report. However, such implicit- and 
explicit- measure distinctions are not the only disadvantage of some substance abuse tasks, 
as it was sought to develop methods for measuring substance use and abuse attentional and 
cognitive biases that were more reliable, as well as capable of measuring different 
processes.
This thesis looked at attentional bias, cognitive bias, and the nature of the 
involvement of automaticity in the development of these biases, with the aim of exploring 
various aspects o f psychological addiction. A number of results have been observed that 
would suggest that attentional biases are associated in the maintenance of substance use 
through allocating attentional resources toward stimuli. These processes may set into 
motion automatic processes that lead to substance seeking behaviour.
8.2: Empirical Evidence
The results of this thesis would suggest that attentional biases are not merely a by-product 
of substance use. It would appear that they may play a role in the development and 
maintenance of substance use behaviour. However, whether such attentional biases play a 
causal role is still open for debate. One view is that substance use is indeed (in part) 
maintained by attentional biases. It was demonstrated within this thesis that following 
repeated substance use an environment becomes increasingly occupied with stimuli related 
to substance use. The cause of this may be the increased importance attributed to 
substance-related stimuli following repeated exposure. This leads to the automatic 
development of habits and associations, which can then lead to substance-related stimuli
gaining increased salience, which would affect how the environment is perceived. This was 
demonstrated using the PET, where heavy drinkers were found to mis-estimate the amount 
of alcohol-related stimuli in an environment.
Following the development of the fixed gaze inhibition task, a number of aspects of 
attentional bias could be explored over and above what could be achieved with previous 
measures. This task was first used to indicate the compulsory aspect of attentional biases. It 
was hypothesised that HDs would demonstrate poorer inhibitory control. Here it was found 
that heavy drinkers are unable to inhibit their attentional biases for alcohol-related stimuli. 
This suggests that when presented with alcohol stimuli, HDs are compelled to look at 
substance-related stimuli. Attentional biases were further explored using this measure by 
looking at the initial orienting of attention when in the presence of substance-related 
stimuli. Previous measures had not adequately been able to observe this process. Here it 
was found that HDs will have an initial orienting bias for alcohol stimuli. This result, taken 
together with the inhibition finding, would suggest that, when in the presence of alcohol 
stimuli, a HD will have an initial orienting bias for alcohol stimuli, but this bias is also difficult 
to inhibit. Such a notion would have wide reaching implications, as the mere sight of alcohol 
stimuli has, within previous literature, been associated with increased craving and substance 
seeking behaviour. Tiffany (1990) suggested that substance abuse reflects a 'loss of control'. 
Likewise, Field and Cox (2008) suggest that poor inhibitory control may influence craving, 
substance seeking, and subsequent attentional bias. This is what the fixed gaze task 
explored. Although substance seeking was not measured and craving was not found to be 
associated with the fixed gaze task, it was found that inhibitory failures were associated 
with heavy drinking. Therefore this chapter supports existing theories of substance use. 
Whether this task is a more sensitive measure of attentional bias is still open for debate. 
However, it would appear that measures of inhibition would benefit substance abuse 
diagnostic tools. A limitation with the fixed gaze task is the confounding distance variable. 
Further research would be required where varying the distance between fixation region and 
stimuli is not manipulated but kept constant. But by presenting stimuli peripherally, it was 
possible to investigate biases in preconscious processing. Franken (2003) stated that biases 
in preconscious processes were not associated with appetitive motivational states. 
Therefore, it would appear that this chapter adds to the literature by providing evidence
which could indicate such biases, as increased alcohol use leads to further distraction 
toward congruent peripherally presented stimuli.
Chapter 3 provided evidence that could demonstrate the potential robustness of 
attentional biases. It was hypothesised that alcohol attentional biases would remain 
constant, whilst MDMA attentional biases would fluctuate; based on assumptions made 
regarding consumption habits. Firstly, evidence was found to suggest an attentional bias for 
MDMA. Second, it was observed that attentional biases do not fluctuate to a large degree as 
a result o f use intention, suggesting that attentional biases may not be transient once they 
have been established. Thirdly, it was demonstrated that craving and outcome expectancies 
may not be associated with attentional biases. However this may again be a demonstration 
of the distinction between implicit and explicit measures. Explicit measures, such as 
outcome expectancies, may not be as accurate as implicit measures of substance abuse, 
such as attentional bias measures. This distinction is important in the development of 
screening tools for substance abuse, since implicit measures may be providing a more 
accurate measure of the relevant aspects o f substance abuse. Use intention was 
hypothesised to lead to attentional bias fluctuations as Field and Cox (2008) make the 
suggestion that stronger associations between craving and attentional biases would be 
observed when a substance is perceived as being available. However, this notion was not 
supported as attentional biases did not fluctuate as much as predicted. The dissociation 
between the Tiffany (1990) and Robinson and Berridge (1993) theories can be examined 
with the findings from this chapter. Within the alcohol condition, it was found that there 
was greater attentional bias when usage was not intended. This supports Robinson and 
Berridge (1993) who would predict that greater attentional bias would be observed when 
abstaining, due to stimuli being appetitive. Further research would be required, due to the 
limitations of this chapter. However, this finding would have large ramifications for the 
substance abuse literature if further supported.
With Chapter 5, the aim was to establish whether cognitive biases can affect how the 
environment is perceived. It was found that this was indeed the case during an alcohol and a 
food version of the task. The results would suggest that following the development of an 
attentional bias, an environment is perceived in a manner that reflects such a bias. 
Therefore, if an environment becomes increasingly filled with substance-related stimuli that
one becomes compelled to look at initially and uncontrollably (see Chapter 2), this in-turn 
may lead to further substance use. If this is the case, then attentional biases may play a 
causal role in substance use maintenance. These results support Tiffany (1990) who 
suggested that an environment would seemingly become increasingly occupied by alcohol- 
related stimuli as alcohol use increases. Such a finding demonstrates the importance of 
cognitive factors within substance abuse behaviour. If an environment is distorted in a way 
that constantly reminds a drinker of the positive nature of alcohol, then this will affect 
future substance seeking. Future PET research would benefit from measures of substance 
seeking behaviour, as this is an important step in validating any new substance abuse 
measure.
Also investigated within this thesis were the effects of automaticity development 
and whether deficits in automaticity development would lead to different patterns of 
substance use. In order to do this a population was used who are putatively impaired in 
automaticity development (Nicolson and Fawcett, 1990). Through the use of dyslexic 
participants it was found that there were differences in the reported substance use of 
dyslexics and non-dyslexic controls. However, by examining the attentional biases of 
dyslexics, it was not possible to observe broad differences between dyslexics and non- 
dyslexic controls. The results, however, would suggest that there were minor differences 
with regard to attentional biases. Also, within the SRTT it was observed that dyslexics may 
have different explicit learning strategies. This result may have implications for the 
automatisation hypothesis of dyslexia. As these results cannot be comprehended in a 
manner which would provide support for this theory of dyslexia. The priming study may 
indicate that dyslexics form habits related to substance use in the same way to non-dyslexic 
controls. This conclusion is supported by the observation that the same pattern of priming 
results was found for the two populations. Each of these sets of results could arguably be 
attributable to automaticity not being impaired within a dyslexic population. Such a finding 
may have wide reaching implications for how dyslexia is diagnosed and treated. It would 
appear that the automatisation deficit hypothesis of dyslexia (see Nicolson and Fawcett, 
1990) was not supported within this thesis. This supports previous research which may 
indicate that this theory of dyslexia is flawed (i.e. Beaton, 2002; Bishop, 2002). However, 
this is not the focus of this thesis. The utilisation of dyslexics within this thesis was to
explore automatic aspects of substance abuse. However, the lack of significant findings with 
the dyslexic population does not indicate that automaticity is not important within 
substance abuse. It was merely observed that dyslexics did not perform as would be 
expected should they be impaired in automatic skill development. In future, studies of 
automaticity and substance abuse would benefit from directly measuring automaticity 
development, rather than rely upon a group being impaired in its automaticity 
development.
With Chapter 7, the aim was to explore why some stimuli may develop automaticity 
whilst others do not. It was hypothesised that manipulation of different conditions would 
improve memory associations. Chapter 7 of the thesis suggests that automaticity develops 
more easily through semantic elaboration. Deeper processing of stimuli leads to more 
durable memory associations. This suggests that a deeper thinking about, e.g., alcohol than, 
e.g., water would lead to an attentional bias. The results provide support for current 
concern theories for substance abuse (e.g. Klinger and Cox, 2004), as a current concern may 
be analogous to a preoccupation with substance abuse. Thus attentional bias would be the 
result of deeper processing of stimuli which leads to stronger representations and 
associations with positive expectancies. Therefore, a current concern may develop 
automatically (cf. Tiffany, 1990) should substance use behaviour be repeated.
Within the thesis, it would appear that there are a number of implications for 
current theories. It would appear that Tiffany (1990) would be supported in terms of an 
environment becoming increasingly filled with alcohol-related stimuli for the HD and such 
stimuli automatically lead to an initial orienting of attention; a process which may be 
difficult to inhibit for the HD. Chapter 3 would indicate that the incentive salience theory of 
substance abuse (Robinson and Berridge, 1993) may explain attentional biases, as 
attentional biases are strongest when use was not intended (analogous to  when a substance 
would be seen as unavailable). However, it would appear to be more complicated than that. 
As Chapter 7 may indicate that a current concern (see Klinger and Cox, 2004) for substance 
abuse may develop through automaticity (cf. Tiffany, 1990). Further research in this area 
would be compelling. However, it appears that incentive salience, automaticity, and current 
concerns theories may all be complimentary and operating in parallel or within different 
stages of substance use behaviour.
It would appear that the largest limitation within the thesis was the adoption of a dyslexic 
population in the hope of measuring differences in substance abuse as a result of 
discrepancies with automatisation development. It would therefore appear that this thesis 
provides evidence contrary to that o f Nicolson and Fawcett (1990), regarding the cause of 
dyslexia. Yet automaticity would appear to be important for the development of substance 
abuse. An area for future research would be to investigate how a current concern for 
alcohol use may develop automatically through a deeper processing of alcohol-related 
stimuli. However, this is currently speculative. But such an investigation would benefit from 
providing direct measures of automaticity rather than rely on populations putatively 
impaired in automaticisation development.
8.3: Closing Remarks
Whether attentional biases play a causal role in substance abuse is inconclusive. However, it 
would seem that attentional biases play a considerable role in the maintenance of 
substance abuse behaviour. The fixed gaze inhibition task demonstrated that those who 
engage in frequent heavy drinking behaviour were unable to inhibit their attentional biases. 
This, together with the finding that alcohol stimuli are able to both hold and grab attention, 
suggests that a loss of control is involved in attention when drinking is problematic. This 
would further suggest that once someone becomes a heavy drinker then he/she loses some 
voluntary control over his/her drinking behaviour, as the mere sight of alcohol-related 
stimuli could be enough to lead to craving that could lead to substance seeking behaviour. 
This research therefore has implications for current UK government issues about policies 
regarding the removal of tobacco products from visible places, e.g. behind shop counters. 
This thesis (presuming that the alcohol findings are applicable to nicotine) would suggest 
that if a cigarette smoker were to see cigarettes then further smoking behaviour may be 
initiated. Therefore, by removing the stimuli, smoking may decrease. Such suggestions point 
to the importance of studying the psychological aspects of addiction, as cognitive 
intervention techniques may have beneficial effects for those who have substance abuse 
problems.
Attentional biases are theorised to be due to the repeated associations between 
substance cues and the effects of substances (Robinson and Berridge, 1993). A moderate 
correlation has been observed between attentional biases and craving (Field et al., 2009b).
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This may be explained by a direct effect o f attentional bias on behaviour in the absence of 
craving as a mediator either as a result o f habit (Tiffany, 1990) or as a result of incentive 
salience (Robinson and Berridge, 2001). Attentional bias has been found to be associated 
with a number of different factors associated with continued substance abuse behaviour. 
Studies have found an association between attentional bias and craving (Franken, 2003), 
severity of addiction (Bearre et al., 2007; Fadardi and Cox, 2006), poor treatment outcome 
(Carpenter et al., 2006), and relapse post-treatment (e.g. Cox et al., 2006). Indeed, amongst 
heavy drinkers, those with low attentional bias have better treatment outcomes than those 
with high attentional biases (Cox et al., 2007). Such findings demonstrate the importance of 
attentional biases within substance use. Therefore attentional bias interventions may be 
beneficial for those in substance abuse recovery. MacLeod et al. (2002) developed an 
attentional bias modification training computer programme for anxiety. A substance abuse 
version revealed promising results (Schoenmakers, Bruin, Lux, Goertz, Kerkhof, Wiers, 
2010).
Within the current thesis a method has been identified which may be a useful tool 
for the screening of cognitive biases in the PET. This is an implicit measure of substance use. 
This task may be beneficial for the screening of substance users and the task may have 
advantages over other cognitive bias measures which may be merely measuring explicit 
notions of a user's own substance use. More research is required before such conclusions 
are of course fully supported. It is suggested that this task be used with other clinical 
populations, but also within-subjects by varying the percentage of each word category for 
multiple testing sessions. Within this thesis, also developed, was an inhibition task. This task, 
although successfully used for screening, may also be useful as a tool for attentional bias 
modification, so may potentially be able to help with substance use problems. What the 
fixed gaze inhibition task is able to do is measure inhibition for alcohol stimuli. However, if 
this were to be adopted as an intervention task, it may be able to teach those with 
substance use problems to control their distractibility toward substance-related stimuli. This 
o f course is hypothetical. However, it does appear theoretically justifiable, as greater control 
over an ability to inhibit gaze toward substance-related stimuli could potentially lead to 
decreases in craving and substance seeking behaviour. It is suggested that further research 
into the association between performance on this task and substance seeking behaviour be
performed. As an orientation of attention is not always necessary for substance seeking 
behaviour (see Hogarth et al., 2008)
The distinction between implicit and explicit components of substance abuse would 
also appear to be important for future developments within the field of psychological 
addiction. It would appear that explicit awareness of stimuli is important for the 
development of automatic associations involved in substance abuse. Yet for the 
measurement of cognitive and attentional biases it is implicit measures which are more 
accurate. This may be due to the loss of control behaviour associated with substance abuse, 
and that once automatic associations are in place following an initial period of explicit 
awareness, then substance abuse behaviours may operate outside of awareness. This may 
suggest that implicit measures of substance abuse may be more accurate than explicit self- 
report measures. Such distinctions are hypothetical, but highlight that implicit and explicit 
components of substance abuse need to be considered when developing both screening 
and intervention techniques for substance abuse.
In conclusion, attentional biases appear to be robust and not transient, and not 
necessarily reliant upon use intention. They may maintain substance use and they may be 
involved in substance seeking behaviour. Cognitive biases lead to an environment seemingly 
becoming increasingly full of substance-related stimuli and this process occurs 
automatically, potentially outside of awareness. It would also appear that explicitly being 
aware of an association initiates the initial stage of attentional biases. Greater 
understanding of these processes has the potential to help people suffering from substance 
abuse problems.
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Appendix A
'General health7 questionnaire used in Chapter 2 in order to covertly inquire about alcohol 
usage.
Questionnaire
Read the questions carefully and be as honest as you can when answering 
them.
Please tick Yes or No to each question by using the number '1'.
Don't miss any questions out. If in doubt tick the answer that you 
feel is true most often.
You will encounter some questions that cannot be answered by 
either 'yes' or 'no'. For these questions, answer in the box provided.
Place a number T  in either YES or NO.
Yes No
EXAMPLE: 1
1. Do you find difficulty telling left from right?
2. Is map reading or finding your way to a strange place confusing?
3. Do you dislike reading aloud?
4. Do you take longer than you should to read a page of a book?
5. Do you find it difficult to remember the sense of what you have 
read?
6. Do you dislike reading long books?
7. Is your spelling poor?
8. Is your writing difficult to read?
9. Do you get confused if you have to speak in public?
10. Do you find it difficult to take messages on the telephone and 
pass them on correctly?
11. When you say a long word, do you sometimes find it difficult to 
get all the sounds in the right order?
12. Do you find it difficult to do sums in your head without using 
your fingers or paper?
13. When using the telephone, do you tend to get the numbers 
mixed up when you dial?
14. Do you find it difficult to say the months of the year forwards in 
a fluent manner?
15. Do you find it difficult to say the months of the year backwards?
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16. Do you mix up dates and times and miss appointments?
17. When writing cheques do you frequently find yourself making 
mistakes?
18. Do you find forms difficult and confusing?
19. Do you mix up bus numbers like 95 and 59?
20. Did you find it hard to learn your multiplication tables at school?
21. Do you consider yourself to be under stress?
22. Have you ever had surgery?
23. Have you ever broken any bones?
24. Do you experience stiff, swollen or painful joints?
26. Do you experience fatigue or lack of energy?
27. What is your current weight?
28. How many hours do you spend in front of a computer per day?
29. How many hours sleep do you get everyday?
30. How many hours exercise do you get per week?
31. How many alcohol units do you drink per week? (Please use the 
calculator b e l o w ) ______________________
Alcohol Calculator
Alcopop
Lager, Bottle
Wine, Small Glass
Wine, Large Glass
Spirit (eg Vodka, Whiskey, Gin, etc.)+ Mixer
Pint
Shot (eg. Tequila, sambuca, etc.
32. What is your Daily Dietary Intake for the following:
No. of cups of coffee
No. of cups of tea
Glasses of Coke/Soda
Glasses of milk
Glasses of water
Portions of vegetables
Amount of sugar
 Chocolates
Sweets
How 
many per 
week
TOTAL
Portions of fruit
Appendix B
Alcohol craving questionnaire used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Questionnaire
Read the questions carefully and be as honest as you can when 
answering them.
Please state how strongly the statements relate to your own behaviour by using 
the number '1'. Don't miss any questions out. If in doubt tick the answer that you 
feel is true most often.
Strongly
Agree
Agree
i
Som
ewh 
at agree
i
N
either 
Agree 
or
H
k
ao
rp
p
Som
ewh
at
Disagree
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
EXAMPLE
1
1 would accept a drink if it was offered to me 
now
Drinking now would make the good things in 
my life appear even better
1 am missing having a drink now
It would feel as if the bad things in my life had 
completely disappeared if 1 drank now
1 could easily limit how much alcohol 1 would 
drink if 1 had a drink now
1 need a drink now
My desire to drink now seems overwhelming
Even major problems in my life would not 
bother me now if 1 drank
1 am making plans to drink now
Drinking now would make me feel on top of 
the world
Drinking now would make me feel less tense
Drinking would be satisfying now
1 would do almost anything to have a drink now
Drinking now would make the bad things in my 
life seem less bad
1 crave a drink now
1 would feel more in control of things if 1 drank
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now
1 would consider having a drink now
Drinking would be wonderful now
1 might like a drink now
Nothing would be better than drinking now
Drinking now would make me feel good
If 1 drank now, the small daily hassles would 
feel less important
If 1 had the chance to use alcohol now, 1 think 1 
would drink
1 have an urge to drink now
1 want a drink so much, 1 can almost taste it
Drinking would be pleasant now
1 would feel less worried about my daily 
problems if 1 drank now
1 have a desire to drink now
1 am thinking of ways to get alcohol
1 would like a drink now
Drinking now would make me feel less stressed
1 will have a drink now, whatever gets in the 
way
Drinking now would make things seem just 
perfect
1 am going to drink as soon as 1 possibly can
If 1 started drinking now, 1 would be able to 
stop
All my tension would disappear if 1 drank now
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Appendix C
MDMA craving measure from Chapter 3 -  Parrott (unpublished). When calculating a 
participant's score, a 'not at all' response would be assigned a value of 0. Also, 'slightly' to 'very 
strongly' responses received values from 1 to 4 respectively. Therefore, a high craving score 
would indicate stronger craving.
Self-Report Measure of Craving for 
MDMA/ecstasy
Place a ' I 1 in the appropriate box
Not
at
all Slightly Moderately Strongly
Very
strongly
EXAMPLE 1
1. 1 crave ecstasy right now.
2. Sometimes 1 want to take ecstasy -  even in 
situations where it is not really possible.
3. If 1 used ecstasy now, 1 would feel more 
accepted by everyone.
4. When dancing or partying -  1 need to take 
ecstasy.
5. 1 would feel more emotionally aware if 1 used 
ecstasy now.
6. When on-ecstasy 1 feel more energetic.
7. 1 have an urge to use or take some ecstasy.
8. When on-ecstasy everyone generally is much 
nicer.
9. Taking ecstasy would make me feel better right 
now.
10. When planning to take ecstasy - my desire for 
it gradually becomes stronger.
11. If a friend offered me some Ecstasy right now -  
1 would take it.
12. Nothing is better than being-on ecstasy.
13. 1 would love some ecstasy right now.
14. When partying 1 cannot really enjoy myself 
without taking ecstasy.
15. 1 want some ecstasy now - and do not care how 
pure it is.
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16. I plan my weekends around when and where I 
can get ecstasy._____________________________
17. I would like to score some ecstasy right now.
18. Handling the pills is part of the enjoyment of 
using ecstasy._______________________________
19. I want to be with friends now - all of us on 
ecstasy.____________________________________
20. I love the build-up of anticipation before taking 
ecstasy____________________________________
24
Appendix D
Outcome expectancies measure from  Chapter 3 -  Engels and Bogt (2004).
Which of the following do you associate with ecstasy/MDMA  
use?
Place a T  in the appropriate box
Not at 
all Slightly Moderately Strongly
Very
strongly
EXAMPLE 1
get into music totally
makes everything more beautiful
dance endlessly
more fun with others
having in-depth discussions with others
more sensitive
makes me a better lover
confusion
lack of control
suspiciousness
touching is nicer
nausea
fear
edginess
makes it easier to communicate
self insight
depressive/feeling low,
fainting
cuddly ('feeling to urge to cuddle')
headache
euphoria
more open for others
joyfull
full of energy
nice to dance with others
have better sex
getting into a fantastic mood
making love is nicer
 I 250
get to know oneself better
kissing is nicer
dancing is so nice
dizziness
feeling incredibly well
makes me a nicer person
aggression
2
Appendix E
Alcohol outcome expectancies measure from Chapter 3 -  Leigh and Stacy (1993)
Alcohol Questionnaire
Here is a list of some effects or consequences that some people experience after drinking alcohol. How 
likely is it that these things
happen to you when you drink alcohol? Please circle the number that best describes how drinking 
alcohol would affect you.
(If you do not drink at all, you can still fill this out: just answer it according to what you think would 
happen to you if you did drink.)
Place a '1' in the appropriate box.
When 1 drink alcohol:
?"
No
Chance
Very
Unlikely Unlikely Likely
Very
Likely
Certain
to
Happen
0 EXAMPLE 1
1 1 become clumsy or uncoordinated
2 1 am less alert
3 1 feel less stressed
4
It takes away my negative moods and 
feelings
5 1 get a headache
6 1 feel more social
7 1 feel ashamed of myself
8 1 am more sexually assertive
9 1 feel guilty
10 It is fun
11 1 have problems driving
12 1 have a good time
13 1 feel happy
14 1 am more sexually responsive
15 1 am more outgoing
16 1 am friendlier
17 1 feel sick
18 1 feel pleasant physical effects
19 1 feel good
20 1 am able to talk more freely
21 1 become more sexually active
22 It is easier for me to socialize
23 1 get mean
24
1 have problems with memory and 
concentration
25 1 enjoy the buzz
26 1 feel sad or depressed
27 1 get a hangover
28 1 get into fights
29 1 can't concentrate
30
1 am able to take my mind off my 
problems
31 1 experience unpleasant physical effects
32 1 have more desire for sex
33 1 am more accepted socially
34 1 become aggressive
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Appendix F
Mood question from Chapter 3 -  Stayer et al (1997)
MOOD
QUESTIONNAIRE
Place a T  in the appropriate box
Definitely
Not Not
Not
Really A Little
Very
Much Extremely
0 EXAMPLE 1
1 content
2 rested
3 restless
4 bad
5 worn-out
6 composed
7 tired
8 great
9 uneasy
1
0 energetic
1
1 uncomfortable
1
2 relaxed
1
3 highly activated
1
4 superb
1
5 absolutely calm
1
6 sleepy
1
7 good
1
8 at ease
1
9 unhappy
2
0 alert
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2
1 discontent
2
2 tense
2
3 fresh
2
4 happy
2
5 nervous
2
6 exhausted
2
7 calm
2
8 wide awake
2
9 wonderful
3
0 deeply relaxed
Appendix G
Alcohol use questionnaire from  Chapter 3
Male Female
Sex
Years
Age
Yes No
Dyslexia
Yes No
Seaking drug/alcohol treatment?
Yes No
Currently employed?
Yes No
Currently studying?
GCSE ALEVEL DEGREE PostGrad
What is your highest level of 
education?
Today Tomorrow
This
week
Next
week
This
month Longer
When do you next intend to have 
a drink?
Today Tomorrow
This
week
Next
week
This
month Longer
When do you next intend to get 
drunk?
Today Yesterday
2 days 
ago
3 days 
ago
Week
ago Longer
When did you last have a drink?
Today Yesterday
2 days 
ago
3 days 
ago
Week
ago Longer
When did you last get drunk?
0-5
units
6-10
units
11-15
units
16-20
units
21- 25 
units
26 + 
units
Typically, how much alcohol 
would you drink on a nightout?
< 10 
units
11-20
units
21-30
units
31-40
units
41-50
units
>51
units
Typically, how much alcohol do 
you drinker per week?
Yes No
256 n ___
Do you use mix your drinks on a 
nightout?
Beer Lager Cider Wine spirits Alcopops
What drinks do you consume on a 
typical night?
Week
s Months Years
How long have you been getting 
drunk? (insert estimated 
numbers)
Total
How many occasions have you 
ever been drinking in the last 30 
days? (rough estimate)
Yes No
Do you go on nights out without 
drinking?
alm
ost
never
(not
Som
etim
 
es (quite 
difficult)
O
ften
(very
difficult)
= J CD
p -  <"d  ;
■ - D  $  CD c
• o Qj „
£  • <  * <  -i 
in ­
Do you think that your use of 
alcohol was out of control?
Does the prospect of not drinking 
make you feel anxious or 
worried?
Do you worry about your use of 
alcohol?
Do you wish you could stop 
drinking alcohol?
How difficult do you find it to stop 
or go without alcohol?
Yes No
Do you use alcohol weekly?
Have you had a recent alcohol 
binge?
Experienced social problems
Experienced financial problems
Experienced legal problems
Experienced work problems
Vomited due to alcohol?
Accessed health services (first aid, 
ambulance, hospital, or GP) due 
to alcohol use
Accessed talk therapy (counsellor, 
social worker, or psychiatrist) due 
to alcohol
Alcohol Units Guide:
Alcopop 1.4
Lager, Bottle 1.7
Wine, Small Glass 1.5
Wine, Large Glass 2.1
Spirit + Mixer 2.0
Pint 2.5
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Appendix H
MDMA use questionnaire from Chapter 3.
Male Female
Sex
Years
Age
Yes No
Dyslexia
Yes No
Seaking drug treatment?
Yes No
Currently employed?
Yes No
Currently studying?
<GCSE GCSE ALEVEL
DEGRE
E
PostGra
d
What is your highest level of education?
Today
Tomorro
w
This
week
Next
week
This
month Longjer
When do you next intend to use 
ecstasy/MDMA?
Today
Yesterd a
y
2 days 
ago
3 days 
ago
Week
ago Long£L
ills
re
ia
m
—
When did you last use ecstasy/MDMA
1 pill 2 pills 3 pills 4 pills 5 pills 6 + p
Typically, how much ecstasy would you 
use on a nightout?
Less
than
1/4
gram 1/4 gram
1/2
gram
3/4
gram 1 gram
Mo
thar
gra
Typically, how much MDMA would you 
use on a nightout?
Yes No
Do you use ecstasy/MDMA with other 
drugs on a nightout?
Cocaine
Ampheta
mine
Cannab
is
Popper
s
Ketami
ne LS
What other drugs do you use?
Weeks Months Years
259 K
How long have you been taking 
ecstasy/MDMA? (insert estimated 
numbers)
Ecstasy MDMA
How many occasions have you taken 
ecstasy/MDMA?
Yes No
Do you go on nights out without taking 
ecstasy/MDMA?
Never/
almost
never
(not
difficult
)
Sometim 
es (quite 
difficult)
Often
(very
difficult
)
Always/
nearly
always
(imposs
ible)
Do you think that your use of ecstasy was 
out of control?
Does the prospect of missing a dose 
make you feel anxious or worried?
Do you worry about your use of ecstasy?
Do you wish you could stop using 
ecstasy?
How difficult do you find it to stop or go 
without ecstasy?
Yes No
Do you use ecstasy weekly?
Have you had a recent drug binge, where 
you haven't slept for over 48 hours?
Experienced social problems
Experienced financial problems
Experienced legal problems
Experienced work problems
'Overdose' attributed to ecstasy
Accessed health services (first aid, 
ambulance, hospital, or GP) due to 
ecstasy use
Accessed talk therapy (counsellor, social 
worker, or psychiatrist) due to ecstasy
Appendix I
AUDIT questionnaire from Chapter 4, 5 and 6.
Alcohol Use Questionnaire
Read the questions carefully. Record your responses carefully in the box 
provided.
Place the appropriate answer number in the box at the 
right.
1. How often do you have a drink containing 
alcohol?
(0) Never [Skip to Qs 9-10]
(1) Monthly or less
(2) 2 to 4 times a month
(3) 2 to 3 times a week
(4) 4 or more times a week
2. How many drinks containing alcohol do you 
have
on a typical day when you are drinking?
(0) 1 or 2
(1)3 or 4
(2)5 or 6
(3) 7, 8, or 9
(4) 10 or more
3. How often do you have six or more drinks on 
one
occasion?
(0) Never
(1) Less than monthly
(2) Monthly
(3) Weekly
(4) Daily or almost daily
Skip to Questions 9 and 10 if Total Score 
for Questions 2 and 3 = 0
4. How often during the last year have you found 
that you were not able to stop drinking once you 
had started?
(0) Never
(1) Less than monthly
(2) Monthly
(3) Weekly
(4) Daily or almost daily
5. How often during the last year have you failed 
to
do what was normally expected from you 
because of drinking?
(0) Never
(1) Less than monthly
(2) Monthly
(3) Weekly
(4) Daily or almost daily
6. How often during the last year have you 
needed
a first drink in the morning to get yourself going 
after a heavy drinking session?
(0) Never
(1) Less than monthly
(2) Monthly
(3) Weekly
(4) Daily or almost daily
7. How often during the last year have you had a 
feeling of guilt or remorse after drinking?
(0) Never
(1) Less than monthly
(2) Monthly
(3) Weekly
(4) Daily or almost daily
8. How often during the last year have you been 
unable to remember what happened the night 
before because you had been drinking?
(0) Never
(1) Less than monthly
(2) Monthly
(3) Weekly
9. Have you or someone else been injured as a 
result of your drinking?
(0) No
(2) Yes, but not in the last year
(4) Yes, during the last year
10. Has a relative or friend or a doctor or another 
health worker been concerned about your 
drinking
or suggested you cut down?
(0) No
(2) Yes, but not in the last year
(4) Yes, during the last year
Appendix J
Alcohol PET stimuli from Chapter 5.
Flute Shorts Bongos Bitter
Trombone Bar Window Cello
Trumpet Invitation Alcopops Piano
Queue Building Whiskey Violin
Lager Mirror Bassoon Beer
Card Telephone Clarinet Mouse
Viola Shoe Oboe Read
Brandy Gin Chain Pint
Floor Off-licence Keyboard Vodka
Drink Bass Drums Bagpipes
Booze Pan Carpet Watch
Box Lamp Recorder Maracas
Alcohol Windshield Guitar Stout
Key Banjo Wine Cape
Sherry Boots Pub Spirits
Appendix K
Alcohol PET questions from Chapter 5.
Questions
What percentage of the word list was music related?_________________ %
What percentage of the word list was alcohol related?________________ %
What percentage of the word list was neither music nor alcohol related?
 %
Do you play a musical instrument?
YES/NO
Appendix L
Food PET stimuli from Chapter 5
Road Cheese Pastry Source
Railway Available Station Bus
Lentils Legislate Principle Ticket
Method Contract Airport Train
Milk Export Journey Proceed
Individual Process Parking Indicate
Bicycle Period Cake Concept
Boat Chips Potato Chocolate
Traffic Data Candies Butter
Passport Grapes Rice Onion
Salad Tram Car Sugar
Airplane Grease Section Driving
Taxi Area Apples Assume
Vary Burgers Moped Beans
Estimate Bread Similar Ship
Appendix M
Food PET questions from Chapter 5.
Questions
What percentage of the word list was transport related?_________________ %
What percentage of the word list was food related?________________ %
What percentage of the word list was neither transport nor food related?
 %
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Appendix N
Current Concerns word verification pilot. Note that these are the word stimuli and concerns 
categories used within the task within Chapter 5.
Home 
and 
Household 
M
atters
Em
ploym
ent and 
Finances
Health 
and 
M
edical 
M
atters
Partner, Fam
ily, 
and 
Relatives
Alcohol Related 
M
atters
Educational
M
atters
Recreation 
M
atters
Transportation
M
atters
Partner
Job
Kids
Husband
Laundry
Mother
Employer
Drugs
Car
Party
Bank
School
Gardening
Grade
Pub
Hangover
Pain
Bicycle
Traffic
Argument
Nightclub
Investments
Ironing
Bus
Lecture
Sport
Revision
Moped
Cleaning
Music
J 268
Train
Study
Drink
Depression
Plane
Television
Coursework
Teacher
Shopping
Wine
Theatre
Relationship
Illness
Debt
Cooking
Money
Vodka
Loan
Surgeon
Friendship
Cinema
Skate
Exam
Walk
Vacuuming
Pint
Pharmacy
Career
Bar
Quiz
Dentist
Doctor
Weight
Medication
Polishing
Sex
Library
Washing
Gym
Whiskey
Girlfriend
Interview
Appendix O
Current concerns questions from Chapter 5.
Questions
What percentage of the word list was related to:
(Do not worry if your percentages do not exactly add up to 100%)
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
%
- Home and Household Matters
- Employment and Finances
- Health and Medical Matters
- Partner, Family, and Relatives
- Alcohol Related Matters
- Educational Matters
- Recreation Matters
- Transportation Matters
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Appendix Q
UEL substance abuse questionnaire 
used in Chapter 6 -  Parrott (200a) and 
CAGE (Ewing, 1984).
Drug Use Questionnaire
1. Alcohol. Tobacco and Cannabis Use
Please indicate your answer by pressing the number '1' in the appropriate box. 
EXAMPLE:
NO YES
Have you ever smoked tobacco?
Do you smoke tobacco now?
If YES, how many cigarettes do you smoke per day on average?
Do you drink alcohol?
If YES, how many units of alcohol do you drink in a typical week?
Do you smoke cannabis?
If YES, how many times do you smoke per month of average?
2. Other Drug Use
Which of the following drugs have you taken (indicate with a number '1'), and approximately how matiy 
life time?
EXAMPLE: 12
NO YES
How many 
times? Prefer not to say
Ecstacy/MDMA
Amphetamine
Cocaine/Crack
LSD
Cannabis
Barbiturates/
Benzodiazepines (eg 
Valium)
Opiates (Heroin, 
Morphine)
Magic Mushrooms
Anabolic Steroids
Solvents
Poppers
Ketamine
Prozac
Others (Please specify and indicate how often used, 
as above):__________________________________
3. Alcohol Use
Each item of this questionnaire is a question that a person may either agree with or disagree with. 
For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the item says.
Please respond to all the items; do not leave any blank.
Choose only one response to each statement. Please be as 
accurate and honest as you can be.
276
Choose from the following four response 
options:
Very true for Somewhat false for
me Somewhat true for me me Very false for me
1 2  3 4
Question
Your
Response
Have you ever felt the need to cut down on your drinking?
Have you ever felt annoyed by criticism of your drinking?
Have you ever had guilty feelings of your drinking?
Have you ever taken a morning eye opener?
27
Appendix R
ADC Dyslexia questionnaire used in Chapter 6 - Vinegrad (1994).
Dyslexia Questionnaire
Look at the questions in the checklist. The questions are all related to different areas of 
dyslexia.
Read the questions carefully and be as honest as you can when answering 
them.
Please tick Yes or No to each question by using the number '1'. 
Don't miss any questions out. If in doubt tick the answer that you 
feel is true most often.
Place a number '1' in either YES or NO.
Yes No
EXAMPLE: 1
1. Do you find difficulty telling left from right?
2. Is map reading or finding your way to a strange place confusing?
3. Do you dislike reading aloud?
4. Do you take longer than you should to read a page of a book?
5. Do you find it difficult to remember the sense of what you have 
read?
6. Do you dislike reading long books?
7. Is your spelling poor?
8. Is your writing difficult to read?
9. Do you get confused if you have to speak in public?
10. Do you find it difficult to take messages on the telephone and 
pass them on correctly?
11. When you say a long word, do you sometimes find it difficult to 
get all the sounds in the right order?
12. Do you find it difficult to do sums in your head without using 
your fingers or paper?
13. When using the telephone, do you tend to get the numbers 
mixed up when you dial?
14. Do you find it difficult to say the months of the year forwards in 
a fluent manner?
15. Do you find it difficult to say the months of the year backwards?
16. Do you mix up dates and times and miss appointments?
278
17. When writing cheques do you frequently find yourself making 
mistakes?
18. Do you find forms difficult and confusing?
19. Do you mix up bus numbers like 95 and 59?
20. Did you find it hard to learn your multiplication tables at school?
Have you ever been diagnosed with dyslexia?
27
Appendix S
ADHD questionnaire used in Chapter 6 -  Jasper and Goldberg (1995).
Attention Deficit Questionnaire
In s t ru c t io n s :  The 24 items below refer to how you have behaved and fe lt DURING 
MOST OF YOUR ADULT LIFE. I f  you have usually been one way and recently have 
changed, your responses should reflect HOW YOU HAVE USUALLY BEEN. For each 
item, indicate the extent to which it is true by checking the appropriate box next to 
the item.
Place the appropriate answer number in the box provided.
1. At home, work, or school, I find my mind wandering from tasks that are uninteresting or difficult.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
2 .1 find it difficult to read written material unless it is very interesting or very easy.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
3. Especially in groups, I find it hard to stay focused on what is being said in conversations.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
280
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
4 .1 have a quick temper... a short fuse.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
5 .1 am irritable, and get upset by minor annoyances.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
6 .1 say things without thinking, and later regret having said them.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
7 .1 make quick decisions without thinking enough about their possible bad results.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
8. My relationships with people are made difficult by my tendency to talk first and think later. 
0 Not at all
28
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
9. My moods have highs and lows.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
10.1 have trouble planning in what order to do a series of tasks or activities.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
11.1 easily become upset.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
12.1 seem to be thin skinned and many things upset me.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
13.1 almost always am on the go.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
14.1 am more comfortable when moving than when sitting still.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
15. In conversations, I start to answer questions before the questions have been fully asked.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
16 .1 usually work on more than one project at a time, and fail to finish many of 
them.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
17. There is a lot of "static" or "chatter" in my head.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
28
5 Very much
18. Even when sitting quietly, I am usually moving my hands or feet.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
19. In group activities it is hard for me to wait my turn.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
20. My mind gets so cluttered that it is hard for it to function.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
21. My thoughts bounce around as if my mind is a pinball machine.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
22. My brain feels as if it is a television set with all the channels going at once.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
284 I___
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
23.1 am unable to stop daydreaming.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
24 .1 am distressed by the disorganized way my brain works.
0 Not at all
1 Just a little
2 Somewhat
3 Moderately
4 Quite a lot
5 Very much
28
Appendix T
Priming questionnaire from Chapter 6 -  Studying.
Please answer each question in turn within the spaces provided next to 
beneath each question. (Please keep answers brief)
1. How im portant to you is studying?
2. Do your friends ever pressure you into studying?
3. Which night(s) do you normally study during a regular week?
4. Do you study as much as you would like to?
5. Do you study better alone?
6. W here do you normally study?
7. Is studying normally a highlight of your week?
8. How many times have you been out drinking in the last tw o weeks?
9. How many times have you been drunk in the last tw o weeks?
10. How long is it since you last w ent drinking? (in days),
11. How many units did you consume the last tim e you w ent 
drinking (1 unit = 1 /2  pint or one shot)?
12. On the line below mark (with an X) how strong your typical urge
to drink alcohol is:
Strong urge W eak urge
J 28
Appendix U
Priming questionnaire from Chapter 6 -  Socialising.
Please answer each question in turn within the spaces provided next to or 
beneath each question. (Please keep answers brief)
1. How im portant to you is going out to socialise?
2. Do your friends ever pressure you into socialising?
3. Which night(s) do you go out to socialise during a regular week?
4. Do you socialise as much as you would like to?
5. W hat things do you usually do with your friends when socialising?
6. W here do you normally socialise with your friends?
7. Is socialising normally a highlight of your week?
8. How many times have you been out drinking in the last tw o weeks?
9. How many times have you been drunk in the last tw o weeks?
10. How long is it since you last went drinking? (in days)
11. How many units did you consume the last tim e you w ent 
drinking (1 unit = 1 /2  pint or one shot)?
*12. On the line below mark (with an X) how strong your typical urge
to drink alcohol is:
Strong urge W eak urge
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(see Researcher Documentation for details).
1
Department of
Psychology
ETHICS
COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Thom Wilcockson
From: Professor Ian Thornton
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Dr. Emmanuel Pothos
Date: Tuesday, 6th January, 2009
Re: The co morbidity of dyslexia and substance abuse
Your proposed study, ’’The co morbidity of dyslexia and substance abuse”, has now 
been reviewed. Provided the information obtained is kept absolutely confidential and 
that no personally identifiable information is entered on computer, it was agreed that 
no substantive ethical issues are raised and you may therefore proceed with your 
study. Please note that the study is approved subject to comments contained in my 
email to you dated 18th December 2008.
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Please note that because the EMS system has been modified, an EMS Approval 
Code and Date of Expiry are no longer required.
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COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Thomas Wilockson
From: Dr. Steve Stewart-Williams
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Dr. Emmanuel Pothos
Date: Monday, 23rd August, 2010
Re: Priming and dyslexia
Your proposed study, “Priming and dyslexia”, has now been reviewed. Provided the 
information obtained is kept absolutely confidential and that no personally 
identifiable information is entered on computer, it was agreed that no substantive 
ethical issues are raised and you may therefore proceed with your study.
Please ensure that the signed copy of your Ethical Approval, together with any other 
paperwork associated with your research, is included in your final write up.
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To: Thomas Wilcockson Student No. 292017
From: Professor Ian Thornton
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Dr. Emmanuel Pothos
Date: 28th March, 2011
Re: Making Associations Automatic
Your proposed study, “Making Associations Automatic”, has been reviewed and is 
approved. Provided that the information obtained is kept absolutely confidential and 
that no personally identifiable information is entered on computer, you may proceed 
with your study.
Please ensure that the signed copy of this Ethical Approval, together with any other 
paperwork associated with your research, is included in your final write up.
In order for your study to be displayed on the Experiment Management System 
(Subject Pool):
1. Leave a copy of this approval letter in the folder outside Dr. Irene Reppa’s office 
(room 915b)
AND
2. Send a request for your study to be made visible, via the link on the EMS website 
(see Researcher Documentation for details).
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